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The Delegation of Law-Making Authority to the United States Forest Service: 
Implications in the Struggle for National Forest Management
Chair: David H. Jackson
This paper presents a descriptive assessment of the presence of legislative delegation by 
the United States Congress to the United States Forest Service. The central tenet is an 
analysis o f both the presence, and the impacts, delegation has had on the ability of the 
Forest Service to identify and accomplish a distinct agency mission.
The presence or absence of delegation by the United States Congress was established by 
employing formulae developed by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999). The formulae produce 
a relative means for measuring the extent to which statutes exhibit delegation, constraints, 
and discretion to an executive agency. The Organic Administration Act (1897, and as 
amended), the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (1960), the National Forest 
Management Act (1976), and the National Forest Timber Reform Act of 1975 (S.2926), 
were analyzed, all five exhibiting varying degrees of delegation, with the Organic 
Administration Act and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act exhibiting the most 
delegation and affording the Forest Service the highest degree of discretion.
The paper presents a description o f the conflict intensive environment in which the 
Forest Service manages, and how delegation is both a cause and a result of this conflict. 
Specific problems related to conflict are discussed, including litigation, administrative 
appeals, and the nature o f national forest outputs. The impact of delegation on two other 
Forest Service facets is also addressed: the budget process and the use of administrative 
regulations. Delegation appears to exacerbate the already complex budget process and 
contributes to the difficulty in matching agency funding to the agency missions. The 
administrative regulations too are subject to delegation, illustrated with examples of the 
current problems associated with the roadless initiative and the NFMA planning 
regulations.
The paper concludes by suggesting that imprecise management direction from the 
Congress has created or facilitated the current Forest Service management crisis. The 
suggested remedies focus upon revising Congressional incentives to delegate, and the 
formation of a new Public Land Law Review Commission to address these specific 
concerns.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
There was a time when the forest industry enjoyed the admiration o f  
society. Paul Bunyan, Smokey the Bear, and hard working 
lumberjacks were respected fo r  the roles they played in providing us 
with wood and protecting us from fire. This respect has been 
severely eroded by the anti-forestry movement, which portrays 
foresters and loggers as either tools o f  greedy capitalists or 
unthinking destroyers o f  the environment. How can this trend be 
reversed so the general public once again respect the hard work 
done to provide society with its most renewable material resource?
Patrick Moore1
Professor David Schoenbrod entitled his book on legislative delegation, Power 
Without Responsibility, How the Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation. In an 
application of his theories to the United States Forest Service, perhaps a revised title 
might read Power Without Responsibility, How Congress Abuses the People and the 
Forest Service Through Delegation. Congress, in this particular case, has not limited 
itself to an unfocused public disservice, but rather has elected to see a once model federal 
bureaucracy criticized, crippled, and castrated to the point that a book entitled A Burning 
Issue, A Case for Abolishing the U.S. Forest Service2, could even be published. I do not 
dispute Professor Nelson's findings nor his arguments, but rather find it disturbing how 
an agency with a century of experience managing the largest parcels of land ownership in 
the United States could have arrived at such a place.3 It is generally a rare occurrence for
1 P a t r i c k  M o o r e ,  G r e e n s p i r i t :  t r e e s  a r e  t h e  a n s w e r  143 (2000).
• R o b e r t  H. N e ls o n ,  A B u r n in g  Is s u e , A C a s e  f o r  A b o l i s h in g  t h e  U.S. F o r e s t  S e r v ic e  (2000).
3 Gifford Pinchot best sums up the historic nature o f  the Forest Service: “The Forest Service was generally 
recognized as the best government organization o f its day. It set a new standard o f  efficiency in
1
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an executive agency to be disbanded, particularly one with the Forest Service’s 
longevity.4 Surely it has, and will occur, but in rare instances. To consider the Forest 
Service one o f those rare candidates for agency dissolution requires an acceptance that 
there are fundamental problems, unresolved or incapable of resolution, in the agency’s 
mission and the agency’s effectiveness, and that its existence is no longer warranted.
The agency’s decline is in no small part a result of the wrong the Congress has
done the agency, and in a way, done the public as well. In their own self-interest, the
members of Congress have failed to grapple with the difficult and volatile issues of
public land management. They have failed to make their will, and thereby the public’s
will, clear and unequivocal; and have failed to account for the tenacious nature of
environmentalists and would-be natural resource managers, each seeming to have a
vision or version of how best to manage public lands, to whom a compromise won is but
a reason to seek another. This ongoing underestimation has been coupled with a dramatic
increase in public involvement in the management of federal natural resources. The
difficulty in the failure by Congress to perceive the heightened public interest in national
forest decision-making was artfully described by Marion Clawson:
One of the truly difficult problems in public participation, both for 
the planner and the serious and responsible private group, is to find 
some means of screening out the obviously stupid, naive, and self- 
serving suggestions of some members of the public, without at the 
same time discouraging genuine and sensible participation by the 
concerned public. Any public enterprise seems to attract a share of 
irresponsible self-appointed intervenors, whose major interest is 
entertainment and self-aggrandizement. Such people cannot reject 
any opportunity to speak in public and to seize, if only for a
W ashington. That was because it had a great purpose and knew that it had, and because it was organized 
on the principle o f  individual recognition and responsibility.” B r e a k in g  N ew  G r o u n d  281-282 (1947).
4 A n t h o n y  Do w n s , In s id e  B u r e a u c r a c y  20  (1966).
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moment, a degree of public attention—like the naughty boy at the 
party who would rather be noticed and despised than ignored.5
The result has been that the United States Forest Service has been at the fore o f 
some of the most protracted and heated administrative controversies of the last forty 
years. While the history and bases of the particular criticisms of this agency have varied, 
it is a central tenet that a prevailing and fundamental flaw may exist in the legislative 
source of this agency's management authority.
The Forest Service has been tasked with managing and regulating vast natural
resources by virtue of the statutory edicts of the United States Congress. Congressional
direction to the Forest Service has been less than specific, affording little in the way o f an
concrete agency mission. Consequently, the Forest Service's attempts at resource
management have been plagued by controversy and litigation, ultimately imbuing the
agency with a sort of administrative schizophrenia, unable to identify or even recognize
its mission. The cause, I posit, is that the Congress, by enacting broad, vague legislation,
with accompanying directives to the Forest Service to meet various and oft conflicting
goals, has left the Forest Service saddled with the unenviable task of interpreting
amorphous statutes; the whipping boy for the public’s ire when the agency misinterprets
Congressional intent. As has recently been observed:
The purposes of the national forests and public lands are no longer 
clear...The management planning process for the national forests 
and the public lands cannot resolve basic differences in values.6
5 M a r io n  C l a w s o n , T h e  F ed er a l  L a n d s  R e v isit e d  256 (1983).
3
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O f course, it may be a polite understatement to imply that the purposes of the national 
forests have only recently become unclear; it may be accurate to state that the purposes 
have been unclear for at least the last 40 years.
In analyzing the role that such goal-based legislation plays, David Schoenbrod has
made the useful distinction between goal statute and rule statutes:
Rules statutes state rules demarcating permissible from 
impermissible conduct; the job of deciding what these rules mean in 
particular situations is interpretation. Goals statutes state goals, 
which usually conflict, and delegate the job of reconciling any such 
conflicts to others who are entrusted with promulgating the rules of 
conduct necessary to achieve those goals. Goals statutes delegate 
legislative power.7
Goals statutes with the accompanying delegation of law-making authority can reflect a
reluctance or unwillingness to accept responsibility for the costs of broadly drawn
legislation. Schoenbrod notes that:
Given the political nature of the legislative process, a goals statute 
is likely to express popular hopes that are inherently contradictory 
and the leave the delegate with the unhappy job of dealing with the 
people’s disappointments and conflicts. In a goals statute, the 
legislature therefore tends to do only half a job— to distribute 
benefits without taking responsibility for the costs. The bill for the 
benefits comes later and on the agency’s letterhead. The agency 
gets the blame while Congress gets only the praise.8
Scholars have addressed generally the Congressional delegation o f law-making 
authority;9 and while many arguments have been set forth that such delegation is
6 D o n a ld  W. F lo y d ,  e d . F o r e s t  o f  D is c o r d  50 (1999).
7 David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1223, 1224(1985).
8 Id. at 1254.
9 D a v id  S c h o e n b r o d ,  P o w e r  W i t h o u t  R e s p o n s ib i l i ty :  H o w  C o n g r e s s  A b u s e s  t h e  P e o p le  T h r o u g h  
D e l e g a t i o n  (1993); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise o f  the Administrative State, 107 H a r v .  L. R ev .
4
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violative of the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court, since the New Deal era of 
the 1930’s, has not seriously limited the Congressional trend to delegate ever greater law 
making authority to federal administrative agencies.10 Consequently, arguing against the 
practice of legislative delegation from a constitutional perspective may be neither 
persuasive nor practical. It appears, as Professor Lawson suggests, that the “bloodless 
revolution” has occurred;11 and the tenets of Article I of the Constitution have been 
subverted or are perhaps being politely ignored. Consequently, this paper will not 
examine the Constitutional arguments against the delegation of legislative authority. 
Rather, in what I believe to be a pragmatic decision, this paper will seek to illustrate, 
from a policy perspective, to what extent, and .v iL'i -vha. effect, the unchecked delegation 
of legislative authority is having on the Forest Service and its efforts at managing the 
national forests. If the restrictions of Article I have been abrogated, if not de jure, then 
certainly de facto, perhaps the only remaining means of dissuading delegatory behavior is 
by demonstrating that it not only fails to achieve the goals established by the legislature, 
but that it generates a political and management fiasco in its wake.
1231 (1994); Nick Smith. Restoration o f  Congressional Authority and Responsibility Over the Regulatory 
Process, 33 H a r v .  J. ON LEGIS. 333 (1996); J.D. Hayworth, Powers Congress Cannot Delegate, 77 POL’Y 
REV. 63 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation o f  American Administrative Law, 88 H a r v .  L. R ev . 
1669 (1975); David Schoenbrod, Separation o f Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional 
Purposes o f  the Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. R e v . 355 (1987); Bernard Schwartz, OfAdministrators 
And Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, The Laws, and Delegations o f  Power, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 443 
(1977).
10 The recent decisions in American Trucking Assoc, v. EPA. 195 F.3d 4  (D.C. Cir. 1999) and American 
Trucking Assoc, v. EPA. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) stood for the proposition that the non-delegation 
doctrine may not be as extinct as is commonly thought. However, the Supreme Court’s holding on the 
issue at Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001), in which the court unanimously 
upheld the constitutionality o f  the Congressional delegation o f  authority to the EPA, does not bode well for 
a  legal resurrection o f  the non-delegation doctrine.
11 Lawson, supra note 9 at 1231.
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This paper seeks to analyze the manner in which the Forest Service has acquired 
the management authority it now wields, and the manner in which the nature of that 
authority has affected the attempts as national forest management.
The Forest Service management program has been characterized as an amalgam of
“conflicting legislative incentives and congressional expectations, differences in the
beliefs of Forest Service personnel, and legal challenges to the agency’s plans and
projects.”12 While some argue that the enactment of the Multiple-Use-Sustained-Yield
Act of 1960 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 served as Congressional
attempts to exert closer supervisory authority and perhaps to accept more responsibility
for the management of the national forests,13 it has contrarily been argued that Forest
Service management discretion has remained essentially unencumbered.14 This paper
will attempt to resolve such conflicts. For, while it may superficially appear that these
laws serve to define and restrict Forest Service regulatory authority, I propose that
Congress has perpetuated agency discretion with ambiguous management goals, all the
while continuing to avoid responsibility for difficult resource management decisions.
Robert Nelson appropriately noted that:
Clearly the Multiple-use Sustained-yield Act in practice provided 
little specific guidance to Forest Service land managers. Because of 
its vagueness, the definition of multiple-use is subject to many
12 Forest Service Decision-Making: A Framework fo r  Improving Performance, General Accounting Office 
GAO/RCED-97-17 (April 4, 1997).
u  John P. Hogan, Ttie Legal Status ofLand and Resource Management Plans fo r the National Forests: 
Paying the Price fo r  Statutory Ambiguity, 25 E n v t'L  L. 865. (Summer 1995); Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., Die 
National Forest Management Act, 8 ENVT’L L. 549 (1978).
14 Multiple Use and Sustained Yield: Changing Philosophies for Federal Land Management?, Proceedings 
and Summary o f  a Workshop Convened on March 5 and 6, 1992 102nd Congress, 2nd Sess. H. o f  Rep. 
Comm. On Interior and Insular Affairs, prepared comments o f  Matthew Carroll and Steven Daniels, pp.45- 
70.
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different interpretations. The Public Land Law Review Commission 
concluded from its investigations that “multiple use has little 
practical meaning as a planning concept or principle.” Even Edward 
Crafts, one of the key Forest Service officials responsible for the 
Multiple-use Sustained-yield Act, later conceded, “Everything fell 
under multiple use and who can argue against multiple use because 
it is all things to all people. They used it as a justification for 
whatever they wanted to do.”15
Lacking specific statutory direction, the Forest Service management role has been 
described as the “nearly impossible task of serving many different interests.”16 Yet “goal 
statutes” are not simply synonymous with “vague statutes.” Goal statutes can indeed 
have substantial constraints embedded within them. In either case, however, the result is 
the same, the agency is delegated law-making authority, that it might meet the goal or 
goals set before it.
Building upon Professor David Schoenbrod's examination of the Clean Air Act 
and the Environmental Protection Agency17, this paper will examine the jurisprudence 
and administrative structure directing and guiding the Forest Service’s management of 
the national forests. The statutory resource management goals of this agency, when 
juxtaposed with the manner and effectiveness of achieving those goals may serve to 
illuminate whether the Forest Service has been guided by goal or rule statutes. If goal 
statutes predominate, it must be determined whether the Forest Service has been able to
15 R o b e r t  H . N e ls o n ,  P u b l i c  L a n d s  a n d  P r i v a t e  R ig h ts :  T h e  F a i l u r e  o f  S c ie n t i f ic  M a n a g e m e n t  
68(1995).
16 Resources Ltd. Inc. v. Robertson. 789 F.Supp. 1529, (D. Mont. 1991) modified, 35 F.3d 1300 (9lh Cir. 
1993), 8 F.3d 1394 (9lh Cir. 1993)
17 Schoenbrod, supra note 7; David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case o f  the Clean 
Air Act, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 740 (1983).
7
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meet the goals set for it. If delegation is indeed occurring, what are the effects? Is 
delegation, as asserted earlier, a cause of the current identity crisis in the Forest Service?
The related issue of judicial review will be impossible to ignore during the course 
of the paper. While the topic is not my primary focus, critics of legislative delegation 
often point to the judiciary as a means of tempering agency discretion,18 and some would 
see the courts as a surrogate decision-maker when the Forest Service’s actions fail to 
meet the management vision of these individuals.19
As indicated earlier, the constitutionality of Congressional delegation will not be 
addressed. A majority of the Supreme Court appears comfortable with its absence; and 
additionally, Professor Schoenbrod has argued that managers of public land are not 
bound by the constraints of Article I.20 My effort is not to dispute his assertion, but rather 
to ascertain whether delegation fails to accomplish legislative goals, and whether it does 
so in a particularly contentious manner. This paper will examine the applicability of the 
argument that federal agencies, in this case the U.S. Forest Service, should not serve as 
repositories o f law-making powers. The patent dangers in Congressional delegation 
being excessive agency discretion, insurmountable management obstacles, and perhaps 
most importantly: “Unchecked delegation would undercut the legislature’s accountability
18 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits o f  Aggressive Judicial Review o f  Agency Action, Duke L. J. 
1989:522, Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations o f  Law, Duke L. J. 
1989:511
19 Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial Interpretation o f  a 
Substantive Environmental Law; 15 PUB. LAND L. Re v . 53 (1994).
20 Schoenbrod, supra note 9, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the Peonle Through 
Delegation at 186, Schoenbrod, supra note 7 at 1265.
8
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to the electorate and subject people to rule through ad hoc commands rather than 
democratically considered general laws.21
Chapter Two will discuss the theories surrounding the delegation of legislative 
authority, and the incentives for legislatures to delegate and pass vague goal statutes. 
Chapter Two will not focus upon the Forest Service specifically, but will frame the issue 
which the later chapters of this paper will explore. Chapter Three presents an analysis 
designed to assess the extent to which Congress has in fact delegated its authority to the 
Forest Service. Chapter Four will examine the nature of the management environment in 
which the Forest Service must try to function, and the role delegation comes to play. 
Chapter Five will look at delegation’s impact on the agency’s multiple-use mandate, 
while Chapter Six presents an overview of the problems faced in attempting to formulate 
budgets in the face of delegated law-making authority. Chapter Seven examine two 
particular areas of administrative rule-making, the Roadless Rules and the latest NFMA 
rules. Finally, Chapter Eight summarizes the paper’s findings and provide suggestions 
for improving the agency status quo.
Summary:
There is little argument that the current Forest Service situation is dire. The 
recognition that the agency is wallowing about, unable to define a consistent path or to 
stay upon a path is evident in the rush to embrace management philosophies that may 
appease its varying critics. The Forest Service offered up ecosystem management as an 
overarching framework in which its management of the national forests would occur. For
21 Schoenbrod, supra note 7.
9
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naught, however, because the environmental community continues to rail against the
agency for any harvest of trees on public lands, regardless of the management label, and
the timber industry continues to criticize the ever diminishing harvest volume on public
lands. Failing to placate its critics, the Forest Service has now turned toward the dual
concepts of sustainability and collaboration as both as a planning tool, and as a a
substantive methodology.22 These approaches, though newly labeled, are concepts that
the forestry profession has been cognizant of since well prior to the existence o f the
national forests. But while the Committee of Scientists cites to Theodore Roosevelt for
the premise that planning in the national forests must be focused upon sustainability in an
environmental sense,23 it would be remiss to omit that Roosevelt was very much a
proponent of productive human uses o f these forests:
The fundamental idea of forestry is the perpetuation of forests by 
use. Forest Protection is not an end in itself; it is a means to 
increase and sustain the resources o f our country and the industries 
which depend upon them. The preservation of our forests is an 
imperative business necessity. We have come to see clearly that 
whatever destroys the forest, except to make way for agriculture, 
threatens our well-being.24
It is in this cauldron of fundamental management dispute that this paper
endeavors to explain why the dispute has so clearly manifested itself in the decay
of the once proud Forest Service.
22 65 Fed. Reg. 65,513 (2000) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 217 and 219).
23 Committee o f  Scientists, Sustaining the People's Lands: Recommendations fo r  Stewardship o f  the 
National Forests and Grasslands into the Next Century 14-15 (1999).
24 President’s Message o f  December 2, 1901, as related by Gifford Pinchot, Supra 3 note at 190.
10
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Chapter 2. Incentives to Delegate
Although policy ambiguity is often a political necessity and is even 
technically desirable in many circumstances, it does have 
drawbacks. Vague policies make it difficult to set priorities and 
identify exactly what is to be accomplished. For example, a forester 
who must make land use decisions on the basis o f  "multiple use ” 
does not have a well-defined set o f  decision rules or criteria for  
guidance...Finally ambiguity invites conflict and mangers who must 
implement vague policies often find  themselves in the middle o f  
heated arguments
Fred Cubbage, et al.~5
Before delving into the particulars that delegation plays with the Forest Service, it 
is necessary to understand and appreciate the general tendency that legislatures have 
towards the passage of vague goal-setting laws. This behavior, explainable by a number 
o f theories, is fundamental to the politics of legislatures. As such, any analysis of the 
problems faced by the Forest Service need be in the context of this reality.
The role played by administrative agencies in the development of policy and 
management of the vast and diverse federal public lands cannot be underestimated. The 
federal public lands managed by only two such agencies, the United States Forest Service 
and the Bureau of Land Management comprise some 462 million acres. In the case of 
many federal agencies, the charge has been leveled that the Congress routinely empowers 
the agencies with the authority to make law.26 In other words, the Congress delegates 
legislative authority to the executive branch and its agencies, empowering agency 
formulation of policy.
25 F r e d e r i c k  W. C u b b a g e ,  e t  a l . ,  F o r e s t  R e s o u r c e  P o l i c y  19 (1993).
11
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Critics o f such delegation in many cases offer constitutional rationales for why 
such behavior is inappropriate and even illegal.27 In the case of federal land management 
agencies, particularly the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, the 
constitutional argument against delegation warrants minor consideration. Both of these 
agencies are charged with managing federal public lands, and Article IV of the 
Constitution has provided Congress with unfettered discretion to choose the management 
regime of such lands.
This chapter proposes approaching the issue from a different tact. It seeks to 
address the rationales whereby Congress may be inclined to implement a relatively vague 
statute, thereby leaving the administrative agency the role of deciphering and 
implementing the details of the law. Law-making authority vested in federal public land 
management agencies places the agencies in the policy-making role for the federal public 
lands. This chapter’s positive approach is designed to “analyze the operation of an 
existing, or a postulated, set o f rules for collective decision-making quite independently 
o f the efficacy o f this set in furthering or promoting certain “social goals.”28 Though 
compelling normative arguments have been made that legislative delegation is 
inappropriate for a variety of reasons,29 this chapter will not debate the merits of these 
arguments. Rather, the discussion will focus on a positive examination o f delegation by
26 For the most complete critical description o f  the delegation issue see D a v id  SCHOENBROD, POWER 
W i t h o u t  R e s p o n s ib i l i ty :  H o w  C o n g r e s s  A b u s e s  t h e  P e o p le  T h r o u g h  D e le g a t io n  (1993).
27 Id., see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise o f  the Administrative State, 107 H a r v .  L. R ev . 1231, and 
Delegation and the Constitution, 22 REGULATION 23 (1999).
28 J a m e s  B u c h a n a n  a n d  G o r d o n  T u l l o c k ,  T h e  C a l c u l u s  o f  C o n s e n t  308 (1962).
29 For recent and comprehensive indictments o f  legislative delegation see the symposiums compiled at 36 
AM. U. L. Rev. (1987) (A Symposium on Administrative Law "The Uneasy Congressional Status o f  the
12
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Congress in the field o f public land management. The chapter will attempt to answer the 
question: why are legislators inclined to craft vague statutes, setting broad goals, without 
particular guidance?
Legislatures and Their Desire to Delegate
Any inquiry into the individual and collective motivations for the generation o f 
ambiguous statutes, and the resultant delegation to the bureaucracy by Congress, must 
begin with a review of the theories addressing why legislators act as they do. This 
section shall discuss the primary theories asserted to explain why Congress might pass 
vague legislation. While much of the literature addresses the act o f delegating law­
making power to agencies, integral to delegation is the passage of hazy goal-based 
statutes.
The primary school of thought addressing this aspect of legislative motivation is 
represented by the public choice theorists.30 A central tenet of this body of literature is 
that legislators act according to a primary desire to be reelected. The legislation 
produced by such individuals would then tend to reflect this need for reelection. Much of 
the following discussion will flow from that basic premise. It should be recognized 
however, that identifying a single rationale for vague legislation may not be practical, or 
even possible, as Fesler and Kettl point out:
Administrative Agencies); and 20 C a r d o z o  L. R ev . (1999) (The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation 
Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives).
30 For a comprehensive discussion o f  public choice theory and government see D e n n is  C . M u e l l e r ,  
P u b l i c  C h o ic e  II (1989) and Ja m e s  M . B u c h a n a n  a n d  R o b e r t  D . T o l l i s o n ,  e d s . ,  T h e  T h e o r y  o f  
P u b l i c  C h o ic e -  II (1984).
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The reasons for deliberate or inadvertent delegation o f policy­
making power are various. In a new policy field in which there is 
little or no accumulated experience to build on, the legislature wants 
something done but can make only a vague gesture as to the 
direction that action should take. In a field whose technology or 
other features are expected to change rapidly, the statute must permit 
flexible action by the agency, rather than require frequent returns to 
the legislature for enactment of new language. Some subjects 
[parenthetical omitted] simply do not lend themselves to 
specification of criteria to confine administrative discretion. Also, 
in some areas the ingenuity o f business people can be depended on 
to generate clever ways of evading any highly specific prohibitions 
in a statute...At times, the legislative process itself is so stormy and 
full of crosscurrents that the statue passed incorporates a number of 
contradictory policy guidelines, and the agency has to use its own 
judgment in making sense out of the mish-mash. Sometimes, too, 
the necessity of reaching a compromise solution leads the legislature 
to use language that papers over disagreement but whose deliberate 
ambiguity leaves the agency great scope for interpretation.31
Self-interest and Reelection
Legislators respond, as argued by Weingast,32 to the compelling force of the
electoral imperative. The electoral imperative as described by Weingast dictates that:
The principle of survival in electoral competition implies that 
representatives who fail to maximize their chances of reelection are 
systematically replaced by those who do so. In the face of the 
electoral imperative, congressmen ensure that their actions promote 
this goal. Virtually every action they take and every resource they 
deploy, therefore, contributes to their reelection.33
31 Ja m e s  W. F e s l e r  a n d  D o n a ld  F. K e t t l ,  T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  A d m in i s t r a t i v e  P r o c e s s  13-14
(1991).
33 Barry R. W eingast The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (With 
Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147,148 (1984).
33 Id. This primal motivation is also recognized by Anthony Downs in A n  E c o n o m ic  T h e o r y  o f  
D e m o c r a c y  (1957), wherein he applies the self-interest axiom to illustrate the rational vote-maximizing 
government. Robert Dahl in D e m o c r a c y  a n d  i t s  C r i t i c s  (1989), too notes, as an element o f his 
“polyarchy”, the behavior modifications undertaken by politicians to win elections.
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Weingast’s model suggests that delegation, or passage of vague goals statutes, manifests 
a decision by the legislature designed to enhance the likelihood o f reelection of its 
members. Logically, each legislator must ascertain which decisions enhance reelection 
chances, and which do not.
Morris Fiorina suggests that legislators exhibit behavior designed to minimize the 
transaction costs of a particular policy.34 In those instances, when the net transaction 
costs of legislating (including time, resources, uncertainty of result, and judicial review) 
exceed the costs associated with delegation (including agency drift, oversight, interest- 
group influence or agency capture), the rational legislator will legislate vaguely, leaving 
the costly process of developing the details to the agency.35
If, as Charles Lindblom notes in addressing the constant issue of risk:
Neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators 
yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated error in 
predicting the consequences of policy moves. A wise policy-maker 
consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part o f what 
he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated 
consequences he would have preferred to avoid,36
the risk-averse legislator may be inclined to avoid the uncertainty associated with 
legislation.
34 Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice o f  Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process 39  
P u b . C h o ic e  33 (1982).
35 Fiorina sets forth a model. Nj(x) = bj(x) -  c :j(x), wherein N is the net benefit o f  policy x enacted in 
legislative district j ,  b are the benefits and c are the costs. In analyzing a choice between an administrative 
remedy and a legislative remedy, the rational legislator applies the two submodels: Lj(x) = bj(x)-cj(x), and 
Aj(x) =  bj(x) -  Cj(x), where L and A are the net costs o f  the legislative and administrative delegation 
respectively.
36 Charles E. Lindbloom, The Science o f  “Muddling Through ”, P u b . ADMIN. R e v . 79, 86 (1959 ).
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Epstein and O'Halloran describe this analysis generally as “transaction cost
politics.” To them the costs break out as follows:
Legislators can enact direct, detailed laws though normal 
congressional procedures, but the necessary information to make 
well-formed policy may be costly to obtain; bicameralism and 
supermajority requirements inhibit speedy, flexible action; and 
legislative logrolls tend to inflate the costs of even the simplest 
policy initiatives. Alternatively, Congress can delegate authority to 
the executive branch to escape this dilemma, but bureaucrats may be 
motivated as much by the desire to pursue their own policy goals, 
inflate their budgets, and increase their scope of control as by their 
desire to follow congressional intent. Neither option is without its 
faults, but in different circumstances one or the other may be 
relatively more attractive from the legislators’ point of view.37
In their model, “delegation will follow the natural fault lines of legislators political 
advantage.”38 Krislov and Rosenbloom agree, adding that “it is one of the perversities of 
the modem bureaucratic state that elected officials come to rely heavily upon bureaucracy 
for their incumbency.”39
Fiorina, similarly, summarizes elsewhere: “...Congressmen appropriate all the 
public credit generated in the system, while the bureaucracy absorbs all the costs.”40 
Fiorina’s general model contains a specific theory of delegation—responsibility shifting 
behavior-discussed in detail later. It is important to now note that Fiorina’s model is 
essential if one accepts that Congress delegates to shift responsibility. Fiorina suggests 
that when Congress wishes the credit for the outcomes of legislation, it is far less likely to
37 Da v id  Epst e in  a n d  S h a r y n  O ’H a l l o r a n , D e l e g a t in g  Po w e r s : A  T r a n sa c t io n  C o s t  Po l itic s  
A ppr o a c h  t o  po l ic y  M a k in g  u n d e r  Se pa r a t e  Po w e r s  (1999) 7-8.
38 Id. at 47; See also Alex Cukierman and Allan H . Meltzer, A Positive Theory o f  Discretionary Policy, The 
Cost o f  Democratic Government and the Benefits o f  a Constitution, 24 ECON. INQUIRY 367  (1986).
39 S a m u e l  K r i s l o v  a n d  D a v id  H . R o s e n b lo o m , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  B u r e a u c r a c y  a n d  t h e  A m e r ic a n  
P o l i t i c a l  S y s te m  12 (1981).
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delegate the details away.41 Only in those instances when the net benefit o f legislative 
action is negative will delegation occur—thus, delegation does not always occur.
It is also important to recognize that the view that legislators will invariably 
delegate to enhance the prospect of reelection is not universally accepted. Wilson points 
out that:
Some scholars assume that in their single-minded desire to get 
reelected members o f Congress always seek to manipulate the 
bureaucracy in order to enhance their prospects for reelection. They 
would do well to ponder the lengths to which Congress has gone to 
weaken many of the powers that would permit it to exercise such 
control.42
Wilson may be off base in suggesting that granting the bureaucracy greater 
autonomy is not a mechanism by which to manipulate the bureaucracy. By shifting the 
difficult and contentious matters to the agency, the Congress has indeed manipulated the 
agency, all the while increasing agency autonomy—the two are perhaps not as mutually 
exclusive as Wilson seems to suggest. Nonetheless, David Schoenbrod, certainly a critic 
of delegation, nonetheless realizes that legislative behavior may be explained in terms of 
motivations apart from reelection.43 Thus, though many public choice theorists construe 
legislative behavior as a response to an identifiable incentive-reelection— there remain 
other cognizable factors which may provide an explanation.
40 M o r r i s  F io r in a ,  C o n g r e s s - K e y s t o n e o f t h e  W a s h in g to n  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  71 (1977).
41 Supra note 34 at 46.
43 J a m e s  Q. W ils o n ,  B u r e a u c r a c y :  W h a t  G o v e r n m e n ts  D o  a n d  W h y  T h e y  Do I t  239 (1989).
43 Supra note 26 at footnote 23. Schoenbrod includes among the possible rationale: power and prestige 
within Congress, making good public policy, and moving into higher elected office. Though these 
incentives are technically not focused upon reelection, they nonetheless may all contribute to vague 
legislation.
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In the matter o f the Forest Service, it is no doubt a temptation, when faced with
highly polarized and organized interests, to avoid actions which may negatively impact
reelection chances. Any action in such a setting will disenfranchise at least some of the
relevant interests. The alternative-vague legislation (e.g. the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act o f I960 (MUSYA))— is essentially a form of non-action. No one can
determine what the statute requires; and hence, no interest can negatively view a
legislator that voted for it. The MUSYA reflects a legislative reelection strategy
described by Schoenbrod:
Delegation thus allows members of Congress to function as 
ministers, who express popular aspirations (through enacting lofty 
statutory goals) and tend to their flocks (by doing casework), rather 
than lawmakers who must make hard choices in passing laws...With 
delegation, legislators can escape being ejected from office except 
upon grounds that would oust a minister from the pulpit- scandal. In 
those exceptional cases when incumbents do lose an election, their 
defeat is far more likely to be caused by some escapade or chicanery 
than by how they shaped the law.44
Who could condemn a legislator for supporting a law directing the Forest Service 
to manage the vast national forests for “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and 
wildlife and fish purposes”?45 The language is plain, simple, inclusive, and nearly 
meaningless. The delegation to the bureaucracy is even more obscure. The Secretary of 
Agriculture is directed to promulgate regulations for the management o f these oft
44 David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics. 20 C a r d o z o  L. R e v . 731, 740- 
741 (1999). It is important to understand that though Schoenbrod may well provide a rationale for the 
promulgation o f  a statute such as the MUSYA, it is nonetheless quite plausible that in the case o f  this 
particular statue, the agency itself was largely responsible for the ambiguous nature o f  the law in an effort 
to ensure its own authority and discretion. This issue is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
45 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1999).
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conflicting resources, all the while “due consideration shall be given to the relative values
of the various resources in particular areas.”46
Observation of these obscurities in the MUSYA is not novel. Thirty years ago,
the Public Land Law Review Commission, in analyzing the MUSYA, noted that:
The lack of clear statutory direction for the use of the public lands 
has been the cause of problems ever since Congress started to 
provide for the retention of some of the public domain in permanent 
Federal ownership.47
*  *  *
Congress has not provided the agencies with clear policy objectives, 
directives to engage in land use planning to accomplish those 
objectives, nor general guidance as the to the kinds of factors to take 
into account in the land planning process.48
While this paper will discuss other plausible theories why Congress may have 
chosen to delegate so broadly and blindly, in the case of the Forest Service, it is certainly 
reasonable that reelection in the face o f a polarized constituency may be an omnipresent 
factor. Finally, passage of any contentious piece of legislation, one whose impact the 
concerned interests can glean prior to rulemaking, will entail a great number of 
“transaction costs.” Fiorina's model would suggest that the Congressman choose 
delegation in such a scenario.
Legislative Efficiency
46 Id. at §529.
47 P u b l i c  L a n d  L a w  R e v ie w  C o m m iss io n , O n e  T h i r d  o f  t h e  N a t i o n ’s  L a n d  43 (1970) 
MId.
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A number o f possibilities have been put forth to explain delegation and vague 
statutes in terms of manageability.49 Though these relatively innocuous arguments are 
viewed skeptically by delegation scholars, the increase in federal spending and legislation 
in the last century, with no accompanying increase in the size of Congress or in the 
congressional sessions, are two reasons Nishkanen cites as an argument for an ever 
increasing congressional willingness to delegate.50 He argues that:
...This has reduced the potential for Congress to formulate detailed 
legislation on many issues and to monitor performance under such 
legislation. This has led Congress, especially on regulatory issues, 
to approve ‘symbolic’ legislation, delegating to the administration 
the power to fill in the detail.51
Thus, the influence of such things as time constraints, staffing limits and 
volume of legislation may indeed contribute to passage of non-specific 
statutes.
Responsibility Avoidance
The theory has been advanced that legislators will invariably seek to avoid 
difficult decisions for which they will be directly accountable to the electorate.52 This 
paradigm is but one factor that may be included among Fiorina’s legislative costs, a sub-
49 Peter Aronson et al .,A Theory o f Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. Re v . 1,21 (1982), describe 
managerial explanations as consisting o f  four elements: 1) reducing congressional workloads; 2) 
eliminating the need for frequent statutory amendments; 3) having specialists decide matters about which 
Congress is not knowledgeable; and 4) establishing relative permanence among the decision makers who 
control certain problems.
50 William Nishkanen, Legislative Implications o f  Reasserting Congressional Authority over Regulations 
20 Ca r d o z o  L . R e v . 939 (1999).
51 Id. at 942.
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model perhaps, but one that also stands on its own, seemingly capable of explaining
delegation all by itself. This model has been best described as responsibility-shifting.
Stone summarizes this behavior:
Legislators must worry about getting reelected as well as about 
substantive issues. Each legislator faces not only conflict with 
representatives o f other constituencies, but conflicting interests 
within his or her own constituency. One way to escape conflict and 
avoid alienating potential supporters is to shun statutes that clearly 
harm people...But when they are forced to make substantive rules, 
ambiguity is a wonderful refuge. Nothing lubricates difficult 
bargaining and hides real conflict so well.S3
William Niskanen has described this as part and parcel o f the American political
system.54 He notes that:
The most important insight about this behavior is that substantial 
delegation of fiscal and regulatory authority usually serves the 
interests of both Congress and the President by allowing both to play 
their expected roles...Congress often approves very general 
regulatory legislation—leaving the regulatory agencies with broad 
discretion to define the law by the rules they promulgate. This 
permits members o f Congress to play both sides o f the street—to 
take credit for the presumed benefits o f the regulation and the blame 
the agencies for the costs of meeting specific rules. The President 
accepts the role o f regulatory cop in exchange for much more 
executive discretion on regulations than on fiscal issues.55
The relationship between this model and federal land management can easily be 
appreciated. In discussing the nature of forest policy, Cubbage, O’Laughlin and Bullock 
point out that:
52 Fiorina, supra notes 34 and 35.
53 Deborah Stone, Po l ic y  Pa r a d o x  295 (1988).
54 Supra, note 50.
55 Id. at 941-42.
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...Many forest policies are vague. Such lack of specificity is 
intentional because policymakers usually must appeal to a variety of 
groups with dissimilar views and values. More specific policies 
with well-defined objectives quite often are divisive because they 
clearly identify winners and losers. To avoid disagreement, 
policymakers retreat to ambiguity and leave specifics to 
implementing agencies.56
It would be undoubtedly difficult to focus the myriad difficulties of the Forest 
Service on a particular legislator’s role in passage of, for example, the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act of I960. The management of public lands is monitored by a diverse, 
well-funded and aggressive set of special interests. In such a climate, the incentive to 
avoid labeling the statutory winners and losers of forest policy is easily understood.57
Additionally, when interest groups are both active and organized, as in many 
public land debates, a legislator may seek to avoid what Schattschneider describes as the 
“socialization o f conflict”.58 When the scope of the conflict expands, a legislator’s ability 
to control or predict its outcome is diminished. In those instances where the special- 
interest does not expect the result it desires, the tendency will be to expand the conflict.59 
In such cases, a risk-averse legislator may exercise the power described by Bachrach and 
Baratz as the power to obstruct.60 In this instance, the obstruction is to prevent expansion 
o f the entirety o f a conflict into a legislative and publicized forum. The preferred
56 Supra, note 25.
57 For example, Dennis LeMaster argues in D e c a d e  o f  C h a n g e  (19 8 4 ) that the NFMA was the political 
product o f the Forest Service, the environmental interests, and the timber industry. I would further suggest 
that though the NFM A as enacted was perhaps the democratic result o f  the political process, it did not 
produce the best long-term result for the agency.
58 E .E . Sc h a t t s c h n e id e r , T h e  Se m iso v e r e ig n  P e o p l e  39 ( i9 6 0 ).
59 Id. at 38. Schattschneider argues that “Private conflicts are taken into the public arena precisely because 
someone wants to make certain that the power ratio among the private interests most immediately involved 
does not prevail.”
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mechanism becomes the administrative forum. The rationale described by Bachrach and 
Baratz is: “B [the interest group] is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to 
the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s [the 
legislator] set of preferences.”61 Thus, in the case o f national forest legislation, our 
hypothetical legislator will often be faced with difficult decisions compounded with close 
scrutiny o f those decisions. Shifting the responsibility, with its attendant costs, to the 
Forest Service begins to look quite appealing.
This strategy becomes particularly salient in light of the effectiveness with which 
the environmental community has been able to nationalize the forest management debate. 
For example, using the spotted-owl and old-growth as tools, these groups were able to 
“socialize the conflict,” expanding the situs of the dispute from the Pacific Northwest to 
national prominence.62 Correspondingly, a legislator need concern himself with not only 
the ramifications of local decisions, but with a far larger interested public. The pressure 
to shift the difficult decisions to the Forest Service begins to look ever more appealing.
Now, while David Schoenbrod has argued that responsibility-shifting is the 
primary rationale behind vague statutes and delegations to agencies63 as a means to 
explain why delegation occurs, it also may explain why it does not always occur.
60 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces o f  Power, 56 AM. Po l . Set. R e v . 947 (1961).
61 Id. at 948.
62 George Hoberg, Science, Politics, and US Forest Law 12, Paper prepared for the Univ. o f  Montana 
School o f Forestry and Resources for the Future, “Collaboration and Decision-making on the National 
Forests: Can it Work? Four Perspectives o f the Potential Problems and Opportunities” January 22-23,2001 
(January 19, 2001).
63 David Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rule Statutes: The Case o f  the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 
(1983); The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance, 83 MICH. L. Re v . 1223 (1985); 
Separation ofPowers and the Powers that Be: The Constitutional Purposes o f  the Delegation Doctrine 36 
A m . U n iv . L. Re v . 355 (1987); Po w e r  W ith o u t  Re s p o n s ib il it y : Ho w  C o n g r e ss  A b u s e s  t h e  P eo ple
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Legislators are also more likely to avoid delegation if doing so 
significantly would shift credit away from them or would fail to shift 
away much blame...Conversely, are more likely to delegate if doing 
so would shift blame away from them significantly or would fail to 
shift away much credit.64
Schoenbrod expands on this basic premise to offer two related incentives for delegation. 
One, “’delegation enhances legislators’ opportunities to simultaneously support the 
benefits o f an action and oppose its costs...”;65 and two, “delegation enables legislators to 
represent themselves to some constituents as supporting an action, and to others as 
opposing it...”66
Again, the proponents of this model are not without opposition. Peter Schuck 
argues that delegation and the resultant agency authority do not deflect responsibility, but 
rather manifest an increase in public responsibility.67 He argues that agencies are the 
focus o f policy formulation, as they are typically more accessible and responsive to the 
public and that:
...It is only at the agency level that the citizen can know precisely 
what the statute means to her; how, when, and to what extent it will 
affect her interests; whether she supports, opposes, or wants changes 
in what the agency is proposing; whether it is worth her while to 
participate actively in seeking to influence this particular exercise of 
government power, and if so, how best to go about it; and where 
other citizens or groups stand on these questions.68
T h r o u g h  D el e g a t io n  (1993); Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to Mv Critics, 20 C a r d o z o  L. Re v . 
731 (1999).
64 Id. Po w e r  W it h o u t  Re sp o n s ib il it y  at 90-91.
65 Id  at 92.
66 Id. at 92-93.
67 Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. Rev. 
775(1999).
68 Id. at 782.
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Rather than providing a bastion from responsibility, Schuck sees delegation to 
agencies as providing the public with the access and accountability they require. Though 
Schuck persuasively explains his position, it is perhaps more suited to arguing why 
delegation is not improper, rather than a rebuttal of the responsibility-shifting delegation 
provides. Schuck’s position may actually serve to reinforce the incentives for a 
congressman to delegate.
Jerry Mashaw additionally argues that delegation, if viewed as a policy lottery 
utilized to avoid responsibility, only does so up and until the “administrative delegate 
‘spins the wheel’ and chooses a determinate policy.”69 At that point, he argues, the 
legislator can no longer obscure his role. Mashaw advances a number of normative 
arguments why delegation is not detrimental, but underlying those arguments is his tenet 
that delegation is not as useful a tool for responsibility avoidance as has been argued by 
others.
Conflict and Compromise
The very nature o f partisan, and perhaps interest-group politics, suggests another 
theory for delegation. Contemporary American policy-making has been characterized by 
Theodore Lowi as “interest-group liberalism.”70 Lowi postulates that American politics 
have devolved to a bargaining process whereby special-interests subvert the democratic 
process by avoiding the rigors of the rule o f law. Lowi summarizes:
69 J e r r y  L. M a s h a w , G r e e d ,  C h a o s  a n d  G o v e r n a n c e :  U s in g  P u b l i c  C h o ic e  t o  Im p ro v e  P u b l i c  
L a w , 148 (1997).
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Interest-group liberalism has little place for law, because laws 
interfere with the political process...A good clear statute puts the 
government on one side as opposed to other sides, [or on every side] 
it redistributes advantage and disadvantage, it slants and redefines 
the terms of bargaining. It can even eliminate bargaining as this term 
is currently defined.71
Delegation is crucial to Lowi’s view of modem government. Lowi sums up the 
relationship:
The legal expression of the new liberal ideology can be summed up 
in a single, conventional legal term: delegation of power. 
Delegation of power refers technically to actions whereby a 
legislature confers upon an agency certain tasks and powers the 
legislature would and could itself exercise if that were not 
impracticable. Delegations can be narrow or broad, but the practice 
under the liberal state has most generally and consistently been 
broad. As Professor David puts it, Congress in effect says, “Here’s 
the problem: deal with it.” 72
He continues:
Clear statutes that reduce pluralistic bargaining also reduce 
drastically the possibility of scientific treatment of government as 
simply part o f the bundle of bargaining processes and multiple 
power structures. A good law eliminates the political process at 
certain points. A law made at the center of government focuses 
politics there and reduces interests elsewhere. The center means 
Congress, the President, and the courts. To make a law at a central 
point is to centralize the political process.73
Lowi indicts the bargaining found in interest-group government, or 
logrolling as it is more pejoratively labeled, to be the cause o f much delegation,
70 T h e o d o r e  J . L o w i, T h e  E n d  o f  L ib e r a l is m :  I d e o lo g y ,  P o l i c y ,  a n d  t h e  C r is is  o f  P u b l ic  
AUTHORITY (1969).
71 Id. at 125-26.
12 Id.
73 Id. a t 127.
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while vague laws facilitate an ever greater degree of logrolling. Bargains then, 
among the special-interests and the legislators he claims, result in laws which 
reflect the bargains—all winners, no losers, and no identifiable position for the 
“center of government.”
Viewed not as a collection o f special-interests in constant policy negotiation, the 
nature of public opinion may instead be generally described by the multimodal diagram 
espoused by V.O. Key.74 This ‘W’ shaped curve depicts a situation in which opinions on 
a particular issue are arranged in three peaks ranging on a spectrum from radical to 
conservative.
With any specific public land issue, for example closures of national forests to
motorized travel, Key’s model suggests that a block of opinion will oppose, a block will
support, and a block will be neutral on the issue. In such cases, Key states that:
In the resolution of conflict the outcome obviously depends on the 
direction in which those citizens shift who occupy the central 
position in such a distribution or on their ability to pull to a central 
position individuals located at the extremes.75
Shifting the distribution often mandates political compromise. In those instances where 
compromise is required, vague statutes reign. David Truman points out that:
The imperative of compromise among groups, between group 
demands and the “rules o f the game”, explains various aspects of the 
legislative process...One of these is the ambiguity of many 
legislative formulas...[A]mbiguity and verbal compromise may be 
the very heart o f a successful political formula, especially where the 
necessity for compromise is recognized but is difficult to achieve in
74 V . o. K ey , P u b l i c  O p in io n  a n d  A m e r ic a n  D e m o c r a c y  71 (1961) 
15 Id. a t 71.
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explicit terms. Ambiguity may postpone or obviate the necessity for 
a showdown and as such has an important political function.76
Similarly, Richard Stewart points out the role conflict plays in generating vague statutes. 
He posits:
...There appear to be serious institutional constraints on Congress' 
ability to specify regulatory policy in meaningful detail. Legislative 
majorities typically represent coalitions of interests that must not 
only compromise among themselves but also with opponents.
Individual politicians often find far more to be lost than gained in 
taking a readily identifiable stand on a controversial issue of social 
or economic policy...These circumstances tend powerfully to 
promote broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies.77
Terry Moe suggests a contrary possibility. Based upon a legislative fear that a 
later Congress may undo the acts of the current body, legislators will seek to enact laws 
that “insulate” their pet agencies from post hoc tampering.78 Moe acknowledges that 
there are several ways to accomplish this goal, but the “most direct way is for today’s 
authorities to specify in excruciating detail, precisely what the agency is to do and how it 
is to do it, leaving as little as possible for future authorities to exercise control over, short 
of passing new legislation.”79 Moe’s argument suggests a rationale for why delegation 
would tend not to occur. The fact that vague statutes are indeed promulgated leads one to 
believe that while Moe’s rationale may be one consideration of legislators, it is one 
outweighed by other factors. It may be but one element in Fiorina’s model.80
76 D a v id  B. T r u m a n ,  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t a l  P r o c e s s  393 (1951).
77 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation o f  American Administrative Law, 88 H a r v .  L. REV. 1667, 1695-96 
(1975 ). Stewart’s footnote following this passage concludes that “broad delegations avoid potential 
stalemate by providing a  ‘means o f  acting without making final choices.’’’ This tends to support the idea 
that vague legislation is essentially non-action.
78 Terry Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side o f  the Story, 6  J. L. ECON. & ORG. 2 1 3 ,2 2 7  (1990).
79 Id.
80 Supra, notes 34  and 3 5 .
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Agency Impetus
Thus far, this paper had focused on the incentives that may persuade a legislator, 
from strictly a legislative perspective. While the literature on delegation does not address 
the effect o f agency-initiated action in any detail, it is important to recognize the role an 
agency might play in the passage of a deliberately vague piece of legislation. An agency 
may have any number o f reasons for seeking broad, vague legislation; perhaps the most 
plausible being that the agency enjoys the discretion and lack of statutory constraints on 
its actions.
First and foremost, is the recognition that agencies will seek, both as collectives 
and as individual bureaucrats, to further its/their own self interest.81 Part o f that self- 
interest is the perception that it is preferred to have greater discretion and greater 
decision-making space in the application of the law, than lesser. The difficulty, of 
course, is when the greater discretion creates more problems and impediments to 
accomplishing on-the-ground tasks than would a specific, rule-based statute.82 A self- 
interested agency should always consider this potential when the opportunity to support 
legislation arises.
In the specific case of the Forest Service, it has been argued by at least one 
closely related to the process, that the agency itself was responsible for the promulgation
81 Supra note 4.
82 It is easy to see that when an agency’s action cannot be measured against clear statutory responsibilities, 
in the ensuing legal fracas a court may be left with second guessing the agency’s decision. If  the statutory 
responsibilities are clear, there is very little dispute as to whether the agency has met them. This problem is 
particularly acute in environmental policy act cases (both federal and state), wherein the agency is never 
quite sure to what extent an analysis is adequate until a court correctly explains to the agency the manner in 
which it should have conducted its analysis.
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of the MUSY A, a notably obscure law.83 Wolf summarizes the agency incentive as 
follows:
...The Forest Service felt that if it had general authority, that was 
not specific, that enumerated what it was to do then it could 
reconcile these differences in a way it [emphasis added] thought 
would best serve the public interests. So the Multiple Use bill came 
up, the terms weren’t defined—there was a jumble of uses and 
resources as you know when you read the act—and they said it 
wasn’t going to cost anything, but its enactment would be o f great 
value, which again, you’re in 1960 and election is coming up and 
you’re dealing with people who have political antennae.84
Wolfs recollection supports a theory that the Forest Service, and other agencies, drive
legislation in their own self-interest.85 Dennis LeMaster’s similarly posits that the
NFMA, too, was a product of the Forest Service.86 The irony, of course, is that while the
MUSYA and the NFMA may have indeed been bom out of agency interest, the very
discretion the Forest Service sought to ensure has provided its contemporary opponents
with the means to challenge and obstruct its actions.
Summary
This chapter set out to outline the various incentives faced by legislators in crafting a 
given piece of law. Regardless of which theory is most appealing, it remains difficult to
83 Interview by Alan McQuillan with Robert W olf Missoula Mont. (April 19, 1989), and Robert Wolf, 
National Forest Timber Sales and the Legacy o f Gifford Pinchot: Managing a Forest and Making it Pay 
60 U n iv , o f C o l o ., L . Re v . 1037 (1989). See also Sa m u e l  T. D a n a  a n d  S a l ly  K. Fa ir f a x , Fo r e s t  
and  Ra n g e  POLICY, 202-204 (1956); J. Michael McCloskey, NOTE a n d  C o m m e n t , Natural Resources— 
National Forests—The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act o f1 960, Or. L . Rev. 49 (1961); and GLEN O. 
Ro b in so n , T h e  Fo r e s t  Se r v ic e : A St u d y  o n  Pu b lic  La n d  M a n a g e m e n t  41 (1975) all o f  which 
support W olfs contention.
84 Id. Interview at p.2
85 This view is shared by Anthony Downs and is discussed in In sid e  B u r e a u c r a c y  (1966).
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dispute that the choice to delegate is often quite rational on the part of the legislator. In 
simplest terms, when the benefits of delegation outweigh the costs, the rational 
congressman will shift the responsibility to the agency. What is the implication for the 
Forest Service? The next chapter will examine the extent to which delegation to the 
Forest Service has occurred. If in fact delegation has occurred, and there are costs borne 
by the agency and the public as a result, the remedy may be as simple as altering the 
legislative formula—ensure that the costs of delegation exceed the benefits. That 
possibility will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
86 Supra, note 57. The Forest Service essentially had the opportunity to support one o f  two competing 
pieces o f draft legislation, S.2926 and S.3091. The agency perceived S.3091 as the more discretionary and 
threw its support behind that bill—which eventually was signed into law as the NFMA.
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Chapter 3. Congress and the National Forests
The most effective public policies are those that define fairly clear 
ends, yet provide some flexibility in the means chosen to reach those 
ends, the capacity o f  agency staff to pursue the ends effectively, and 
the ability fo r  nongovernmental watchdogs to press agencies when 
necessary
Steven Yaffee.57
Professor Yaffee’s above suggestion implies a sort of balancing of the specificity 
of a policy in establishing agency goals with the methodological discretion by which to 
reach the goals. He goes on to cite to the Endangered Species Act as an example of a 
statute that has succeeded both generally as a law, and specifically as an example of this 
balancing.88 There is certainly ample room to question his conclusion on both counts; but 
more topically, he points to the central question of this chapter: to what extent has 
Congress balanced discretion and specificity in Forest Service Management? Discretion, 
specificity of actions, and delegation are all interrelated. Delegation can be quite broad, 
but with equally sweeping constraints the resultant agency discretion may be quite 
limited. It is not quite so simple as saying a vague statute is bad because it delegates and 
results in too much agency discretion. Every statute will have a component of delegation, 
and a component o f constraint. The balance between the two will determine how much 
discretion an agency wields. In critiquing the statutes that drive the Forest Service, it is 
insufficient to merely note that they are “vague”, without a more detailed understanding 
of the relationship between delegation and ultimate discretion.
87 St e v e n  Y a f f e e , W isd o m  o f  t h e  S p o t t e d  O w l , Po l ic y  L esso n s  fo r  a  N e w  C en tu r y  361 (1994).
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The difficulty is in being able to objectively review any of the statutes directing 
the Forest Service, and compare the results both to the other Forest Service laws, and to 
federal legislation at large. Fortunately, the problem is not novel. Professors Epstein and 
O’Halloran have devised, and elaborated upon in their 1999 book, a method whereby the 
extent to which delegation in federal legislation can be quantified.89
Epstein and O’Halloran systemize delegation so that differing public laws can be 
compared in a relative manner. They relied upon the Congressional Quarterly for 
descriptions of each law in question, breaking the law into major provisions. Each major 
provision was examined using a set of criteria to determine whether delegation had 
occurred. A series of 14 constraints were then applied to each law in an effort to quantify 
the statutory restrictions on agency actions. The formula developed by Epstein and 
O’Halloran produces a discretion index expressed as: d i = r ,  - C L 90 Based upon this 
formula, an index of 0 suggested that no discretion is present, while an index of 1 
suggested the law affords the executive branch unfettered discretion-essentially a 
complete delegation of authority to the agency.
Epstein and O’Halloran examined in excess of 250 laws; the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA) o f 1976 among them. They did not however, examine the 
Organic Act of 1897, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) o f 1960, or the 
Resource Planning Act (RPA) of 1974, all certainly important laws in Forest Service
" I d .
89 Supra, note 37
90 The formula assesses the delegative provisions present and the constraints present, and expresses both as 
ratios: r;and f. The two are multiplied together to reach the constraint index, q, and that then is subtracted 
from the delegation ratio to obtain the discretion index, dj. This system was designed to avoid the 
potentially o f  having a discretion index result less than zero.
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jurisprudence. Additionally, the results o f their methodology as applied to the NFMA is 
not contained within their text. The general methodology, though, is contained in some 
detail.
Consequently, since a determination of delegation regarding the Forest Service 
requires an analysis of several laws, and their comparison to other federal laws, this 
Chapter focuses upon an application o f their methodology to as many of the national 
forest management laws as practicable. Since several of the pertinent Forest Service laws 
are not referenced in the Congressional Quarterly, notably the Organic Act, which 
predated the Congressional Quarterly, I have nonetheless chosen to analyze all of these 
laws, and the National Forest Timber Reform Act of 1975 (NFTRA),91 with the same 
methods as Epstein and O'Halloran; maintaining as close a parallel to the process 
premised upon the Congressional Quarterly, as possible. There of course other laws that 
impact the Forest Service; a recent list cites 82 of them.92 Many of these other laws, 
however, are not the direct Congressional mandates to the Forest Service national forest 
management program. Some deal with very specific issues or resources, while others are 
of general applicability to ail federal agencies. I have chosen the laws that have been 
passed with the clear purpose of setting forth the manner in which national forest 
management would be conducted.
Before undertaking such an analysis, it is important to note that though Epstein 
and O’Halloran have admirably crafted a useful means of comparing statutory discretion, 
there are several junctures at which the examiner’s bias can create flaws in the apparent
91 The National Forest Timber Reform Act o f  1975 (S.2926) was the ill-fated alternative to the NFMA 
sponsored by Senator Jennings Randolph (D. W.Va).
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objectivity of the method. First, the determination of “major provisions” by the 
Congressional Quarterly, whose staff is subject to change over the years, is by no means 
an objective measure of a statute’s provisions. Depending upon how the law is broken 
into provisions can drastically affect the calculations. In other words, the simple 
identification of provisions can be driven by the bias of the analyst, resulting in a 
potential range of results. Second, an analyst applying this system must make the 
determination of whether delegation has occurred or not in each identified provision. A 
seemingly simple task facilitated by the guidance in Epstein and O’Halloran’s text, it is 
nonetheless another opportunity for subjectivity and bias to become inserted into the 
process. Again, a small change in the number of “delegating provisions” can create a 
large change in the delegation ratio and discretion index.
In an attempt to provide continuity across the several statute to be examined, and 
to allow the results to be compared to Epstein and O'Halloran’s data, I have sought to 
adhere to their protocols as closely as possible. I have additionally attempted to remain 
consistent in my own approach to these statutes in both the identification of major 
provisions, and in the identification of delegation. Nonetheless, the results I present are 
acknowledged to be relative comparisons between laws, inherently relying upon a certain 
amount of discretion and judgment.
Chart 1 displays graphically the results of the calculations performed on four 
distinct laws, and includes the amended version of the Organic Act. The necessity to 
review the Organic Act in both its original format, and the amended version is due to the 
substantial differences between the two. A large number o f provisions are absent from
92 D o n a ld  w . F lo y d ,  e d . F o r e s t s  o f  D is c o r d  71 (1999).
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the amended act, particularly the timber harvest provisions that provided the basis for the 
Monongehela decision.93 The National Forest Timber Reformation Act is included as a 
contrast to the NFMA. As the competing legislation in 1975, it arguably represented a 
more prescriptive, less vague statute.
\ \  *
\ \
«v*iSv,F2;.*JS8
'S '
■  Delegation Ratio
■  Constraint Ratio 
□  Discretion Index
%
Chart t. Relative Delegations, Constraints and Discretion Among Forest 
Service Statutes94
93
94
Izaak Walton League v. Butz. 522 F.2d 945 (4(h Cir. 1975).
Organic Act (as enacted):
9 major provisions, 6 delegate .\ r( =  6/9 =  .33
3 o f  the 14 constraints present . \  ft= 3/14 = .21
. • .C i  =  (.33)(.21) = .07 
.-.di =  .33 - .07 =  .26
Organic Act (as amended):
10 major provisions, 6 delegate .•.ri =  6/10 = .60
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The chart reflects this contrast, both in the authority delegated, and in the total discretion 
afforded the Forest Service. The constraint index for the NFMA and the NFTRA is, 
incidentally, identical.
While the work of Epstein and O’Halloran depict discretion indices ranging from 
1.00 for the most discretionary laws, to a law with a ratio of .0004, indicating very little 
discretion,95 it realistically appears that few laws exceed a discretion index of O.4.96 The 
discretion indices for both the NFMA (.26) and the NFTRA (.17) bracket the mean (.20)
1 o f  the 14 constraints present .'.f. = 1/14 = .07
.\Cj = (.60)(.07) = .042 
.-.dj = .60- .04 = .56
MUSYA:
4 major provisions. 3 delegate .\ r, = % = .75 
None o f  the 14 constraints present /. f  = 0/14 = 0
.-. Cj = (.75)(0) = 0  
dj = .75 -  0 = .75
NFMA:
22 major provisions, 10 delegate .\ r; = 10/22 = .45
5 o f the 14 constraints present .\ f, = 6/14 = .43
.-. c ,=  (.45)(.43) = .19 
.-. dj = .45 - .19 = .26
In an effort to minimize variability between the Epstein/O'Halloran results and these calculations, 
Professor David Epstein provided the author with the NFMA coding sheet for his original 
calculations. There were only a slight difference: Epstein coded 9 provisions delegating versus 10 
for the author, leading to a small change in the delegation index.
NFTRA (S.2926):
17 major provisions, 5 delegate .\ r, =  5/17 = .29
6 o f  the 14 constraints present .\ f  =  6/14 = .43
-•Cj = (.29)(.43) = .12 
.•.dj =  .29- .12 = .17
95 Supra, note 37 at 111.
96 Id.
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for the public lands category established by David Mayhew97 (though this category 
includes only the laws analyzed by Epstein and O’Halloran, and specifically excludes the 
MUSYA, and the Organic Act).98 In contrast, the MUSYA would be the fifth most 
discretionary law among all the public laws analyzed, regardless of category, with the 
Organic Act as amended following closely as the ninth most discretionary law.99
The simple, or perhaps simplistic, conclusion is the recognition that delegation of 
law-making authority is occurring in national forest management, this coming as no real 
surprise.100 The MUSYA reflects a level of discretion that pervaded much of the federal 
legislation generated during the 1960’s. The NFMA, an arguably less discretionary 
law,101 was crafted in the 1970’s, a period of less sweeping delegation.102 These two laws 
represent the trend, noted by Epstein and O’Halloran, of a decrease in delegation. They 
suggest that though the trend towards delegation appears downward, the increase in the 
number of legislative provisions and the procedural constraints within which agencies 
must operate may nonetheless intensify: '‘Congress is writing laws that allow interest 
groups more impact on policy, which in turn gives rational groups greater incentive to
97 Id. at 199.
98 I f  the Organic Act (as enacted) and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act are included the mean becomes 
.29, with the NFMA and the NFTRA then tending to fall below the mean.
99 Supra, note 37 at 111.
100 McMichael v. U.S.. 355 F.2d 283 (9* Cir. 1965).
101 David Clary, in T im b e r  a n d  t h e  Fo r e s t  S er v ice  192 (1996) argues that “While NFMA offereda 
fundamental charter for the Forest Service, it was a refined endorsement o f  multiple use. The options that 
it preserved for the land manager ensured that the Service would never be relieved o f  controversy.”
102 Supra, note 37 at 112-117.
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organize and come to Washington.”103 The question of the impact of delegation and its 
relationship to special interest politics will be addressed in the next chapter.
Based upon these calculations, it may be asserted that the Organic Act and 
MUSYA are extraordinarily delegatory; the NFMA, substantially less so. In some ways, 
that is in keeping with the perception that the NFMA was a Congressional attempt to 
wrest forest management from the agency and reassert its role as the arbiter of national 
forest decision-making. The opposing camp, of course, can rally around the fact the more 
prescriptive option, the NFTRA, was not the bill chosen by the Congress to accomplish 
that goal. The incentives and costs faced by Congress suggest that though action was 
needed in light of the Monongohela decision, Congress did not wish to act so assertively 
as to ignite a conflagration of political conflict. As suggested in Chapter 2, by delegating, 
it could both act decisively with a new law, and essentially not act by passing a law that 
enjoyed general political support, but that lefr the nasty issues in the hands of the agency.
Another way to examine this result is by applying the formula developed by
Morris Fiorina and discussed in Chapter 2. Fiorina’s model attempts to explain the
individual legislator’s decision to delegate as:
Nj(x) = bj(x) -  cij(x), wherein N is the net benefit of policy x enacted 
in legislative district j, b are the benefits and c are the costs. In 
analyzing a choice between an administrative remedy and a 
legislative remedy, the rational legislator applies the two submodels:
Lj(x) = bj(x)-Cj(x), and Aj(x) = bj(x) -  Cj(x), where L and A are the 
net costs of the legislative and administrative delegation
i 104respectively/
103 Id. a t 120.
I<M Supra, notes 34 and 35.
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The model suggests that in the decision to adopt the NFMA over the NFTRA, N was
presumably positive for each senator that voted for the former. If the benefits to each
legislator did exceed the costs, what was the range of political support an opposition to
each respective bill? Dennis LeMaster provides a summary of the array of interests.105
LeMaster portrays the situation as one in which the majority of the environmental groups,
the Forest Service, the professional associations, and the timber industry all had thrown
support behind S. 3091, and against S. 2926.106 Support for S. 2926 appeared to reside
only with several of the environmental groups, particularly those that had successfully
litigated the Monongahela case. LeMaster describes the embrace of S. 3091:
Members of the two committees [Agriculture and Forestry, and 
Interior and Insular Affairs] were quite proud of their efforts, 
believing that genuine compromises had been reached on some very 
difficult issues...Acceptance o f the amended bill [S.3091] grew 
among conservation and industry groups alike.107
It is not difficult to see, at least superficially, the Congressional incentive to pass 
the less precise legislation. S.3091, in its original form, was a product of the Forest 
Service itself. Much like the promulgation of the MUSYA, the agency played an integral 
role in the formulation and passage of the its own management statute. In both cases, in 
its desire to ensure its own discretionary authority, the agency miscalculated the nature o f 
those forces that sought to oppose national forest management. This miscalculation has
105 Supra, note 57.
106 Id. at 64-67.
107 Id. at 71. See also Robert Wolf, Promises to Keep: How the Forest Service has Pruned Back the 
National Forest Management Act, 7 The E n v t’l  Fo r u m  10 (1990), wherein he points out that the NFMA 
was chosen because it was viewed as a progressive forest management law.
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compounded the problems associated with the delegation of authority, and will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and S.
With the sheer weight of support in favor of the legislation, it is tempting to assert 
that the Congressional choice of S. 3091 represented not only a cost/benefit analysis of 
delegation, but also was the choice most reflective of the democratic process. To a 
congressman in 1975, it may well have appeared that the short and long term problems 
associated with national forest management would be resolved by subscribing to the 
option preferred by the moderate majority of the interests, not the one supported by the 
marginalized extremists. Legislators run a risk in accepting the special interests as 
proxies for the greater public interest; the risk that the two will not ultimately coincide. 
Congress, in the interests of political expediency, will tend to choose that legislative 
option most likely to placate as many special interests as possible. That strategy, 
however, is precisely what Congress must not do in the realm of national forest 
management. Failure to appreciate the long-term impacts of its legislative decisions is a 
flaw that cannot be underestimated, but is one that makes delegation that much more 
attractive to individual legislators. The results of such a short term, placatory strategy 
will be discussed in the next two chapters.
It is interesting to note that while the MUSYA depicts a great degree of delegation 
and discretion, the NFMA offers far less, and the NFTRA less still, the debate continues 
after 25 years as to whether the NFMA provides any substantive standards at all by which 
the Forest Service must temper its management. This debate, or contrast in perceptions, 
reflects a fundamental problem associated with the NFMA. The statute does not do what
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the myriad of interests want it to d o ,108 nor does it represent the same commodity to 
even allied interests.109 Though a product o f a political process, the NFMA does not 
represent to the environmental community the directives to the Forest Service that they 
wish to see imparted, and to the forest products industry the NFMA serves as a stumbling 
block to the efficient transformation of wood fiber.110 Apart from the dissatisfaction 
found among ideological opposites, is the curious dichotomy that the NFMA provides 
substantive standards that just need enforcing, versus the view that no such standards 
exist, and that new legislation is therefore warranted.111 This state of affairs is a result of 
the nature of the statute itself, and bears further examination in the next chapter. Suffice 
it now to say that the requirements of NFMA, though a great deal more prescriptive than 
the MUSYA, do not appear to be effective in preventing multiple interpretations o f the 
statute, and dispute over substantive requirements.112 Such flaws will inevitably drive 
litigation. This conclusion was shared, at least by some, shortly after the passage of the 
NFMA:
Ideally Congress should set policy for federal forest land 
management...In the real world, Congress sometimes fails to do its 
policy-setting job. In fact, all too often Congress has the annoying
108 For those interests that do not wish to see the harvest o f  timber in any national forest, the NFMA does 
not represent a complete victory. While it does restrict certain activities, it continues to facilitate 
harvesting.
109 For a contrast in opinion even among environmentalists see Federico Cheever, Four Failed Standards: 
What We Can Learn from the History o f  the National Forest Management's Substanive Timber 
Management Provisions, 77 OR. L. R ev . 601 (1998) versus JackTuhoIske and Beth Brennan, The National 
Forest Management Act: Judicial Interpretation o f  a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. 
R E V . 81 (1994); Stephanie M. Parent, The National Forest Management Act: Out o f  the Woods and Back to 
the Courts?, 22 E n v t ’l  L. 699 (1992); John F. Hall and Richard S. Wasserstrom, The National Forest 
Management Act o f1 976. Out o f  the Courts and Back to the Forests,  8 E n v t ’l  L . 523 (1978).
110 Supra, note 57 at 71.
111 Supra, note 109.
112 Cheever, supra, note 109 at 694. He argues that each o f  the standards enacted in the NFMA are more 
ambiguous than those contained within the Organic Act.
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habit o f passing laws without clearly articulating what i t-  Congress- 
- intends the policy to be. Considering the complexities of the issues 
with which Congress must deal, inadvertent oversights are 
understandable. But sometimes it seems as if laws are intentionally 
ambiguous, in which case the agency or the courts must divine the 
intentions of the lawmakers when they wrote the bill. When 
Congress fails to articulate policy, the agency has no choice but to 
set its own or cease to function. This leaves the agency vulnerable 
to lawsuits by those who disagree. If there are those who still don’t 
agree, the whole thing winds up back in Congress for resolution....
I am not disputing the interpretations arrived at by the courts, but I 
do question whether adjudication is the best way to set land and 
resource management policy. We were frequently told in law school 
that the purpose of the law is to let people know what is expected of 
them, so that they may plan their actions with certainty. But these 
days, most federal land-management agencies are certain of only 
one thing—more environmental lawsuits.113
More recently, it has become apparent that the best intentions o f the NFMA to 
resolve and reduce litigation, have instead provided fertile ground for spawning litigation.
-An Example o f  Delegation's Failings: the Organic Administration Act (1897) 
The discretion indices, and delegation and constraint ratios are useful measures 
for comparing disparately different statutes with a common parlance. Unfortunately, in 
providing that commonality, the details of the statutes, the “meat” of the statutes if you 
will, may become obscured. In order to appreciate the effects of these statutes, it is 
necessary to understand the details, beyond what the Epstein/O’Halloran equations 
deliver.
113 Richard Pardo, The Complacency o f  Congress in C risis  in  F ed e r a l  Fo r e s t  La n d  M a n a g e m e n t  44 
(Dennis LeMaster et al. eds.. 1976).
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The Organic Administration Act, in its original form, contained a large number of
provisions for the survey of public lands in the West.114 These provisions specified both
the locale, and the appropriation for the survey.115 While of historic import, these
provisions played no role in designating the management of the national forest reserves,
and do not appear in the amended Organic Act. The provisions that empowered the
president to take certain measures in the management of the national forests, in some
cases, were similarly quite prescriptive. For example, the language of difficulty during
the Monongahela controversy, specifically required certain procedures for the harvest of
timber from the federal reserves. Pinchot, commenting on the Act, noted that this
language imparted broad discretion to the forester:
Specifically, the Secretary was authorized to sell 'the dead, matured, 
or large growth of trees’ on the forest reserves, after the trees had 
been ‘marked and designated.’ Another door wide open to the 
forester.116
At the time, the restrictions offered, at least to Pinchot, ample room to exercise the 
profession o f forestry in a relatively unencumbered setting. The countervailing argument 
is that the Act was not in fact a delegation of authority at all to the agency, but was a 
prescriptive set of regulations designed to harness agency discretion.117 The regulations 
are less an attempt to shackle the agency, but more reflect an attempt to prevent 
continued abusive national forest harvesting practices by loggers. The Forest Service 
retained great leeway in management under this Act.
114 Act o f  Ju n e  4,1897, c.2, §1,30 Stat. 32
n s Id.
116 G iffo r d  P in c h o t , Br e a k in g  N e w  G r o u n d  117 (1947).
117 C h a r l e s  W ilk in s o n  a n d  H. M ic h a e l  A n d e r s o n ,  L a n d  a n d  R e s o u r c e  P la n n in g  in  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
F o r e s t s  133 (1987).
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This same language, however, interpreted some 70 years later, would be strictly 
and narrowly construed, quite a contrast to Pinchot’s vision. One author described the 
situation as:
The decision in Izaak Walton League v. Butz showed many o f us 
that the Organic Act’s authority was not quite as broad as we had 
assumed. Still this kind of legislation by and large reflected an 
apparent congressional unwillingness or inability to specify the kind 
of management policies and practices it deemed most appropriate 
for the public lands, in essence telling the administrators to do the 
best job they could within the general guidelines provided...Thus, 
the Forest Service, delegated rather broad discretion to manage the 
national forests in the public interest, established its own policies to 
carry out its responsibilities. It did so simply because Congress has 
failed to provide any specific guidelines.118
The marked variation in interpretation and the technical nature o f the litigation119 should
have been a brilliant warning to Congress o f the tone and tactics of future national forest
litigation. The professional discretion of the forester was to quickly be replaced with the
angry allegations of groups intent on ending the practices for which the forest reserves
were originally established. This fundamental shift in both policy and methods was even
recognized by the court:
It is apparent that the heart of this controversy is the change in the 
role of the Forest Service which has taken place over the past thirty
Izaak Walton also brings to the fore a recurring theme related to both the Forest 
Service and delegation: the holistic nature o f contentious issues and the effect on both
118 Jerome C . Muys, Specification o f  Goals. Procedures and Guidelines in CRISIS tN Fe d e r a l  F o r e s t  
La n d  Ma n a g e m e n t  38 (Dennis LeMaster et al. eds., 1976).
119 The judge in Izaak Walton consulted a dictionary for a definition o f  the term mature, though that term o f 
forestry art has implications far removed from that found in Webster. This is a blatant example o f  the peril 
faced by the forestry profession when its decisions become the subject to judicial second-guessing.
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Congress and the Forest Service. As the next chapter will discuss at length, with a given 
policy issue, in a climate of heightened controversy, Congress will be best served by 
addressing the policy, but by not addressing the underlying controversy. That unhappy 
task will be foisted upon the agency. Of course, in such a climate, the agency wants as 
precise a direction as is possible to avoid being rendered about by the political forces.
Unfortunately, when the agency is slow to recognize its peril, Congress will act in 
its best interest, often even garnering the agency’s support for proposed legislation. It 
should be clear that as national forest management was elevated both in the public’s 
consciousness and as the general level of conflict escalated, the scrutiny of the statutory 
framework also increased. Opponents of Forest Service programs could pore over the 
respective laws, in the hopes of unearthing a silver bullet akin to the harvesting language 
of the Organic Act.
Summary:
Compromise of contentious issues by shifting the focal point o f the conflict away 
from Congress, towards the agency is the tragic irony of Forest Service legislative 
involvement. The Forest Service must be stirred from its mistaken belief that an 
abundance of bureaucratic discretion will ensure its ability to effectively manage in the 
current social climate. The reason for the agency’s slumber is perhaps a result o f the 
longstanding, and justifiable, reliance on scientific management as a shield from public 
pressure. I do not suggest that the Forest Service has at any point been immune or
120 Supra, note 93 at 954.
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insulated from public pressure,121 but to a large extent the pressure emanated from 
Congress. With the Izaak Walton decision, the dependence on scientific management to 
buttress Forest Service decisions entered its twilight. As many have noted, with the 
public’s rejection of agency expertise, and distrust of its management decisions and 
rationale, the Forest Service’s ability to defend its actions eroded. As the chart in 
Chapter Four will point out, I would suggest that as the agency moves further up the 
curve, the reliance on sound scientific management increases if the agency is to overcome 
the increasing obstacles. If the agency cannot take refuge in science, its ability to 
exercise the discretion granted it to meet any particular goal will be illusory. As Sally 
Fairfax notes:
The question of why the Forest Service emerged an early winner in 
the nondelegation terrain is interesting. It seems important that the 
agency presented itself as the premiere expression of scientific 
decision-making.122
I doubt that any person familiar with the today’s Forest Service would suggest 
that the agency remains atop the pedestal of “scientific decision-making”.
121 Jack Ward Thomas and James Burchfield, Comments on the Religion o f  Forestry, 97 J. OF FORESTRY 10 
(1999).
122 Sally Fairfax, State Trust Lands Management: A Promising New Application fo r  the Forest Service in A 
V isio n  f o r  t h e  U.S. Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e : Go a l s  f o r  t h e  N e x t  C en tu r y  110 (Roger Sedjo, ed. 2000).
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C h a p t e r  4 : A n  E n v ir o n m e n t  o f  C o n f l ic t
In the first part o f this century, the courts fairly consistently rejected 
agency programs and decisions by locating in them an 
unconstitutional delegation o f  authority. The U.S. Forest Service 
successfully dodged the nondelegation bullet. Public domain 
management was one area in which the court significantly aided the 
expansion o f  federal authority.
-Sally Fairfax123
There are undoubtedly any number of potential effects that may result from 
Congressional delegation to the Forest Service. An optimist might argue that the 
increased discretion afforded the agency leads to the efficient and effective management 
of the national forests. While possible, such a view requires that the delegation of 
authority also include forest management goals that are definable, consistent, and 
attainable. In the absence of such goals, the discretion afforded the Forest Service is 
nothing more than the power to do as the agency chooses, or perhaps the means whereby 
the agency is coerced into performing as the salient special interests choose. While 
Professor Fairfax may be accurate that the Forest Service dodged the nondelegation 
bullet, the result may be that the agency caught another bullet squarely in the chest.
This Chapter will discuss this fundamental concern in understanding the effects of 
delegation: how conflict has served as both an impetus and a result o f delegation, and 
further illustrate the contentious management arena in which the Forest Service must 
operate. Describing first the intertwined relationship between delegation, vague statutes
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and the inherent conflicts faced by agencies, the chapter will follow with a detailed 
examination of specific problems posed by the nature of litigation, administrative 
appeals, and judicial review. All of these difficulties, it must be remembered, are part 
and parcel of the role delegation plays in creating obstacles for effective agency 
operation. If the Epstein/O’Hal Ioran formulae accurately reflect the statutory situation, 
and delegation is indeed prevalent, the nature of national Forest conflict itself is worthy 
o f attention.
The Nature of the Beast
The problems associated with delegation are not simply a direct result of a
legislative addiction to delegation, but rather they result from the interaction between
delegation, conflict, and ambiguous statutes. Put another way, in order to avoid the direct
responsibility for legislative effects, a legislature must provide an agency with sufficient
discretion to essentially craft its own set of laws; the legislature must provide the agency
with enough rope for the agency to eventually hang itself. Discretion is built upon
ambiguity, and the ambiguity can be the product of a broad management goal, the lack of
effective constraints on agency action, or both. Regardless of the particular combination,
an inevitable effect of vague statutes is the potential for multiple interpretations. In such
cases, when disparate parties with incompatible value systems can reasonably interpret a
legal mandate differently, the stage is set for conflict. In turn, that conflict will spawn
litigation.124
_ _
124 Some might argue that the precise details in the NFMA, for example stand regeneration within five 
years o f  harvest, are nearly meaningless in any silvicultural sense. I would suggest that spedficity o f  that 
type is not particularly beneficial for the Forest Service in this context, as it merely ties a specific 
management requirement to an ambiguous underlying management goal o r purpose. While it may provide
4 9
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Expressed simply, the relationship between conflict, delegation, and vague 
statutes can be visualized like so:
Delegation
Vague Laws
C o n flic t
FIGURE 1. Policy Relationships: Legislatures, publics, and agencies.
Delegation, as such, is neither exclusively a cause nor an effect of conflict. 
Rather, it is both a product of the conflict inherent in the national forest management 
arena (as a device described in Chapter Two), and it fuels further conflict by its failure to 
conclusively set forth a cogent and legitimate strategy for national forest management, 
leaving too much room for disagreement. Based upon this relationship, 1 would suggest 
that as the public interest125 becomes more unclear to a legislator, the interests become
an agency with opportunities for flexibility, it will inevitably engender distrust o f  the agency, and 
ultimately spawn litigation.
1:25 In the absence o f  a universally accepted definition, much like the term ‘old-growth”, the term “public 
interest” tends to mean what each individual user o f  the term chooses. M y intended meaning refers to a 
consensus or political majority position that is recognizable to a politician. Where that majoritarian break-
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more fragmented, or if the legislator is less sure as to the prevailing interest to support, 
the greater the tendency toward delegation. The corollary of course, is in situations with 
a clearly identifiable public interest, one reflecting a great deal of unanimity, a legislator 
will tend to advocate self-aggrandizing legislation.
Though not written in the context of national forest management, Professor
Pendleton Herring, in discussing the public interest, noted nearly 65 years ago that:
Its [the public interest's] value is psychological and does not extend 
beyond the significance that each responsible civil servant must find 
in the phrase for himself. Acting in accordance with this subjective 
conception and bounded by his statutory competence, the bureaucrat 
selects from the special interests before him in a combination to 
which he gives official sanction. Thus inescapably in practice the 
concept of public interest is given substance by its identification 
with the interests of certain groups.126
Herring’s view suggests that the public interest is largely a construct that takes corporeal 
form when a bureaucrat makes a decision to ratify a set of interests. There is no need, 
however, to limit this observation to bureaucrats. Certainly a legislator too lends 
substance to the public interest in the choice of legislative paths. But before any one path 
is chosen, the legislator, like the bureaucrat, must select a single or a set of special 
interests to advocate, or must devise some intermediate position, and then convince these 
constituencies to accept that position. In order to maximize the opportunity for re- 
election, the rationale legislator would likely choose from the special interest positions
point is set, be it a simple majority, supermajority, o r unanimous consent, is not the issue. Raher, a 
politician must be able to discern from his perception o f  his constituents which particular stance on an issue 
will maximize the number o f  constituent votes. For a broad and thoughtful analysis o f  the public interest, 
see Carl J. Friedrich, ed., N o m o s  V, T h e  Pu b lic  In t e r e s t  (1962).
126 E. Pendleton Herring, Pu b lic  A d m in ist r a t io n  a n d  t h e  P u b l ic  In t e r e s t  24 (1936).
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(or craft and intermediate position), that among other things, represented a number of 
votes—presumably more votes than any contrary position.
This aspect o f the hypothesis is not new, and in fact tracks closely with the 
various theories of legislative behavior described in Chapter 2. I would offer, however, 
that there is a resulting impact upon the agency for whom the hypothetical legislation is 
crafted, one that is directly related to both the nature o f the public interest, and the extent 
of the delegation. That impact is the extent to which the agency becomes the focal point 
for dispute, litigation, and ultimately, frustration of its mission.
Basically, an agency is not served by delegated authority in areas of intense social 
and political conflict. In such instances, the agency is far better served by precise, even 
prescriptive legislation, whereby the actions o f the agency can be easily measured against 
the statutory language. Figure 2. below illustrates the nature of this argument.
Vague Maximal
Public
Interest
Defined Minimal
Less More
Delegation
Figure 2. Agency Difficulty Curve
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It is, o f course, possible to describe “Agency Difficulty” in a wide number o f ways. For 
the purposes o f this paper, it is defined as the conflicts and obstacles met by the agency in 
the pursuit of its mission.
This depiction is similar to the model developed by Clark and Cummings in 
assessing whether an agency will or should negotiate, collaborate, or compete.127 In 
Clark and Cummings’ model, an agency’s actions are largely dependent upon several 
factors: the extent of the cooperative behavior of the agency in seeking to please other 
parties, the agencies own relative power, and the risks associated in competing in the 
conflict. In the context of the Forest Service, these factors can fluctuate in any given 
situation, as can the amount of delegation with any given statute. The essence, however, 
is that the agency’s behavior is not only influenced by external forces, but in turn 
influences those external factors. When the agency has a great deal o f delegated power, 
it nonetheless may not imbue the agency with sufficient relative power to triumph in a 
conflict situation. Unfortunately, it is conflict that many Forest Service adversaries seek.
Categorically, agency conflicts and obstacles are typically of the legal variety, as 
lawsuits and injunctions are a powerful tool in preventing agency action and in modifying 
agency behavior. While other metrics o f difficulty surely exist, legal problems are often 
the bottom line, where actual projects either succeed or fail, and where the public is often 
presented with perhaps its only window on the forest management debate.
127 Peter B, Clark and F. Cummings, Selecting An Environmental Conflict Management Strategy, in 
E n v ir o n m e n t a l  C o n f l ic t  Ma n a g e m e n t ,  34  (Phillip A  Marcus and Wendy M. Emrich, eds. 1981).
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For example, an issue like the silvicultural practice of clear-cutting, (the genesis 
o f both the Monongehela decision in West Virginia128 and of the Bolle Report’s129 
indictment o f Forest Service practices in the Bitterroot Valley of Montana) represents a 
highly divisive issue for Congress; passions run high on all sides. Congressional 
response to the 197S Court of Appeals decision was legislation that was predictably not a 
prohibition on clear-cutting, but rather was a restriction designed to limit its applicability. 
The final discretion to employ clear-cutting as a harvest regime remained with the Forest 
Service.
The result of permitting such broad discretion without adequately defining 
applications should not be unexpected. For example, in an instance where clear cutting is 
proposed, the legal challenge might be brought that its use is illegal and violates the 
ambiguous language of the NFMA, or its implementing regulations.130 The situation 
could not be worse for the implementing agency. The appearance of professional 
discretion is a mirage for judicial interpretation; not the result any professional forester 
would have.
Like the average citizen who must know the laws governing his everyday affairs 
in order that the results of violating those laws be predictable, a management agency too 
must know what is expected from it. Just as a “reasonable and prudent” speed limit 
contrasts with a specific, numeric limit, an agency’s mission can range from the 
ambiguous to the well-defined. When it tends toward the latter, the agency is left without
128 Supra, note 93.
129 U.S. Senate. Doc. 115. A University View o f  the Forest Service. (Bolle Report) 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 
Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office (1970).
130 Sierra Club v. Peterson. 185 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 1999).
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the ability to predict the outcome of its actions. Predictability, however, is a hallmark of 
the legal system. If the Forest Service cannot anticipate the reactions, from all of the 
affected parties, to a selected management regime (and it appears that it cannot; for 
example, ecosystem management has not been a panacea with environmentalist 
challenges), its attempts to effectively manage the national forests will be inconsistent 
and floundering; always wondering from which quarter the next challenge will come to 
its latest proposals.
The Environmental Dispute Industry
National Forest conflict, both as a result of delegation, and as a cause of future 
delegation, is to a large extent a result of interested participants that possess both the 
resources and the will to dispute Forest Service management decisions. Resources, as 
discussed later, have become readily available, and in fact are tied directly to the 
industrialization of environmentalism. Nor is the will lacking. The desire to control or 
direct national forest management has not, as will be explained, waned over time. Both 
the resources and the will to fuel disputes are amply reflected in the nature of modem 
environmentalism.
The notion that environmental concerns are localized and subject to solution by 
the appropriate measure of executive or legislative compromise is partially correct (“Not 
in my backyard” or NIMBY environmentalists certainly comprise many of the national 
forest management objectors), but this view also ignores the reality, or perhaps the 
entirety o f the situation. The environmental community has evolved into an industry 
whose raw materials are ambiguous statutes, and whose cash crop is litigation.
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By way o f example, in 1976, J. Michael McCloskey, o f the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund, made the following statement:
A lot o f interests have great fun making myths about us and 
inventing suppositions that we’re trying to stop all timber cutting or 
all oil drilling or what have you. This is not our policy. We believe 
there is an ample role for timber cutting—to be specific, cutting 
on the national forests, (emphasis added) Those who indulge 
themselves in such myths don’t do their cause a very good service. 
Anybody who operates on the basis of unrestrained enthusiasm for 
such gross characterizations is really living in his own private 
world.
In contrast the Sierra Club both currently, and for the last several years, opposes 
all commercial timber harvesting on not only the national forests, but on any public land; 
actively supporting federal legislation designed to meet that end.132 Now there are 
several possible rationale for this shift. It may be that in 1976, J. Michael McCloskey 
artfully employing the lawyer’s craft, said precisely what he meant: that the Sierra Club 
did not oppose all timber cutting, just all commercial timber cutting. Or—it may be that 
conditions have so markedly deteriorated since 1976 on the national forests that the 
Sierra Club was morally compelled to alter its position to prevent further destruction. 
Considering that the commercial harvest volume has declined precipitously in the last 
decade (during the period that the Sierra Club’s recent position was adopted) tends to 
argue against that direct suggestion, though it may support the variant, which is my 
preferred option.
131 D e n n is  LeM a s t e r  a n d  L u k e  Po p o v ic h , e d s . C r is is  in  F e d e r a l  F o r e s t  L a n d  M a n a g e m e n t  29  
(1976 ).
132 http ://w w w .sierra .c lub .org /forests/b ilI-97 .asD . The legislation supported by the Sierra Club, the National 
Forest Protection and Restoration Act, would end the sale o f  timber on the national forests. Ironically, it
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The reason, I would suggest, for this seeming catharsis is that environmentalism is
indeed a business, one that thrives on conflict, needs conflict, and will work to nurture
conflict wherever and whenever possible. For example, the Sierra Club alone has annual
revenues exceeding $40 million, while one source reports the twelve largest national
environmental organizations having annual revenues exceeding $600 million,133 and
another source reports 13 national environmental groups with annual revenues exceeding
$ 1 billion.134 As Alston Chase describes:
Like many spiritual movements that achieve worldly power, 
therefore, environmentalism has lost its way. Bloated by wealth, 
mainstream environmental groups have become bureaucracies not 
unlike the public agencies they pledged to police. Occupying high- 
rent offices in the nation’s capital far from the “ecosystems” they 
promised to defend, and heavily staffed with well-paid lawyers, 
these organizations are driven by ever greater pressure to increase 
income flow. They spread scare stories to stimulate public 
generosity and embrace litigation as a way of life.135
This behavior, o f furthering any number of goals, by highlighting crises, real or 
imagined, has been labeled as “popularizing;” an d , it is argued, is part and parcel of the 
environmental movement.136 The Sacramento Bee has recently and thoroughly 
investigated and published a series of articles on this very question, suggesting that
has been the executive and judicial branches that that have, in the last decade, largely foreclosed 
commercial timber harvesting on the national forests.
133 http://www.cdfe.org/topl2.htmI. For a more detailed analysis o f the nature o f environmental activist 
funding, See R o n  A r n o l d ,  U n d u e  I n f lu e n c e :  W e a l t h y  F o u n d a t i o n s ,  G r a n t - D r i v e n  
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  G r o u p s  a n d  Z e a l o u s  B u r e a u c r a t s  T h a t  C o n t r o l  Y o u r  F u t u r e  (1999).
134 T e r r y  L. An d e r s o n  a n d  D. L e a l , Fr e e  M a r k e t  E n v ir o n m e n t a l is m  86 (2001).
135 A l s t o n  C h a s e ,  In  a  D a r k  W o o d  4 14  (1995).
136 C h a r l e s  T . R u b in , T h e  G r e e n  C r u s a d e :  R e th in k in g  t h e  R o o t s  o f  E n v ir o n m e n ta l is m  21-26 
(1994).
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prominent elements of the environmental movement have indeed acquired the trappings 
of any large corporate business endeavor.137
Consequently, it would seem foolish to ignore the monetary incentives for the 
opposition of federal land management policy138 (as I would argue it is foolish to ignore 
the spiritual or romantic aspects of environmentalism that undoubtedly fuel many a 
crusade139). The notion that national forest timber harvesting must end can serve well as 
a focal point for groups such as the Sierra Club, rallying their supporters with tales of 
despair, and increasing memberships and funding.140 Further, the control that many 
interests seek over the management of the national forests can be pursued with a number 
of strategies, including both legislative means and resort to the judiciary. The judiciary 
has been the forum of choice for many groups, as the lack of any major forest 
management legislation in the last 25 years attests. The result has been a rush from the 
halls of Congress to the courtrooms. Relying upon the judiciary as an avatar to assert the
137 Tom ICnudson o f  the Sacramento Bee newspaper, in a 5-pan series o f investigative repons from April 
22-26,2001, set forth a compelling collection o f evidence that supports this argument. The stories may be 
accessed at http://www.sacbee.com/news/projects/environment/20010422.html
138 For example, the curiously titled Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504, provides that a party that 
triumphs over the United States in a  adversarial proceeding may recover its legal fees and costs from the 
government. This hybrid o f  the American and English legal fee rules hardly suggests equality o f  any sort. 
In fact, since the government cannot conversely recover costs or fees in the event it prevails, a situation is 
created in which an environmental plaintiff faces virtually no costs for litigation, opportunity or otherwise. 
One can well imagine the effect this incentive arrangement would have on the number o f lawsuits brought 
against the Forest Service.
139 One need not look very far to see the confrontational aspect incorporated within the environmental 
movement. See, for example, RlK. S c a r c e , Ec o -W a r r io r s , (1990). Somewhat humorously, a recent 
lawsuit against the Forest Service (Associated Contract Loggers. Inc. v. USFS. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1029 ( D. 
Minn. 2000) claimed that the agency’s acceptance o f  the “religion” o f  deep ecology was in fact an 
unconstitutional violation o f  the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs case was dismissed, and a rule has 
been issued to show cause why plain tiffs counsel should not be sanctioned for bringing such an action.
140 Supra, note 137.
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degree of control desired, of course, necessitates litigation.141 Jones and Taylor’s 
research substantiates this observation.142 They observed that from 1977 to 1992 in the 
case of the NFMA, and from 1971 to 1992 in the case of the NEPA, environmentalists 
were responsible for 60% and 70% of the respective lawsuits.143 O f those, 75% and 92% 
respectively, were brought with the intention of obstructing commodity production.144 
Jones and Taylor’s conclusion, based upon these numbers, was that: “it reveals also that 
environmentalists were much more likely to use litigation as a tool to seek changes they 
desire in National Forest Management.”145
The data from 1993 to 2000 is similar, but with a slight increase in the 
percentages. Environmental groups brought 70% of the NFMA lawsuits during 1993- 
2000, and 87% of those suits were for the purpose of obstructing commodity production. 
This appears to support the finding that the environmental community has indeed 
embraced litigation as a means to facilitate changes in national forest policy. While the 
Forest Service had by that time, evolved into something other than a timber production 
agency, the volume and type of litigation does not reflect that fact.
Though it appears that litigation is a tool, and perhaps the preferred tool, I do not 
suggest that it is the only tool. Legislative remedies are always an option. A fairly recent
141 The use o f  the courts to assert control, unfortunately, is indirect and highly undemocratic. It is therefore, 
difficult to accept positions on national forest management that do not originate with the C ongrss as 
representative o f  the “will o f the people.” As the most democratic o f  our federal branches o f  government, 
the actions o f  Congress, or inactions, should be considered the closest approximation to the “will o f  the 
people.”
142 Elise S. Jones and Cameron P. Taylor, Litigating Agency Change: The Impact o f  the Courts and 
Administrative Appeals Process on the Forest Service, 23 POL’Y STUD. J. 310 (1995).
143 Id. at 319-321.
144 Id. at 323-323.
145 Id. at 323.
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study noted that between 1977 and 1992 , 507 bills were introduced to the Congress
addressing one aspect or another of the Forest Service.146 Of those, 164, or nearly a third
were enacted. O f course, none of the 507, and none of the bills introduced since, have
resulted in the passage of a comprehensive, explicit alteration in the existing statutory
structure for management o f the national forests, or in the Forest Service’s mandate.
Consequently, an environmentalist with the will and the resources is better served by
committing to litigation as a mechanism for change. Paul Hirt describes it somewhat
differently, but with the same general meaning:
Environmental groups, in pursuit of real change and convinced it 
was unlikely to come from the executive or legislative branches, 
increasingly turned to the courts to defend nontimber multiple use 
values and to attempt to block timber sales in remaining roadless 
areas. The judicial branch soon proved to be an effective forum for 
advancing environmental goals. Litigation proliferated.147
That, I believe, is the explanation for why the Sierra Club changed horses. It
represents a model of the larger, industry-wide embrace of a kind of corporate
environmentalism. Though the 1990s saw commercial timber harvesting as a mere
shadow of its former self, and the Forest Service embarking upon its most holistic
management path ever (ecosystem management), the sounds of battle did not fade. That
is not to say however, that the war hasn’t been decided. In the words o f the former chief
of the Forest Service:
The “war” over the purpose [of the national forests] is over—at least 
for the moment. Muir’s forces have won. Yet the enviros stay
146 Elise S. Jones and Will Calloway, Neutral Bystander, Intrusive Manager, or Useful Catalyst?: The Role 
o f  Congress in Effecting Change Within the Forest Service, 23 POL’Y STUD. J. 3 1 0 , 345 (1995 ).
147 P a u l  W. H ir t ,  A  C o n s p i r a c y  o f  O p tim ism  253 (1994).
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focused on “mop up” and wander the battlefield bayoneting the 
wounded.148
The incentive structure suggests that the Sierra Club and others must raise the bar,
find a new dragon to slay, or at least a new windmill to charge—in this case pursue a
federal zero cut policy, advocate a roadless policy of unprecedented proportions, and
oppose any harvesting of old-growth timber, however subjectively that term might be
defined.149 Similarly, Professor Hoberg recently pointed out that:
During the debate over Section 318 [of the timber salvage rider] in 
1989, environmentalists proposed an allowable cut of 4.8 bbf per 
year. A harvest level they were willing to accept in 1989 is 4 times 
higher than the level they consider outrageously high in 1993.150
If the environmental industry must perpetuate conflict to thrive, then perhaps the 
most effective means is by the litigation stemming from arguments over the intent of 
ambiguous statutes. Certainly, conflict is not enhanced by the formulation of more 
specific laws to reign in the Forest Service. Specific laws make it easy for an agency to 
determine whether it is in compliance or not. In such instances, the agency's legal 
counsel is generally capable of predicting and advising whether any given action will 
result in a violation of a statute or rule.151 In this hypothetical world, an agency, if it so
148 Jack Ward Thomas, “The Times They Are A’Changin’— Is Multiple-Use a Worn-Out Concept?” 
Speech at the University o f  Washington (November 15,2000)
149 For an interesting attempt at gening the Congress to explicitly embrace this ideology, see H.R. 1396, 
106th Cong., I51 Sess., as well as its successor, H.R. 1494, 107th Cong., Is* Sess. (2001). It remains 
questionable, however, whether an entrepreneurial environmental group would ultimately support such a 
blanket ban. It would surely eliminate that particular source o f  conflict, and much like participating in 
collaborative processes designed to find solutions to problems, solutions may not be the actual goal o f  such 
groups.
150 Supra. note 62 at 11.
151 Robert W olf argues that indeed the Forest Service’s legal counsel had advised its client that clearcutting 
o f  “immature” trees was violative o f  the Organic Act. The supposition being, had the client heeded this
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chooses, can avoid the nasty pitfall of litigation, and the costs associated with conflict at 
all levels.
From the opposition’s perspective, if  the law is clear and defined, it is quite easy 
to assess whether the agency violated it. If the agency appears to have complied, an 
environmental plaintiff is not quite as eager to commence hostilities.
It must be kept in mind that courts of law are comprised of former lawyers, many 
of whom now adjudicate in very diverse fields. It is somewhat unnerving for a resource 
manager to entrust a project’s or plan’s fate to a single judge or a panel of judges, 
particularly if the question at hand comprises both factually and legally complex natural 
resource issues, mired in public land administrative procedures. Consequently, the tactics 
of an environmental challenger are simple but can be quite effective. If the plaintiff can 
sow enough confusion, contradiction, and doubt with the court, the agency has a difficult 
challenge. Judges can be all too easily convinced that the “precautionary principle” is 
prudently preferable to permitting an action to proceed. This cautious tendency can be 
compounded by the various depictions of natural resource management agencies by their 
critics as callous despoilers.
If the legal framework directing an agency’s management is ambiguous, the 
environmental challenger’s chances of prevailing are enhanced. Given the opportunity to 
craft and pass into law any form of national forest legislation, environmental challengers
advice, the results o f  Monongehela may not have occurred as they did. Nonetheless, the fact remains that 
the agency had for nearly 70 years interpreted and applied a law in a manner that with which the court did 
not agree. The goal is to craft laws that do not create space for such dichotomous interpretations.
62
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
would not seek a detailed, prescriptive work. Rather, it would favor the very ambiguity 
that has served so well in the past to confound the agency.152
There are number o f ways to focus the discussion on the actual conflicts the 
Forest Service faces, both to support the tenets o f this chapter, and as a means of 
illuminating the effects of delegated authority. The amount of litigation the agency faces 
reflects the nature and clarity o f its management mandate. It too reflects dissatisfaction 
with the agency’s actions, and is again related to the theory that the agency is largely 
unable to clearly ascertain its course. Additionally, the amount and type of 
administrative appeals sets the tone for the level of conflict related to project 
development. Finally, judicial review o f the various legal challenges to the agency 
actions is important to understand, both as an influence on the outcomes of agency 
actions, but also in its relationship to delegation.
LITIGATION
As increased demand began to press the capacity o f  the national 
forests, conflicts arose between those who would manage the stands 
fo r  commercial timber purposes and those who would preserve 
forest environments in an aesthetically pleasing way fo r  outdoor 
recreation enthusiasts. So intense was the conflict between those 
with an interest in having the national forests produce a larger 
volume o f natural resource commodities and the growing body o f  
militant outdoor recreationists that the issues which divided them 
were increasingly taken to court fo r  adjudication.153
152 It is interesting to note that the NFTRA, arguably a more prescriptive bill, was apparently only 
supported by those environmental groups that had litigated the Izaac Walton decision. The more 
“mainstream” groups offered their support for the NFMA. In reality, it appears that both bills imparted 
very nearly the same amount o f  discretion, but it is in keeping with this argument that most o f the 
environmental groups preferred what was perceived as the more discretionary, and thus more easily 
challenged law.
153 M ic h a e l  D. B o w e s  a n d  J o h n  V . Kr u t il l a , M u l t ip l e-U s e  M a n a g e m e n t : T h e  E c o n o m ic s  o f  
P u b l ic  Fo r e s t l a n d s  6  (1989).
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The history of Forest Service litigation is a long one, including nearly every 
variation o f allegation creative plaintiffs can craft. The important bases for the purposes 
of this paper are the primary management statutes. Both the NFMA and the NEPA have 
been examined on at least one occasion by those outside the agency.154 Relying upon the 
WestLaw legal database, Jones and Taylor tracked the number and type of Forest Service 
litigation from the enactment of the NFMA and the NEPA until 1992. Using a similar 
methodology, it is possible to instead track the NFMA and MUSYA litigation from their 
respective passages, to 2000. The results of that analysis are set forth in Charts 2 and 3 
below.155
154 Supra, note 142.
155 In keeping with the protocols employed supra, note 9, a search was conducted on Westlaw o f the 
ALLFED database for cases containing the terms “MUSYA AND National Forest OR Forest Service”, and 
cross checked with a search for "Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act And National Forest OR Forest 
Service” . Both terms and connectors and natural language modes were utilized to verify results. The 
searched returned 23 and 20 documents respectively. Cases were then individually examined to edit out 
those cases that were not pertinent. Only those cases that referred to a count in the plaintiffs complaint for 
Forest Service violation o f  the MUSYA were included in the set. This list included unpublished decisions 
as well, a set excluded from the 199S work supra note 1. Similar protocols were utilized for the NFMA. 
The same database was searched for NFMA AND National Forests OR Forest Service and National Forest 
Management Act AND National Forests OR Forest Service. The searches returned 184 and 186 documents 
respectively, which were then edited to remove extraneous cases. The remaining list included unpublished 
decisions.
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There appears to be a trend towards an increased level of litigation under both 
statutes. It does not appear that the mere timber harvest level, the traditional nemesis, is 
necessarily driving litigation. The absence of a link between timber harvest volume and 
litigation supports the contention that conflict itself may be the goal, not the cessation of 
national forest timber production. While Chart 4, infra, indicates that by 2000 the 
national forest timber sold and harvested had decreased to 1940s levels, with the 
suggestion of further decreases, it appears to be a case in which there is a fixed or an 
increasing demand for the filing of lawsuits by environmental groups as indicated by 
Chart 5 below.
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Chart 4. Timber Volume Sold, 1905-1999 (BBF)
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As additional support for this argument, the silvicultural practice that has 
engendered the greatest angst among Forest Service critics, clearcutting, has been on a 
downward trend since at least 1989.156 Clear cutting represents only 10% of the 
silvicultural treatments employed in 1998, down from 31 % in 1989. 157 Perhaps even 
more dramatically, the total acres on which clearcutting was utilized, dropped from some 
250,000 acres in 1989 to less than 50,000 acres in 1998.158 Notably, this relative 
elimination o f clearcutting from the national forests does not appear to have had any 
limiting impact on litigation.159
Collectively, these indicators substantiate the theory that the environmental 
conflict industry will strive to maintain a consistent and ongoing program of national 
forest dispute, no matter the trends in actual timber sale and harvesting activity.160 One 
way to understand the issue is to consider a sort of supply and demand model. The 
volume of timber offered for sale over the last two decades has plummeted. Nonetheless, 
the corresponding number of NFMA lawsuits has not. With less volume to object to, but 
with a need to maintain funding and support, environmental groups have continued to 
litigate with the same intensity (As will be seen later, this pattern is replicated with
156 U . S. D e p t , o f  A g r ic u l t u r e , Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e , Fo r e s t  M a n a g e m e n t  Pr o g r a m  A n n u a l  Re p o r t  FY
1997 2 9 -3 0 (1 9 9 8 ) .
157 U.S. D e p t o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  F o r e s t  S e r v ic e ,  f o r e s t  m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  FY
1998 45-46(2001).
m Id.
159 Clearcutting, like old-growth, o r any number o f  other modem forestry pariah are often constructs o f  
subjective imagination and perception Clearcutting, like any other silvicultural technique, has both 
appropriate and inappropriate applications. See D a n ie l  B . Bo t k in , D isco rd a n t  H a r m o n ie s : A N e w  
Ec o l o g y  f o r  t h e  T w e n t y -F ir s t  C e n t u r y  162 (1990) fora discussion o f this very issue.
160 See K ev in  L. G erick e  an d  J. S u llivan , Public Participation and Appeals o f  Forest Service Plans- An 
Empirical Examination, 7 SOC’Y AND N a t . R e s o u r c e s  125 (1994), in w hich the  au th o rs’ s tu d y  o f  forest 
p lan  level a p p e a ls  rev ea ls  th a t tim b e r vo lu m e  harves ted  w as no t a  significant variab le  in  any  o f  th e ir  m odels 
analyz ing  th e  n u m b e r o f  ad m in is tra tiv e  appea ls .
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administrative appeals). With a declining pool of sales, a higher percentage of those 
sales will be litigated. The environmental industry, like any other, is reticent to downsize 
to meet changing conditions. It is in this volatile, yet quite predictable atmosphere of 
conflict that the Forest Service finds itself, where even drastic harvest reductions does not 
relieve the agency from incessant challenge.
Summary:
Undoubtedly, litigation against the Forest Service is multi-factorial.161 It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to account for all those factors, though I believe 
I have set forth what is perhaps the primary problem. In the cases of both the MUSYA 
and the NFMA, there has been a marked increase in litigation since the acts’ respective 
passage.162 It may be that the delegatory nature of these statutes, particularly the 
MUSYA, do not provide the impetus for lawsuits (that may be a social effect), but rather 
provide the means for the litigation. Both procedural and substantive bases to litigate 
Forest Service decisions is created, from which the agency’s actions can be contested as 
non-compliant with the law. This effect is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than with 
the National Environmental Policy Act,163 but it also pervades the MUSYA and NFMA. 
The less specificity the statute imparts (or a lack of substantive standard), the greater the
,6|  Id.
161 See R.W. Behan, RPA/NFMA— Time to Punt, J. OF FORESTRY 802 (1981), wherein he notes that: 
“W ithout a law, you can’t litigate, and that’s one reason to repeal RPA/NFMA. From the land manager’s
point o f  view, repealing the law is a guaranteed way to help get forest management decisions out o f the 
courtroom and back into the forest.’’
163 The NEPA provides a universal mechanism for litigants to challenge, upon procedural grounds, the 
proposed action o f any federal agency. By virtue o f  its inherent ambiguity and lack o f precise terminology 
it is a  fountain o f  lawsuits. Jones and Taylor’s work, supra note 133, also demonstrates that the number o f  
Forest Service lawsuits premised upon the NEPA is increasing.
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ability of a plaintiff to accuse the agency of an ambiguous illegal action, and the greater 
the chance that the agency’s decisions will be second-guessed. It is then the responsibility 
of the courts to sort out whether the agency is acting within the scope of an already 
contentious piece of legislation, adding their interpretation to the mix. This tryst o f 
delegation, ambiguity, and conflict serve to cripple Forest Service attempts to justify and 
explain its management decisions.
Figure 1. suggested that in situations with an uncertain or fragmented public 
interest, the legislature will delegate to a greater extent, thus creating more difficulty for 
the agency to face. It is precisely for this reason that delegation should not occur under 
such conditions. The greater the public controversy, the greater the necessity to rely upon 
democratic devices. When the legislature abdicates this responsibility, the burden and 
opportunity fall to the agency. At all times the agency is subject to the directives o f the 
executive branch, whose policies may or may not correspond with the will of the 
legislature.164 When the legislature delegates and affords the agency great discretion, the 
price can be high. The public that prompted congressional action is not satisfied, because 
the problem is not solved, but is rather refocused with a promise and a handshake. The 
result is predictably a continuation of the litigation and obstruction that initially prompted 
congressional action.
Over a six fiscal year period (1992-1997), the Forest Service national timber sale 
outlay for appeals/litigation and appeals/litigation-indirect averaged over six million
164 The current Clinton Roadless Initiative is a prime example o f  this dilemma. Though Congress has 
enacted a statutory mechanism for the protection o f wilderness, and has in fact set aside in excess o f  30 
million acres to date, the executive branch insists upon taking an alternative path to the same result, one 
that does not entail congressional assent, as is statutorily required.
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dollars annually.165 This number does not include those costs that are attributable to the
Department of Justice for the actual litigation in which they represent the Forest Service
exclusively, and consequently underestimates the true cost of Forest Service appeals and
litigation. Nonetheless, while that number does not appear to be increasing, (averaging
between 1% and 2% of the annual total outlay), it still represents a substantial sum,
whose significance will increase as the revenues generated from timber sales decreases.
This state o f affairs has been aptly described:
Appeals and lawsuits are pursued in high numbers and are 
considered a routine cost of doing business. In fact, for many, they 
are their business. 166
ADMINISTRA TIVE APPEALS 
Conflict, or resistance to agency actions, is implicit in the actions o f any public 
bureaucracy, regardless of the mission or setting. Measures of conflict can range from 
full blown litigation, as discussed above, to lesser but nonetheless frustrating and 
debilitating actions. The Forest Service Administrative Appeals process is one such 
measure. The number of appeals taken over forest plans promulgated under the NFMA 
reflect a somewhat different trend from litigation. While there appears to be a decline, or 
a least a leveling off in the annual number of project level administrative appeals (see 
Chart 6 below), the 1245 forest plan level appeals filed in the last 12 years alone, and the
165 U.S. G e n e r a l  a c c o u n t in g  O f f ic e  RCED99-174 Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e , a m o u n t  o f  T im b e r  O ffe r e d , 
So l d , a n d  Ha r v e s t e d , a n d  T im b e r  Sa l es  O u t l a y s , F isc a l  Y e a r s  1992 T h r o u g h  1997,71 (1999).
166 Jack W ard Thomas, What Now? From a Former Chief o f  the Forest Service, in A  VISION FOR THE U.S. 
Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e : Go a l s  fo r  It s  N e x t  C e n t u r y  25 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000).
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roughly 1000 project level appeals per year, nonetheless represent a tremendous indicator 
of dissatisfaction with Forest Service management planning efforts, and a willingness to
"P ro ject" Appeals 1986*1999.
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C h a r ts .  S o u r c e :  U S D A  F o r e s t  S e r v i c e  A p p e a l s  N a t io n a l  W o r k s h e e t s  1 9 9 0 * 1 9 9 9 .
impede those plans.
Generally, appeals of particular projects increased steadily, peaking in 1993, 
when the Congress amended the Forest Service appeal process, restricting the time in 
which an appeal could be filed, and requiring formal public participation in order to have 
standing to appeal.167 Following the enactment of this new provision, the number of 
national forest appeals dropped, sharply at first, but in the last several years appear to 
have stabilized (See Chart 6). Perhaps more interesting is the relationship between the
167 Department o f  Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act o f  1993, P.L. 102-381 Title III, §322.
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number of appeals, and the sale volume of timber from the national forests, and the 
relationship of timber-oriented appeals to the total number of appeals.168
The number of timber-oriented appeals per billion board foot o f timber sold from 
the national forests for 1990-1999 is displayed in Chart 7.
O a t  7. Forest Service Hrrtoer AppeelsfEBF Sdd, FY19&1-19K
ySsX. -v : '  ̂  ■ - J ir 'T tc
Again, the number of appeals appears to have peaked just prior to 1993, dropped 
steadily during the nineties, bottoming out in 1997, but is now on the rise again. All the 
while the absolute amount of timber sold has been decreasing. This would suggest that
l6)i The Forest Service sorts administrative appeals into eleven categories, one o f  which is “timber”.
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the amount and volume o f timber sales alone are not, as if often portrayed, the driving 
force behind national forest contention.169
Similarly, as Chart 8 depicts, the percentage o f timber appeals to the total number 
of appeals tracks quite closely.
Chart 8. Forest Sovice Tirrber AppealtfTotal Appeals, FV1990-1999
Again, the peak occurred near 1993, a rapid decline followed, and then a steady 
climb back to the previously high numbers. Of note is that nearly half of the 1000 or so 
national forest appeals per year are timber related, and that the percentage has not abated 
in light of the changes in timber volumes sold and harvested.170 Nothing suggests that the
169 Supra note 160.
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decrease in timber volume sold over the last decade has meaningfully impacted the 
conflict level in the arena of administrative appeals.
It is likely that the appeals o f forest plans track closely with plan formulation and
plan amendments as they occur from time to time, and thus may not depict any clear
pattern. The project-level trend, however, also does not appear to be associated with the
timber sale volume. Again, though sale volume dropped sharply after 1994, and
continues to do so, appeal trends do not reflect that drop. One author has concluded that
the number and percentage of appeals related to timber sales:
...Indicates that timber management is the most controversial 
activity in which the agency engages, and it illustrates a high level 
o f frustration with the agency’s timber policies among at least a 
segment of the American public.'71
Like litigation, it appears that administrative appeals too will occur at steady 
levels, as the various environmental groups contend amongst themselves to ply their trade 
in the face of a shrinking market. It is questionable then, whether even a complete 
cessation o f national forest timber sales would be effective in limiting appeal numbers, or 
whether the demand would simply drive greater numbers of appeals into the other ten 
appealable management categories.
The costs associated with appeals are immense. Estimates for FY 1990 were 
$195 million in tax revenue and $179 million in PILT foregone, and total Forest Service 
expenditures of $150 million in addressing appeals.172 Costs aside, any suggestion that 
the appeals system be revised or abandoned is commonly met with vehement objection.
171 Supra, note 142.
172 Forest Service Appeals, Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Public Lands, National Parks and Forests o f  
the Senate Comm, on Energy and Natural Resource, 102nd Cong. 180 (1991).
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Often the rationale is that the appeal process plays an integral role in sound public 
participation in national forest management. The mere mention of an abatement or 
restriction of the appeals process has been vocally condemned.173 Self-interest in 
perpetuating conflict may compel environmental groups to oppose any stricture o f the 
appeals process that might diminish these groups’ ability to carry on with business.174
Other observers opine that the Forest Service appeal system is fundamentally
flawed:
This system is designed for an oversimplified model o f resource 
management that is informal, discretionary, and purely 
technical....The current appeals system is ill-equipped to address 
important hybrid questions that contain both technical and social 
components...The failure of the system belies the image of the 
expert steward that the Forest Service has cultivated over the past 
eighty-eight years.175
It is not, however, a matter of an “oversimplified model of resource management,” but 
perhaps instead a matter of an outmoded model. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the 
appeal system is but one aspect of the traditional national forest management paradigm 
that has been altered as a result of the diminution of science, the rise of public
173 Id. at 185-243.
174 One might argue that it is a fundamental desire to end all timber harvesting on federal lands that spurs 
the increased intensity o f  obstructionist litigation. That theory would tend to conflict with the notion that 
this type o f  litigation is an end unto itself. If timber harvesting, one o f  the most promising and perpetual 
sources o f lawsuits, was eliminated, it would in turn eliminate a focal point for popularizing or demonizing 
the agency, thus making the popularization of forest crises more difficult. This conundrum is best 
illustrated by asking whether a group such as the Sierra Club would support to enactment a law such as 
H.R. 1494, knowing that its passage would spell the end o f  the litigation gravy train in many respects.
175 Bradley C. Bobertz and Robert L. Fischman, Administrative Appeal Reform: The Case o f  the Forest 
Service, 64  U . OFCOLO. L. Re v . 3 7 1 ,3 7 3  (1993).
76
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
involvement, and the role o f conflict in forest management. Nonetheless, it is recognized 
that some relief needs be afforded to project-level actions.176
Sustaining conflict, at any level, implies a resource commitment, one that Jones
and Taylor point out, may be misdirected:
Use of litigation and administrative appeals to force agency change 
incurs significant time and money costs for both the Forest Service 
and the external interests that initiate the challenges. Such resource 
expenditures represent significant opportunity costs; if alternative 
means were found to resolve conflicts, these finite resources could 
be spent by both sides in productive ways to enhance stewardship of 
our forests.177
Unfortunately, if the parties respective costs were equivalent, such solutions 
might be attainable, but the very nature of the conflict ensures that costs are not 
equivalent. Unlike a war, the various combatants in the national forest management fray 
do not risk the same defeat. Traditional users of the national forests: the loggers, miners, 
and motorized recreationists all stand to lose the forest privileges that they currently 
enjoy. The risks inherent to conflict are that the uses these groups currently undertake 
will be lost, that these particular multiple-uses will be abrogated to some other multiple- 
use, say wilderness or primitive areas. On the other side of the battlefield, the 
environmentalists face no such risk. Indulging in conflict carries with it no 
corresponding possibility that the uses that these groups enjoy might be lost and
176 GAO Re p o r t , Fo r e s t  Se r v ic e : Issu e s  R e l a ted  t o  M a n a g in g  N a t io n a l  Fo r e s t s  fo r  M ultiple  
USES 7 GAO/T-RCED-96-111 (1996); R. Max Peterson, “The Forest Service Mission: Past. Present and 
Future”, Paper prepared for the University o f  Montana School o f  Forestry and Resources for the Future, 
“Collaboration and Decision-making on the National Forests: Can it Work? Four Perspectives o f  the 
Potential Problems and Opportunities" January 22-23,2001 (2001).
177 Supra. note 142 at 333.
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converted to another use. No one would seriously entertain the possibility o f converting 
the Bob Marshall Wilderness to commercial timberland.
Quite simply, as a result, the front is generally stable, punctuated with forays, or 
moves in only one direction, with the environmentalists advancing. This fundamental 
difference in risk heightens the willingness of the environmental industry to take legal 
actions. As the environmental industry has become more affluent and organized, its 
ability to incur substantial litigation and appeal expenses has correspondingly increased. 
Unfortunately, this collective of groups has really never had to face the truly hard costs, 
the loss of use that is risked by all other parties to the national forest debate.
Entwined with a mission of conflict, the environmental industry does not 
perceive conflict as a problem to be solved.178 The variant of conflict for these groups is 
control. Control is, of course, something that can never directly occur whilst the Forest 
Service exists. Thus, conflict must suffice. Conflict and control are both dependent upon 
the resources or “power”179 o f an organization to muster. Paul Culhane has developed a 
model of measuring the policy output of a particular national forest issue.180 Culhane’s 
model is depicted below:
O = iiAPV, + i2APV2 + . . .  +  i„APV„
Where O =  policy output
178 For an interesting insight into this issue, consider the Sierra Club’s vehement rejection o f  collaborative 
efforts at dispute resolution. The Quincy Library Group forest management program, for example, has 
been roundly criticized by the Sierra Club for a number o f  reasons. It is this type o f  dispute resolution that 
disempowers the conflict industry and cannot, therefore, be tolerated. For details, see 
http://www.sierraclub.org/planet/199711 /delbert.html and
http://www.sierraclub.org/chapters/sanfra...ve%5the%5Fforest%5F%5Fcut%5Fthe%5Ft.html
179 I would again emphasize that pow er can be broken into two components: resources and the will to 
accomplish a task.
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i = a particular group’s relative influence index 
A = the group’s access to decision makers 
P = the group’s power 
V = the group’s value preference 
n = total number of groups in the policy process 
Of particular interest is variable P. The group’s respective power implies not only 
the ability to influence policy formation at the legislative level, but also at the judicial 
level. Culhane factors into the power variable a number o f aspects, including: 
membership, budgets, and professional staff.181
While Culhane concluded in 1981 that preservation groups did not exert much 
influence upon such items at timber sale volume, particularly not relative to the forest 
products industry, it is important to recognize that his analysis was done in the years just 
following enactment o f the NFMA. Looking at Chart 3, one can see that NFMA 
litigation had not yet accelerated. Culhane’s analysis, if applied to current times, 
(particularly for variable P for preservationists) would likely show a much higher 
influence by these groups. Additionally, Culhane’s earlier calculations reflect a severe 
disadvantage for preservationists in the budget subcategory. Again, this factor would 
likely reflect a heightened current power of preservationists to influence policy.
180 Pa u l  J . C u l h a n e , Pu b l ic  La n d s  Po l itic s  (1981)
181 Id. a t 373.
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It is uncertain whether the appeals process has resulted in substantive changes in 
forest management for the better.182 It is highly likely, however, that the appeals process 
has provided an incentive to designing projects that are less controversial, thus less likely 
to trigger an appeal.183 Unfortunately, this influence often occurs in a forum (the 
judiciary) that may not be the appropriate and democratic manner in which national forest 
management should be directed. Project modification to avoid appeals by special 
interests does not suggest that the revised projects are more legally defensible or 
scientifically sound, only that they are more palatable to the various critics.
Administrative appeals and their associated costs, like litigation, are products 
facilitated by delegation. The Forest Service, perhaps at the genesis o f the administrative 
appeals process, apparently believed the appeals process would afford a procedural 
mechanism to attempt the resolution of dispute without the need for formal litigation.184 
Unfortunately, it has offered no such insulation. It must be apparent that so long as the 
agency is left defining and redefining its own mission, its opponents will use all means to 
thwart its actions.
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In any assessment of the legal conflicts facing the Forest Service, there need be an 
understanding of the role the courts play in deciding the outcomes of the disputes. This
182 Supra, note 142. Jones and Taylor note that between 1988 and 1992, on average less than 7% o f 
appealed actions were reversed or remanded to the decision-maker for additional work.
183 Id. at 329.
184 W hy else propagate administrative rules that insert not only costs and delays in project development, but 
serve as one more level o f  litigation, unless the rulemaker believed the appeals would in fact streamline the 
timber sale process?
80
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
role is likewise important in understanding the relationship between delegation, and the 
agency’s management frustration. This section will discuss these relationships.
The role played by courts in clarifying and even defining an agency’s legal 
obligations has become ever more common, partially as a result of the various statutes 
providing standing for challengers of agency actions.185 Standing alone, however, is not 
responsible for the increase in challenges to the Forest Service. The increase can also be 
linked to the delegatory nature o f the enabling statues under which the agency must 
manage. As discussed in Chapter 3, the discretion afforded the agency under any of its 
three primary management statutes is substantial. That discretion, in a judicial context, 
has the potential for two discrete effects.
First, in any challenge to an agency decision under this set o f laws, the reviewing 
court is tasked with determining the legality (procedurally, substantively, or both) of the 
agency decision. In doing so, the principle in reviewing agency actions is the notion that 
deference is due the agency’s decision. Only when the agency has acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or illegally, will a reviewing court overturn an administrative decision. 
Delegation, unfortunately, can wreak havoc with the theoretical functioning of this 
principle.
The standard by which a court must review agency action was established in 
Chevron. U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.186 Justice Stevens, writing 
for the court, set forth the principle that when the intent o f the Congress is explicit, both 
the agency and the court are bound to give effect to that clear intent. In cases where the
185 The Administrative Procedures Act and the National Environmental Policy Act are two that have 
markedly increased judicial scrutiny o f  Forest Service policy and projects.
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intent is not explicit or is ambiguous, however, the court is bound to review the agency’s 
action in the context of the standard of arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the intent of 
Congress.
While this standard has often been read as assuring substantial administrative 
deference, it is only so if the court in question is stringently conservative, not activist. In 
the event any particular court is result-oriented, or willing to impose its own vision, it 
may easily overturn Forest Service decisions as “contrary to the intent of Congress”, as 
the primary national forest legislation is notably ambiguous.
The problem manifests when the court is left as the arbiter of the threshold 
decision of whether Congressional intent has been made clear in the language of the 
statute. The court must look to the MUSYA or the NFMA to glean whether there is a 
clear management intent. If the court finds one, then the agency’s actions must comport 
with the court’s particular finding, which is not necessarily equivalent to the agency’s 
own interpretation of Congressional intent. The court is empowered to second guess the 
agency’s view of the statute in cases where the intent of the statute is unclear. This sets 
the stage for an increase in litigation. It requires but one lawsuit, in which a court 
determines that the Forest Service has failed to comply with Congressional intent, and the 
floodgates are opened to every party looking to prevent any given activity associated with 
that statute. In other words, if a court finds that the Forest Service has misinterpreted 
Congressional intent in a given instance, every instance relying upon that particular 
interpretation is then suspect. As the former Chief o f the Forest Service put it:
186 467 U.S 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
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I would say that unfortunately, or some would say fortunately, these 
evolving statements of mission or purpose for the National Forests 
are so broad and esoteric that for practical purposes they are rather 
meaningless to anyone who seriously tries to relate them to a 
specific area of land. Unfortunately, people like federal judges end 
up trying to determine what these statements really mean in specific 
cases.18
Now some might argue that the courts defer all too often to the Forest Service in 
upholding its administrative decisions. In other words, the Chevron standard provides the 
agency with too much deference for its actions. Data on this issue suggests that simply in 
terms of winning or losing, the Forest Service is typically the victor, winning nearly 54% 
of the NFMA lawsuits from environmentalists, and nearly 80% of the lawsuits initiated 
by commodity interests.188 While the specific nature of the lawsuit certainly has an 
effect on the success rate of the agency, the slim majority of victories against the 
environmental challengers is hardly conclusive evidence that the federal courts are 
blindly deferring to the agency. Such a narrow margin of wins could as easily be 
obtained by flipping a coin in the courtroom.
It takes little imagination to visualize the demoralizing and chilling effects on 
public land managers of this type of scenario. With such randomness inserted into the 
planning process outcome, one suspects the Forest Service might seek to better its odds in 
each subsequent lawsuit. The problem, of course, is that in no particular instance is the 
agency any more likely to meet Congressional intent. Certainly, a court’s opinion is 
precedentially valuable in making that determination, but it offers no safeguard in future
187 Peterson, supra, note 176
188 Supra, note 142 at 326. The data is derived from NFM A litigation from 1977 to 1992.
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litigation. Once again, the agency is left to its own devices, struggling to predict the 
legal outcome of its actions.
It is difficult, without a detailed analysis of each suit in question, to settle the 
quantitative question of judicial deference. It does appear however, that in nearly half the 
occasions, the Forest Service interpretation of the laws and rules that it must uphold, are 
adjudged to be inaccurate. In one half of the cases the environmentalists' interpretation 
of the laws and regulations is adjudged to be incorrect. Given that the specific facts of 
each case will drive the court's analysis, it is nonetheless remarkable that there is no 
greater unanimity on the means by which the Forest Service meets its legal requirements. 
If the law is clear, and the rules promulgated to effect it are likewise clear, how can 
courts, half of the time, find for the agency and the other half, find against it?
Delegation, as set forth earlier, results in vague statutes with very little in the way 
of substantive tests for agency conduct. While it might be relatively easy for a court to 
determine whether the agency proposed a 40 acre clearcut or a 41 acre clearcut, or 
whether the agency left four trees, larger than 21 inches diameter breast height per acre or 
only 3, such standards are not legislatively or administratively present, and such 
questions are consequently not typically asked The court instead must resolve questions 
such as “does this timber sale meet the biodiversity intent of the NFMA? And by the way 
what is that, and do the agency’s rules reflect that intent?” These types of questions lead 
even the most well intended jurists into an area in which they lack the technical expertise.
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For example, recently the Fifth Circuit addressed an ongoing conflict over the
Forest Service’s use of even-aged management on the Texas national forests.189 In that
case, the challenge was made by the environmental plaintiffs that the Forest Service use
o f even-aged silvicultural techniques violated the NFMA, and the agency regulations
implementing the NFMA. Various intervenor-defendants in the case made the argument
that the NFMA was merely a planning statute and contained no substantive management
provisions. In response, the court, in a less than comforting ruling, held the following:
In Sierra Club I, we implied that the NFMA has a substantive 
component, [citation omitted]. We found that the approval of even- 
aged management techniques were within the discretion of the 
Forest Service [citation omitted]. This court reasoned that the Forest 
Service could take actions anywhere along the continuum between 
“preservation of the status quo” on one end, and “eradication of 
species” on the other. Allowing even-aged management was just 
such a discretionary action. This discretion is not, however, 
“unbridled.” [citation omitted] We also warned that “[t]he 
regulations implementing NFMA provide a level of protection by 
mandating that the Forest Service manage fish and wildlife habitats 
to insure viable populations of species in planning areas.” In 
addition, the statute requires the Forest Service to “provide for 
diversity of plant and animal communities.” [citation omitted] 
Consequently, this court has already determined that the NFMA and 
its associated regulations require the Forest Service to comply with 
the law on-the-ground rather than merely issuing standards and 
guidelines as part of its LRMPs.190
The court of appeals went on to affirm the lower court’s entry of injunctive relief 
based upon the district court’s finding that the agency had violated the NFMA “and had 
not protected soil and watershed resources or inventoried and monitored other natural 
resources.’” 91 The court did not, however, define for the agency what level o f protection
189 Supra, note 130.
190 Id. at 373.
191 Id.
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would satisfy the requirements of the NFMA. The Forest Service was left guessing what 
action might in fact meet this court’s perception of the NFMA.
In a 1997 case from a federal district court in Pennsylvania, the court was 
confronted with claims that the Forest Service had violated the NFMA, as well as other
10*7statutes. ‘ The court, in a bizarre amalgam of procedure and substance, found that the 
agency had violated both the NEPA and the NFMA for its failure to develop a sufficient 
number of reasonable alternatives for the timber sale in question. While the holding was 
largely driven by the NEPA, the court took the time to indicate that the required 
additional harvest alternatives must “involve more uneven-aged management 
techniques.”193 The court apparently believed that the NFMA and the NEPA required 
that it direct the agency as to the type of silviculture it should consider in the sale area.
While the court did not second guess the agency’s expert determination that even- 
aged management was appropriate, the court insisted that such a finding be made in the 
context of analyzing for an array of uneven-aged applications. In other words, the Forest 
Service decision to limit its NEPA analysis to a “no-action” alternative (largely a 
procedural matter), and a largely even-aged alternative (largely a substantive decision), 
was found to be arbitrary and capricious.
What do rulings o f this sort suggest for the land managers attempting to get 
projects on the ground? The law appears to hold that the NFMA has some level of 
substantive requirement, though the courts also apparently believe that the while the 
discretion of the Forest Service is nearly boundless, constrained only by such
192 Currv v. U.S. Forest Service. 988 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
193 Id. at 554.
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requirements as insuring the viability of various species populations in the planning area, 
the agency must also provide for the diversity o f plant and animal communities. 
Practically, rulings o f this nature are o f little or no value to a land manager. The agency 
is left back at the drawing board, with its actions still subject to challenge. The courts are 
all too willing to say what was suggested was wrong, but cannot define what is right. 
Consequently, with ambiguous laws and regulations, the Forest Service is left with very 
little in the way of a means of predicting the legal outcome of any particular decision.
As another example, the court in Izaak Walton, relied upon the dictionary 
definition of maturity, when there are at least three such forestry definitions that 
immediately spring to mind (CMAI, the Fisher solution and the Faustman solution)194, all 
three independent of Webster. Certainly, the language in the Organic Act appears clear, 
at least to a forester. It also appeared clear to the court. Unfortunately, those two clear 
views did not happen to coincide. This historical vignette illustrates the largest pitfall. 
When two reasonable interpretations of a statute are possible, the challenge will 
invariably arise to that version which the agency has adopted, in many cases simply 
because the challenge can be made. The court is then left determining which of the two 
versions is the proper view, or perhaps finding its way to a third version. In some cases 
the agency may prevail; in others it will not. In any event, conflict is perpetuated.
194 C M A I, or Culmination of Mean Annual Increment, may be termed biological maturity or the point at 
which harvest would occur to maximize the production o f  timber on a site. The Fisher Solution, a measure 
o f financial maturity, provides that when the increase in the volume o f  an age class o f  trees is equivalent to 
or is less than the interest rate that could be earned upon the dollar value o f those trees, the trees are mature 
and should be harvested. The Faustmann solution, another measure o f  financial maturity, is similar to the 
Fisher solution, except that it incorporates the value o f  the land the trees grow upon into the determination 
o f  value.
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These cases point out that the agency’s difficulties lie not solely with the very 
specific or the very broad provisions of the law, but in the manner in which the two are 
melded. Broad discretionary authority, bounded by often vague and subjective 
limitations, does not create an enviable situation. While the courts, in a large percentage 
of the lawsuits against the Forest Service, defer to agency expertise in its interpretations 
o f the NFMA and the corresponding regulations, the problem remains that the challenges 
continue to occur, with ever greater frequency.
The threat of litigation and the lawsuits themselves can have profound impacts on 
the agency, regardless of whether the agency eventually prevails in the suit. Concern 
with these very lawsuits and appeals was the foremost rationale offered by the current 
Chief of the Forest Service as to why the FY 2002 forest product offering will not 
increase from prior fiscal years, though he apparently believes it in fact should 
increase.195
The second concern is that judges harbor, as does the general populace, opinions 
on the emotionally charged issues that forest management seems to generate. While an 
idealist might argue that the court’s role is as objective arbiter of the law and reviewer o f 
the facts, this faith injudicial conservatism is probably naive.196 Judges, like the public, 
are susceptible to the campaigns waged to paint the Forest Service in a diabolical or 
dysfunctional light. In contrast with other professional decisions (medicine, nuclear
195 Statement o f  Dale N. Bosworth, Chief USDA Forest Service before the Sen. Comm, on Energy and 
Natural Resources, Fiscal Y ear 2002 Budget, May 8 ,2001 . Chief Bosworth specifically cited to “the costs 
and time to navigate the complex appeals and litigation processes, [and] the need for additional work 
directly attributable to legal decisions.”
196 For a comprehensive treatment o f  the nature o f  judicial activism see Ro b e r t  H. Bo r k , T h e  T e m p t in g  
o f  A m e r ic a , T h e  Po l it ic a l  S e d u c t io n  o f  t h e  L a w  (1990).
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physics, military choices, etc...), the public is encouraged to actively participate, and 
does at every turn, in the decisions made on national forests. The focus is diverted from 
the science required for meeting management objectives and whether management goals 
can be met, to arguing over what those goals should be. Public land management is not a 
field that lends itself well to scientific management any longer because so much of the 
management direction is based upon personal values.197 The relatively minor role to 
which science has recently been relegated is in keeping with the nature of those most in 
opposition to the Forest Service.198 Allan Fitzsimmon labels this group as the “new 
paradigmists:
They are forsaking emphasis on the roles played by theory, 
empirical evidence, and verification—in favor of high-sounding but 
subjective, insubstantial, and verifiable concepts, such as the notions 
of ecosystem integrity, health and sustainability. The change in 
beliefs allows the new paradigmists to advocate a public policy of 
federal protection of ecosystems whose success or failure cannot be 
judged by objective and verifiable criteria or through the use of 
independent and replicable testing. The Forest Service provides a 
practical example of this shift away from the tenets of science to a 
value-based system based on opinion and subjectivity.199
197 Some management models, for example the various state trust models, do not appear to suffer nearly so 
much from this malady. State trust land forests are managed by fiduciaries with clear and enforceable 
obligations to manage the lands in a particular fashion (typically for the sustained economic benefit o f the 
beneficiaries). W hile these management models too are affected by the erosion o f  science as a 
management touchstone, the impact is less profound as these management agencies’ respective missions 
are far clearer, and the legal tests to assess the managers’ behavior are more precise. The “values” driving 
trust land management are explicit and subject to change only in a rigorous legal and political fashion—by 
amendment o f  the states respective constitutions, coupled with congressional approval.
198 The Second Committee o f  Scientists, at some level, appears to have recognized this problem, and 
recommended that scientific review be increasingly incorporated into project design. However, the thrust 
o f the recommendation is not necessarily designed to return credibility to the agency’s scientific reputation, 
but perhaps is designed to facilitate projects in the face o f  a general public distrust o f  agency “science” 
This approach, in the long term, may have the potential for resurrecting the agency’s image, provided the 
peer reviewers concurred with agency determinations.
199 A l l a n  F it z s im m o n s , D e f e n d in g  Illu sion s 7  (1999).
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Unfortunately, in the absence of any scientific touchstone or any clear 
congressional direction, courts are left with refereeing arguments over what Congress 
might, or even should, have meant. It should not be suggested that values are not 
important, even essential, in the formation of sound forest policy, but the forum in which 
that policy should be developed is the body best able to balance the varying values—the 
Congress. Courts are not designed to arbitrate, and should not arbitrate, such political 
questions. Unfortunately, ambiguous statutes provide every opportunity for the courts to 
do just that.
Summary:
Clarity of purpose, and priority of goals are the fundamental problems. Though 
brimming with discretion, the Forest Service cannot effectively exercise that discretion in 
the face of an unflappable conflict industry whose very existence is fed by inciting 
disputes with the agency over federal land management. The blame for this collection of 
results can be laid largely at Congressional feet. Failure m deal with the fundamental 
conflicts permeating national forest land management simply shifted the focus of 
litigation and contention to the agency. Any critic with a bona fide concern for the 
manner in which the national forests have been managed should realize that Congress is 
ultimately responsible for choosing the management goals for the national forests, and 
those that would oppose Forest Service actions should recognize and accept that fact.
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C h a p t e r  5: T h e  M y s t e r ie s  o f  M u l t ip l e -U s e
My thesis is that multiple-use as a management concept fo r  national 
forests and other public lands is, i f  not dead, fading fast. I  don't care 
what the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act says—multiple use has 
fallen on hard times, and the prognosis for recovery, at least in the 
short term, doesn’t look too bright.
Jack Ward Thomas200
In simplest terms the concept of multiple-use is premised upon the ability of a 
land manager to balance competing interests, all the while providing any number of 
natural resource outputs. On the national forests, this Congressionally mandated task has 
been much maligned. The criticisms often cite the ambiguity of the Multiple-Use 
Sustained Yield Act, or MUSYA, and the nearly meaningless management standard it 
provides. The MUSYA, the first of the three legs of Chief Emeritus Thomas’s national 
forest management stool201, sets forth the mission of the agency. The MUSYA provides 
for the mixing and matching of resource outputs in the manner most in the public interest. 
Unfortunately, the discretion embodied in the MUSYA is a management curse by any 
other name. It does not embody true discretion, but rather bestows a false sense of 
assurance upon the Forest Service. In order to guarantee discretion, the law would have 
to insulate the agency from the interference of the judicial branch, limit the effects of
200 Jack Ward Thomas, “The Times They Are A ’Changin’— Is Multiple-Use a  Worn-Out Concept?” 
Speech at the University o f  Washington (November 15,2000)
201 Id. Chief Thomas describes the MUSYA, the RPA and the NFMA as the legs o f  the three-legged stool 
making up national forest management. He argues that all three legs have essentially been sheared off, 
leaving the Forest Service and the national forests without a management framework. C hief Thomas 
argues that the MUSYA has been abrogated by the steady decline in active management, that the RPA has 
never been seriously relied upon by Congress, and that the NFMA forest plans have never been 
implemented as written. This legal triumvirate, it appears, has been eroded to the point where it no longer 
can support the weight o f  the agency.
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transient executives, and ensure that Congress ratified the agency’s choice of outputs 
with budgetary appropriations. The MUSYA does none of these things.
What the law does do is grant the agency a free hand in establishing what may be 
the “best" combination of outputs the national forests are able to provide. That free hand, 
however, comes at a price. With no particular criteria to make the decision as to what 
that “best” combination may be, the agency is left twisting in the wind each and every 
time it makes an allocation of outputs. The authority delegated to the agency to make 
decisions on uses is also the means whereby those decisions are attacked, and further, is 
responsible for the agency’s inability to justify its positions.
This Chapter will examine several of the outputs that the Forest Service must 
manage, intending to demonstrate that though the law has remained fixed, the outputs 
have varied with the political and legal forces that buffet the agency. The Multiple-Use 
doctrine explicitly ensures that the respective national forest outputs will fluctuate to 
some extent as the “needs of the American people” change over time,202 while the other 
side of the multiple-use coin, the sustained yield doctrine, explicitly ensures the outputs 
of the national forests will not be inappropriately diminished.203 Fluctuations in this 
instance, however, have occurred as the agency has sought to comport its management 
strategy with the political demands set before it. Those political demands, not reflected 
in statute apart from the broad mission of the MUSYA, have ensured that the Forest 
Service’s interpretation o f multiple-use sustained-yield, and its allocation of outputs will 
never divorce it from criticism and complaint.
202 16 U.S.C. §531(a).
203 16 U.S.C. §531(b).
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Ecosystem Management: An Example o f  the Administrative Shell Game 
In order to illustrate the difficulty in applying multiple-use, sustained yield 
requirements in a manner for which no cogent statutory authority exits, we need only turn 
to the concept of ecosystem management. Not an explicit product of Congress, Allan 
Fitzsimmons has recently noted that the NEPA and the ESA instead serve as the linchpins 
for the Forest Service embrace of ecosystem management.204 While the NEPA and ESA, 
do not directly prescribe Forest Service management, it is axiomatic that these two laws 
have impacted Forest Service decision-making to an ever increasing degree since their 
respective passage. As these two laws are not the subject of examination, I will not 
speculate on the degree to which they also delegate authority to the Forest Service.
Suffice it to say that the Forest Service is relying ever more on these laws to support 
programs that differ from the traditional focus o f the agency—wood fiber production. In 
fact, as reflected in Chart 9, timber production peaked at nearly the same time as the 
passage of the NFMA, dropped slightly thereafter, peaked again some 15 years later, and 
has plummeted dramatically since. The plummet occurring during the formulation and 
implementation of the ecosystem management strategies.205
204Supra, note 199.
205 It is commonly held that ecosystem management did not necessarily precipitate the decline in timber 
volume sold, but rather may have been an anempt by the agency to address that very decline.
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C harta Umber Vbum Sold, 1905-1999 (BBF)
Perhaps not surprisingly, the projections of budget priorities for the next two 
fiscal years, 2000 and 2001, reflect less than 7% of the entire Forest Service budget will 
be dedicated to timber sales.206 The corresponding goals for timber volume offered for 
sale are less than 4 billion board feet per year, with fiscal year 2001 representing less 
volume than fiscal year 1998.207 This volume figure corresponds to a reduction in 
volume not seen on national forests since circa 1955.208 There is no reason to suspect 
that actual harvest volumes will exceed these projections.
206 U.S. D e p t , o f  A g r ic u l t u r e , Fo r e s t  Service  FY 2000 an d  FY 2001 A n n u a l  P e r fo r m a n c e  P la n  
(M a r c h  2000).
207 Id.
208 P u b l i c  L a n d  L a w  R e v ie w  C o m m iss io n , O ne  T h i r d  o f  t h e  N a t io n ’s L a n d .  A  R e p o r t  t o  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  C o n g r e s s  92 (1970).
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In contrast, production of the goods and services the Forest Service currently 
emphasizes depend largely upon the acceptance of the ESA and the NEPA as enabling 
legislation, and upon a particular interpretation of the MUSYA, and the NFMA.209 While 
timber production, in any commercial sense, has atrophied, the notion of ecosystem 
management has correspondingly blossomed. Again, the legal rationale for this paradigm 
is premised upon a holistic reading of the entirety of the laws directing the Forest 
Service.210 There may not be however, as Fitzsimmons and Jack Ward Thomas211 point 
out, any discrete statutory authority for ecosystem management (though the rulings of the 
Honorable Judge Dwyer in Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans. 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. 
Was. 1991, a ff  d at 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991), and Seattle Audubon Society v. Moselv. 
C92-479WD, May 28, 1992; July 2, 1992, may argue otherwise). The interesting part of 
this puzzle is that while the Forest Service has embarked on a management journey 
designed to enable continued timber management, albeit as a much reduced level, the 
new paradigm has nonetheless not contributed to any drop-off in litigation or in appeals.
209 See, Errol E. Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges fo r  Ecosytem Management, in CREATING 
a  Fo r e s t r y  f o r  t h e  2 1st C e n t u r y  361 (Kathryn A. Kohm et al., eds. 1997). Meidinger sets forth his 
vision o f  the varying statutory bases for ecosystem management. Interestingly, Meidinger is able to see 
within these statutes a Congressional intent to manage on a ecosystem scale, and for particularly non­
commodity resources, while others view the MUSYA and the NFMA in quite a different light. The fact 
that these statutes are subject to such broad interpretations, furthers the argument that such vague 
legislation will generate conflict and agency schizophrenia. For a detailed examination o f  the nature o f  
ecosystem management law, See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law o f  Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Management, 81 M in n . L. R e v . 869 (1997 ). For a specific examination o f  the NFMA “biodiversity" 
provision See Michael A. Padilla, The Mouse That Roared: How the National Forest Management Act 
Diversity o f  Species Provision is Changing Public Timber Harvesting 15 J . OF ENVTL. L. 1 1 3 (1 9 9 6 /9 7 ).
2,0 Id.
211 Supra, note 199 an d  infra, note 305 .
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It should be apparent that the notion of ecosystem management, without the explicit 
support of the Congress, is not the panacea for conflict that was once thought.212
With the decline in the timber output, the theory of multiple-use management 
suggest that some other outputs may have in turn increased. And they have; national 
forest wilderness and general recreation area use and visits has increased steadily over the 
last 30 years, well exceeding 12 million visitor days to wilderness areas alone in 1995.213
Correspondingly, the area of designated national forest wilderness has also been 
steadily growing, to encompass in excess of 30 million acres.214
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Chart 10. Visitor Days to the National Forests, 19501996
212 The GAO, as recently as 1998, opined that ecosystem management was an attempt by the Forest Service 
to avoid and/or prevail in legal challenges to its management o f the national foiests. See Forest Service 
Priorities, Evolving Mission Favors Resource Protection Over Production, GAO/RCED-99-166 (1999).
213 Jo h n  F e d k iw , U .S. D e p t , o f  A g r ic u l t u r e , Fo r e s t  S er v ic e , M a n a g in g  M u l t ip l e  U s e s  o n  
N a t io n a l  Fo r e s t s , 1905-1995 1 4 6 (1 9 9 5 ).
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While the 2000 and 2001 annual Forest Service budgets projections do not predict
an increase in Full Time Equivalent (FTE) or dollars committed to the wilderness output,
it will nonetheless comprise 13.9% of the budget (nearly double the timber sale
component),215 and command 6,000 FTE, or nearly 1/6 o f the agency’s personnel (and
nearly double the FTE committed to the timber output).216 Yet in spite of these acreage
increases, the Clinton administration has pushed the agency into analyzing for the
potential of adding an additional 58.5 million acres o f national forest as de facto
(certainly not de jure) wilderness, and the agency has in fact adopted rules doing
precisely that. Hunting and fishing have also increased on the national forests since
1965, though not in so dramatic a fashion.217
What do these examples demonstrate? As the GAO has noted,
While NFMA and other statutes...provide little direction for the 
agency in resolving conflicts among competing uses on its lands, the 
requirements in environmental laws and their implementing 
regulations and judicial interpretations do not [provide little 
direction].218
Various outputs from the national forests have seen ofren dramatic swings in the
last 25 years, while others have remained fairly stable. The law, however, the
Congressional mandate to the agency, has remained static. No substantive piece of
national forest legislation has been enacted since 1976. Instead, as a result of public and
political pressures, and certainly litigation, the Forest Service itself has seen fit to juggle_
215 Supra, note 206.
2,6 Id.
217 Supra, note 213, at 173.
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the multiple-use balls in the order and speed it has seen fit, often not even having that 
choice as special interests and the judiciary determine how many balls to give the agency, 
and tutor it in the art o f juggling. The result has been the susceptibility of the agency to 
every political force imaginable, from local timber protesters and industrial lobbyists, to 
federal appellate judges.
Consequently, resource output priorities have been unpredictable and inconsistent.
The result is that the agency cannot adequately justify its chosen path, and conversely,
cannot defend that path when challenged. As Fitzsimmon argues:
...There is no legal authority for any federal agency to make 
protection o f ecosystems its prime objective, and in recent years 
Congress specifically rejected efforts to enact that idea into 
law...Congress needs to reassert its authority over federal lands and 
clarify its priorities for federal land managers. Does Congress want 
multiple use and sustained yield or not? Does Congress want the 
protection of endangered or threatened species to trump all other 
potential uses o f public land all the time?2
This determination contrasts plainly with the such findings as that o f Manning et al:
The authors conclude that the evolution of national forest policy
toward ecosystem management-related principles is strongly
supported by the public and that these management strategies should
be implemented more quickly in response to this evolving public 
•  •  220 opinion.
218 GAO Re p o r t , E v o l v in g  M issio n  Fa v o r s  Re s o u r c e  P r o tec tio n  o v e r  P r o d u c t io n , 7 GAO/RCED- 
9 9 -1 6 6 (1 9 9 9 ).
219 Supra, no te  199 a t 277.
220 R obert M anning e t a l., Values, Ethics, and Attitudes Toward National Forest Maiagement: An 
Empirical Study, 12 S o c ’Y AND N a t .  RESOURCES 4 2 1 ,4 2 2  (1999).
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This creeping evolution o f management models is manifested most recently in the 
recommendation of the 2nd Committee of Scientists,221 the Forest Service has completed 
administrative rule-making for the purpose of implementing the sustainability thrust of 
the Committee’s report.222 This paradigm appears to differ little from that of ecosystem 
management, except for its more explicit encompassment of the human component 
(perhaps it is only a matter o f biocentric degree). The second thrust of the 
recommendations is the increased use and reliance upon collaborative efforts to resolve 
national forest disputes. This revised vision of national forest management will be 
ensconced in agency rules as law (which is a great deal more tangible than any prior 
incarnation of ecosystem management). The administrative rules will track closely the 
recommendations of the Committee, without the need for Congressional assent.22̂  The 
argument is that these rules will comprise the methodology designed to implement the 
policy. Methods, and rules for that matter, are never free to alter the fundamental 
legislative direction. In this case, since the legislative direction is muddled, the rule- 
makers are pretty much free to experiment. For example, the biodiversity provisions of 
the NFMA that the Forest Service has previously implemented in rule, and those related 
management concepts that the Committee has recommended, exceed even the rigor of the
A product o f  the NFMA, the 2nd Committee released its report in March, 1999.
“  65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (2000) codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 217 and 219.
223 See, Roger Scdjo, Does the Forest Service Have a Future? in A VISION FOR THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: 
G o a l s  f o r  It s  N e x t  C e n t u r y  110 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000) for the recognition that the Committee o f  
Scientist’s recommendations are unerly lacking a legislative foundation, and are therefore highly improper, 
and potentially illegal.
99
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Endangered Species Act. The new regulations, as has been suggested, may spell the end 
of active management on the national forests.224
There seem to be two easy predictions for the results of adoption of this latest 
ecosystem management iteration. One, if the rules do not prohibit commercial logging of 
national forests, there will likely be challenges that whatever the remnant commercial 
logging is somehow “unsustainable.” Two, the rules will not, as they propose, ameliorate 
conflict by virtue of some collaborative process; nor for that matter, even ensure that 
superior management decisions are made. Collaborative decision-making is an effort to 
diffuse the decision-making power away from the agency, toward the interested publics.
It is, by analogy, the passing of the buck by the agency, after discovering it could not 
work with the discretion it guarded so closely during the 1960s and 70s. As Congress 
first sought to avoid the dangerous terrain, the Forest Service now seems ready and 
willing to do the same, even of it must abdicate its professional autonomy in the process.
Collaboration, of course, only compounds the delegation problem. Instead of 
agency personnel, specifically trained in the particular management fields, and ostensibly 
cognizant o f some sort of goal set for it by Congress making management decisions, 
these same personnel will only be another stakeholder at the collaboration table. It is 
perfectly feasible that a collaborative effort might produce a collective decision 
acceptable, even embraced by the stakeholders, yet at the same time be violative o f one 
law or another. Congress will be further removed from the process rather than forced to 
directly deal with the management difficulties. If responsibility is to ultimately be borne
224 K. Norman Johnson, Forest Assessment and Planning at Large Scales fo r  the National Forests: Lessons 
from the Northwest Experience, paper prepared for the University o f  Montana and Resources for the Future
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by the Congress in collaborative efforts, Congressional ratification of such efforts is 
crucial, both for legal and policy reasons. Perhaps foremost, ratification will place the 
credit or blame for collaborative outcomes, not on the heads of the collaborators, but atop 
Congress.
Summary:
The manner in which the various outputs of the national forests have been 
adjusted over time can be attributed to an array of causes. Perhaps the simplest is that the 
Forest Service is simply meeting its statutory mandate to manage the forests in the 
manner that best meets the needs of the American people. It seems more likely that the 
Forest Service is responding to pressures, both legal and political, that are tugging on the 
agency in many different directions at once, threatening to shred the agency fabric. 
Ecosystem management was created, at least partially, in response to those forces, as a 
means of forestalling conflict. With the multiple-use mission as it currently stands, 
however, no single management construct or theory appears to be able to permit the 
Forest Service to avoid the conflicts.
Delegation plays the key role in both facilitating the conflict, and in ensuring that 
no end will ever be in sight. The MUSYA, a markedly discretionary statute, has ensured 
that any management paradigm the agency adopts will never adequately satisfy the
conference “Collaboration and Decision-making on the National Forests: Can it Work? Four Perspectives 
o f  the Potential Problems and Opportunities” (January 22-23,2001).
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various multiple-users. That dissatisfaction, expressed particularly in lawsuits, forces the 
agency to alter its positions, and seek new paradigms to temper the dissatisfied. In doing 
so, the agency merely replaces one group of critics with another group of critics. The 
result is an agency staggering like a drunk down a dark alley, reeling from one side to the 
other, never able to regain its balance.
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Chapter 6: Forest Service Budgeting: Compounding the Problem
There is no Legal Direction to generate a Profit from the Sale o f the 
National Forest Timber. The governing statutes under which the 
national forests are administered do not mandate that managers 
seek to produce a profit.
-U.S. Forest Service Report225
Some now warp these fifteen words, claiming that they authorize the 
Forest Service to ignore financial considerations completely and 
lose money. In fact, the words say that dollar profits and use yields 
need not be the "greatest The I960 Act is not a license to lose
money.
-Robert W olf26
I f the Congress believes that increasing revenue or decreasing costs 
from the sale or use o f  natural resources should be mission 
priorities for the Forest Service, it will need to work with the agency 
to identify legislative and other changes that are needed to clarify or 
modify the Congress's intent and expectations for revenue 
generation relative to ecological, social and other values and 
concerns.
-General Accounting Office227
In addition to the matters discussed in the last Chapter, there are other aspects of 
the Forest Service that are also susceptible to the hazards of delegation. Two of these, 
budgeting and administrative rules, are not products themselves of delegation to the 
agency, but rather are agency processes that delegation has the tendency to corrupt. The 
allegations made in Chapter One, that the agency has been ignominiously deserted by
225 U . S . D ept , o f  A g r ic u l t u r e , Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e , N a t io n a l  Su m m a r y , Fo r e s t  M a n a g e m e n t  
Pr o g r a m  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  FY  1997 59 (1998).
226 Robert E. Wolf, National Forest Timber Sales and the Legacy o f  Gifford Pinchot: Managing a Forest 
and Making it Pay, 60  C o l o . L . R e v . 1037 (1989).
227 Forest Service, Barriers to Generating Revenues or Reducing Costs 6 GA(yRCED-98-58 (1998).
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Congress, is facilitated by the marriage of delegation and these two agency facets. This 
Chapter will discuss the difficulties faced by an agency in coordinating a budget with 
management goals in a delegatory environment. The next chapter will address the issue 
of administrative rule-making, and dangers fraught in that activity.
There is not, even today, an agreement on the fundamental question of whether 
the United States Forest Service must ever return a profit to the Treasury. Absent 
agreement on even this most basic question, it has become both easy and common to 
target the process whereby the Forest Service budget is developed and implemented. The 
General Accounting Office, has, in the last several years, repeatedly criticized one aspect 
or another of the Forest Service budget process, and the agency’s accountability.” 8 The 
debate is particularly remarkable when you consider that in its nascence, the Forest 
Service funded its activities from national forest revenues229, and that today the agency 
costs taxpayers nearly two billion dollars annually.230 There is little doubt that the Forest 
Service budget and budget process can be frustrating, mysterious, and not least, 
expensive. As this paper is examining delegation and its effects, it seems appropriate to 
dedicate a chapter to how delegation and ambiguous statutes may exacerbate these 
budgetary concerns.
228 See fo r  example, Forest Service Barriers to Generating Revenues or Reducing Costs, GAO/RCED-98-58 
(1998); Forest Service, Barriers to Financial Accountability Remain, GAO/AIMD-99-1 (1998); Forest 
Service, Little Has Changed as a Result o f  the Fiscal Year 1995 Budget Reforms, GAO/RCED-99-2
(1998); Forest Service, A Framework for Improving Accountability, GAO/RCED/AIMD-OO-2 (1999); 
Forest Service, Actions Needed for the Agency to Become More Accountable for Its Performance, GAO/T- 
RCED-00-236 (2000); Forest Service, Lack o f Financial and Performance Accountability Has Resulted in 
Inefficiency and Waste, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-135 (1998); Forest Service Decision-Making, Greater 
Clarity Needed on Mission Priorities, GAO/T-RCED-97-81.
229 G i f f o r d  P in c h o t ,  B r e a k in g  N e w  G r o u n d  293 (1947).
230 Supra note 228, Forest Service, A Framework at 18-19.
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It is not my intention to rehash the criticisms that have been previously leveled;
rather, I am interested in the role that the budget plays in light of the statutory delegation.
Delegation, and its symbiont, ambiguous laws, provide a difficult realm in which to
match a budget to a program. Though the problematic result is often recognized, it is not
often that delegation is identified as one of the causes. In an ideal situation, an agency
would have an mission “x”, established clearly by the Congress. The budget necessary to
effectuate that mission would be then a function of that agency mission, or [(x). Were it
that simple, for in reality, there is no mission “x”, but rather a mission that might be best
represented by a + b + c +...n. Additionally, the Forest Service budget is hardly a mere
function of its mission (however that might be defined), but is rather a complex result of
an agency requests, executive scrutiny, and legislative politics. This multi-layered
process, unfortunately, offers a prime opportunity for delegation to create yet another
series o f problems for the agency. Then Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas noted
the inherent problem:
Forest Plans reflect resource conditions and trends, public demands for 
such resources, and public expectations (or “desired future conditions").
They are not designed to anticipate agency budgets. This lack of 
connection between forest plans and the appropriations can frustrate both 
agency personnel and the public, since anticipated outcomes may not be 
realized.'3'
This perception is described by V’. Alaric Sample as the Forest Service’s prisoner’s
dilemma. He notes that;
For many years, they [Forest Service field officials] have seen their budget 
proposals warped by the appropriations process, making it difficult for
231 Forest Service Decision Making Process Before the Subcomm. On National Parks, Forests and Lands o f  
the House Comm, on Resources, 104th Cong. 349 (March 26, 1996).
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them to fulfill their perceived responsibilities for multiple-use forest 
management.232
This particular disconnect between forest plans and budgeting is but a slice of the
larger pie. The failure o f program requests to match budget appropriations is, after all, a
problem inherent in any bureaucracy. Funding levels very seldom reach the level the
agency would ideally desire. Roger Sedjo identified this problem in his dissent to the
2nd Committee of Scientists Recommendations wherein he stated:
As currently structured, there are essentially two independent 
planning processes in operation for the management of the National 
Forest System: forest planning as called for in the legislation; and 
the Congressional budgeting process, which budgets on a project 
basis. The major problem is that are essentially two independent 
planning processes occurring simultaneously.. .There is little 
evidence to that forest plans have been seriously considered in 
recent years when the budget is being formulated.233
The Forest Service, however, presents an even more fundamental problem of a 
related, but distinct sort. By virtue of Congressional delegation, the authority of the 
Forest Service to chart its own administrative course in choosing management of the 
national forests implies certain difficulties. The largest is that absent explicit 
congressional direction, it is surely possible that the agency will choose a course that any 
particular congress will endorse in its specific appropriations. There is no guarantee that 
the administratively prioritized budget requirements and requests developed pursuant to 
the MUSYA, the NFMA, and RPA will match congressional expectations for outputs. In
232 V . a l a r i c  S a m p le , T h e  I m p a c t  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  B u d g e t  P r o c e s s  o n  N a t i o n a l  F o r e s t  P l a n n i n g  
213 (1990).
233 Roger A. Sedjo in Sustaining the People s Lands: Recommendations fo r  Stewardship o f  the National 
Forests and Grasslands into the Next Century, USDA, Comm, o f  Scientists, Appendix A, Views o f  
Committee Members (March 15, 1999).,
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the event the two coincide, it is as likely serendipitous as intentional. Data from 1977- 
1986 suggest that in none of the fiscal years within that period did the Forest Service 
Budgets and the RPA program targets coincide. Nor, for that matter, did these Forest 
Service budgets, the RPA targets, the OMB’s recommendation, nor Congressional 
funding happen to coincide.234
This disjunctive planning relationship can be visualized as Figure 3 below depicts. 
Other actors, such as the USDA and the Office of Budget Management, both have 
respective roles in modifying a Forest Service proposal. They do not, however, 
necessarily play a role in interpreting Congressional intent, and therefore are not co- 
equals with the Service in this depiction. That is not to suggest that delegation’s impact 
on budgeting is not compounded by these intermediary budget actors. They too 
contribute to the difficulties in matching management to funding.
CONGRESS
Delegates Mission and 
Management to the agency
CONGRESS
Sets Agency Appropriations in 
Accord with Legislative Designs
FOREST SERVICE
Interprets Intent; Implements
Develops Plans, Plans to
Management, Extent o f
And Budgets Budget
Figure 3. Congress and Foret Service Budget Relationship235
234 Supra, no te  232 a t 24 .
235 This chart admittedly oversimplifies the Forest Service budgeting process. The role o f  the various 
Congressional subcommittees, the Office o f Budget Management, and the Department o f  Agriculture are
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This divergence in funding is manifested in the agency’s inability to achieve the
goals it has set for itself:
Congress itself has undermined implementation of the multiple-use 
concept by its failure to match budgetary actions with legislative 
instructions. Repeatedly, the Forest Service has gone to Congress 
with budget proposals requesting levels o f spending for the various 
resources necessary to achieve “harmonious and coordinated 
management of the various resources” only to have Congress 
differentially fund one over another.236
While it is recognized quite frequently that budget appropriations and planned 
outputs rarely coincide, the basic cause seems overlooked. It is not a matter, as the GAO 
would suggest, of merely implementing a different or improved budget format, or of 
more closely measuring the outputs of the forest plans. The fundamental flaw will 
remain: Congress will continue to covertly exert its management will through the budget 
process, without ever expressing that will in plain terms that can be apprehended and 
agreed upon by the agency and the public.237
The incentive for this type of behavior hearkens back to the discussion in Chapter 
2. Budget decisions provide the perfect mechanism to make delegation work. In this 
instance, the fragmented nature of the public interest supports the tendency for legislators 
to delegate—like the siren’s song, it beckons to them. But certain legislators face a 
quandary—how to delegate and still ensure the agency provides those commodities most
substantial. The purpose o f  the chart, however, is to depict the difficulty in reconciling Congressionally 
established budgets, with Congressionally established missions.
236 D o n a ld  W. F lo y d ,  e d . F o r e s t s  o f  D is c o r d  21 (1999)
237 Supra, note 146.
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demanded by his or her constituency? The answer lies in the budget. It has been 
suggested that:
In areas where local industries are heavily dependent on national 
forest timber outputs, members of Congress pay attention because 
“this translates into employment in the affected industries and 
ultimately into votes.”238
There is evidence to support this contention; more often than not Congress has 
increased the timber harvest volume in the final appropriations bill over what the Forest 
Service has proposed.239 Provided the agency’s mission is ambiguous, it is a veritable 
certainty that budget proposals will not meet the expectations of any particularly 
constituted Congress. There is no reason, for example, to believe that the I06lh Congress 
will support the self-imposed mission of the Forest Service stemming from a vague 
statute enacted by the 99th Congress. Conflicts then, between the bureaucracy and the 
legislature are resolved with the budget. There arises no need to enact more specific 
legislation with its associated costs. That, after all, might defeat the purpose of the initial 
delegation. The budget provides fertile ground for the legislature to satisfy its immediate 
goals without the need to undermine the benefits associated with delegation.
238 Supra, note 232 at 149.
239 Id. at 150. Sample’s data is from 1977 to 1989. during the peak timber harvest years on the national 
forests. In each year but two, it appears that the final committee appropriations bill suggested an increase 
in the harvest above the Forest Service proposal (all in excess o f  10 billion board feet). Sample also notes 
the incredible specificity o f  the Fiscal Year 1986 conference report which dictated both volumes and 
regional timber output levels to the Forest Service for Oregon and Washington. Such specificity, if  a
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A New Budget For A New Mission?
Robert Nelson, in his eye-opening treatise on the demise of the Forest Service, 
published just prior to the destructive and wide-spread fires of the 2000 season, argued 
the following:
The fire-fighting activities of the Forest Service could be justified 
economically in the past as necessary to protect the commercially 
valuable timber stored in the national forests. For many years 
revenues from timber sales in fact substantially exceeded the costs 
o f fire fighting. However, this is no longer the case. If saving the 
timber for harvest is no longer a top priority, new justifications for 
spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year on forest fire 
control will be necessary.240
Professor Nelson was nearly prescient in his claim. The National Fire Plan for fiscal year
2001, promulgated in response to the 2000 fires, establishes a budget totaling
$1,103,421,000, as an addition to the activities for which the Forest Service has already
been planned and budgeted. Arguably, only $985,147,000 of that sum is actually
earmarked for the national forest system. Nonetheless, this lesser figure represents
approximately 25% of the agency’s FY 2001 entire budgetary projection issued in March
2000, just prior to the fire season, a budget that encompasses all Forest Service activities,
not simply national forest management.241 The national fire plan sum earmarked solely
for the national forest system represents 77% of the FY 2001 national forest system
budget target, and 128% of the FY 2001 wildland fire management target.242
regular occurrence, could actually shift responsibility for national forest decisions back to the Congress, in 
a manner that could be easily appreciated.
240 Supra, note 2 at 25.
241 Supra, note 206.
242 Id. at Appendix A.
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In contrast, the Bush administration’s FY 2002 budget proposal for the Forest 
Service reflects a 31.9% reduction from the prior year’s budget in the wildland fire 
management category.243 If approved by Congress, the 2002 budget will apparently alter 
the management statements made by that the FY 2001 budget and the National Fire Plan. 
By GAO estimate, the forest fuels reduction goals set by the agency cannot be met with 
such a budget.244
Be that as it may, the argument could be made that the FY 2001 investment by the 
Congress, in what might be termed as “forest health and sustainability,” reflects a new 
mission for the agency, one evidenced and accompanied by the appropriate legislative 
funding. If so, it provides an example of how the Congress is able to manipulate the role 
of the agency. There will be those that will praise and those that will condemn the 
National Fire Plan, but the fact remains that it will, with dollars and performance 
expectations, drive the Forest Service in a particular management direction.
Unfortunately, there is no assurance the direction will comport with the requirements of 
the national forest legislation. It is easy, for example, to envision a preoccupation with 
precommercial thinning, at the expense of commercial harvesting, or even to the 
exclusion of commercial harvesting.
The difficulty is again not with whether the substance of the National Fire Plan is 
good or bad, sound or flawed. The difficulty resides with the Congressional willingness 
to manage with purse strings, not explicit legislation; to forego an explicit forest
243 USDA Forest Service FY 2002 Budget Justification
244 General Accounting Office, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy is Needed to Address 
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats GAO/RCED-99-65 (1999).
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management direction, and replace it with a politically embraceable, but short term and 
incomplete remedy.
Summary:
Criticisms that Congress manipulates only the timber budget, and not other
resource outputs, provides credence for the argument that delegation empowers the use of
the budget as a covert management tool. Timber has been, by and large, the premiere
commodity of the national forests in terms of economic measurement.245 By no
coincidence it is perhaps the most salient output in terms of translating to votes. As such,
it is fairly easy to see that as Congress dabbles with national forest timber funding ( and
output) it is in the best interests of the majority of legislators. 1 must reemphasize that it
is the variability in the perceptions of what Congress expects that permits this game to
occur. This potential for change in Congressional expectations has been observed by
Famham’s examination of Forest Service and Congressional budget trends:
Because of the apparent lead that Congress takes in determining 
funding, the budget data suggests that Congress is attempting to 
push the Forest Service toward a particular balance among the five 
traditional multiple uses. The logical conclusion is that Congress 
has been the impetus for the changes that are occurring in Forest 
Service Appropriations.246
Famham goes on to note that this situation reflects a breakdown between the 
planning process and the budget process; in other words, the same conclusion reached by
245 I do not suggest that if  the value o f  water or recreation were captured, the market value o f  these outputs 
might not exceed timber. The fact remains that these outputs remain largely unvalued and uncaptured by 
the Forest Service.
246 Timothy J. Famham, Forest Service Budget Requests and Appropriations: What Do Analyses o f  Trends 
Reveal?, 23 POL’Y S tu d . J. 253 (1995).
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the GAO.247 This planning and budget difficulties are again only the symptoms; a 
fundamental cause remains the ambiguous delegation of national forest management and 
law-making power to the Forest Service.
247 Id. at 266.
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C h a p t e r  7: A d m in is t r a t iv e  R u l e s : F e r t il e  G r o u n d  f o r  
D e l e g a t io n ’s H a n d
Agencies cannot resolve controversial issues with dispatch because 
all o f  the political pressures that Congress would have to wrestle 
with in resolving an issue are also felt by the agency and, in 
addition, Congress imposes upon the agencies extremely time 
consuming procedural requirements and then fails to give them 
sufficient funding to fulfdl these requirements.
David Schoenbrod248
Administrative rules can provide as much “law" directing an agency’s actions in 
many cases, as can statutes. Agency rules are typically adopted unilaterally by the 
agency, with executive approval, though typically with either public participation via a 
formal rulemaking procedure, or an environmental policy act, or both. The guiding tenet 
is that the agency may not promulgate rules for which there is no statutory authority, nor 
may the agency contradict in rule the authority set forth in statute.249 Consequently, 
when the underlying statutes’ meaning cannot be plainly understood, the agency stands in 
a precarious position at rule-making time.
Delegation and Administrative Rules
The role that agency rules play in the operation of any bureaucracy should not be 
underestimated. In many cases, administrative rules provide the substance of the 
agency’s operations, filling in gaps left by the enabling legislation:
248 David Schoenbrod, Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law o f 
the Judiciary Committee, House o f  Rep., Hearings on Monitoring Administrative Rulemaking, September 
12, 1996
249 See generally, Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
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The general pattern of legislation providing for public and private 
rights and privileges to the public lands and their resources has been 
for Congress to state general policies and to delegate to the Federal 
land managing agencies broad discretion to implement the statutory 
policies.250
The result o f  delegation, however, is an intensification of this process. The basic
legal premise guiding administrative rulemaking is that the agency shall not promulgate
rules that either contravene the underlying statute, nor that create new law not
contemplated by the legislature. The legal rationale is similar to the policy arguments
offered against delegation in general: to prevent the executive branch from usurping the
authority of the legislative branch in a manner in which legislative safeguards will not be
in place. The determination of whether agency rules have violated this restrictive
principle is unfortunately made more difficult by the enactment o f ambiguous statutes
with broad delegatory authority. As the scope of delegation and the statutory ambiguity
increase, a test to determine whether the agency has acted ultra vires in its rulemaking
becomes more difficult to formulate. This was recognized early on:
Agencies should be required to state in their regulations: (a) any 
administrative interpretations of statutory language, and (b) the 
standards under which statutory rights are to be administered and 
discretionary authority exercised. This will promote greater 
certainty in the administrative process, which is at the heart of any 
legal system. It will also facilitate congressional oversight to 
determine whether policies are being carried out in accord with 
congressional intent.-51
The key to this observation and recommendation is that Congress will explicitly 
comment on whether the agency’s rules meet the intent of the law they interpret. The
250 Pu b l ic  La n d  La w  R e v ie w  C o m m issio n , O ne  T h ir d  o f  t h e  N a t io n ’s  L a n d . A  R e p o r t  to  t h e  
P r e sid e n t  a n d  t h e  C o n g r e s s  251 (1970).
251 Id. a t 251-252 .
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ability of Congress to do so is pinioned upon the agency making crystal clear in its rules, 
what its interpretation of the law is. If either recommendation is absent, the system 
breaks down— if the agency is not explicit, and if Congress chooses not to address the 
rules, then any hope of direct Congressional responsibility for agency actions is lost.
Two examples of the dangers presented when delegation meets agency 
rulemaking are the Clinton administration’s roadless initiative232 and the 2nd Committee 
of Scientist’s Recommendations for national forest management planning rules.253 The 
former proposes limitations on the uses and management of approximately 58.5 million 
acres o f  the national forests, while the latter suggests a management paradigm based upon 
sustainability and collaborative decision-making. Both represent management directions 
that reflect no explicit legislative direction, and rather are creations of the executive 
branch.
1. The Roadless Initiative
On January 28, 1998, the Forest Service announced that it would enact an 18 
month moratorium of future road construction and reconstruction in roadless areas o f the 
national forests. The agency announced as well that it would commence development of 
a long-term road management policy during the pendency of the moratorium.254
252 Special Areas, Roadless Area Conservation, Proposed Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 30275 (2000) (to be codified 
at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294) (proposed May 10,2000).
253 65 Fed. Reg. 67,513 (2000) codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 217 and 219) For the underlying rationale and 
study results, see Sustaining the People ’ Lands, Recommendations fo r  Stewardship o f  the National Forests 
and Grasslands into the Next Century
254 36 C.F.R. § 212 (1999).
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On October 13,1999, the President issued a Memorandum to the Secretary of 
Agriculture directing the Forest Service to promulgate regulations to “provide appropriate 
long-term protection for most or all of these currently inventoried ‘roadless’ areas, and to 
determine whether such protection is warranted for any smaller ‘roadless’ areas not yet 
inventoried.”255 In compliance with this directive, the Forest Service, on October 19, 
1999, published a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement 
analyzing proposed rules to protect the “remaining roadless areas within the National 
Forest System.”256
The Process
The manner in which the President and the Forest Service have chosen to 
implement a new management regime for roadless national forest lands departs from 
what has historically been the manner in which the President, the Forest Service, and 
Congress have interacted for the protection of wilderness.257 Please note the term 
“wilderness” is used herein with deliberation. It is reasonable and supportable to equate 
roadless areas with the concept of wilderness. It may be argued that the presence or 
absence of roads in a national forest defines whether “wilderness” is present.258 The 
RARE II study, for example, stated that its purpose in inventorying and evaluating
255 Protection o f  Forest “Roadless " Areas, Memorandum from President William Clinton to Secretary o f 
Agriculture (October 13, 1999).
256 64 Fed. Reg. 56306 (1999).
257 Wilderness Act o f  1964, 16 U.S.C. §§1131-1136.
258 Id. at § 1131 (c). “Wilderness” is defined by the Act largely by the absence o f  permanent human 
improvements o r habitation—"Man is a visitor who does not remain.” The presence o f  roads would likely 
not meet this test, though see Samuel Dana and Sally Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy (1956) for a 
discussion that this standard was relaxed in the enactment o f  the Eastern Wilderness Act.
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roadless national forests was in part: “to select appropriate roadless areas to help round 
out the National Forest System’s share of a quality National Wilderness System.”259
Though the President’s October 13, 1999 directive does not mention wilderness, 
the management philosophy it suggests, coupled with the Statement of USFS Chief Mike 
Dombeck before Congress260, clearly imply that the esoteric or non-extractive values of 
the national forest lands under consideration are paramount. Chief Dombeck referred to 
these lands as the “last vestiges o f wildness.”261 Further, scholars have clearly equated 
the roadless national forest lands with wilderness.262 The terms “wilderness”, 
“wildlands”, “wildness” and “primitive area” tend to be used quite interchangeably—but 
all are pinioned on the absence of human disturbance and activity. Roads, which 
facilitate these activities, are the coarse filter in identifying and defining wilderness.
The intrigue associated with the current Forest Service proposal is a result of 
political prestidigitation. Accepting the premise that roadless forest is synonymous with 
wilderness, the proposed process o f delineating and managing roadless forests for 
wilderness values escapes the process established by the Wilderness Act of 1964,263 the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)264, the Forest and Rangeland
259 Summary, Final Environmental Statement, Roadless Area Review and Evaluation, USDA FS-324, p.2, 
(January, 1979).
260 Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Public Lands Management o f  the Senate Comm, on Energy and 
Natural Resources, (November 2, 1999) ( Statement o f  Forest Service C hief o f  Mike Dombeck.)
261 Id.
262 H. Michael Anderson and Aliki Moncrief, America's Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENV. U. L. Rev. 413
(1999).
263 Supra, note 257.
2W 16 U.S.C. §§472(a), 476,500, 513-517,528,576(b), 1600-1602, 1604,1606,1608-1614.
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Renewable Resource Planning Act o f 1974 (RPA)26S, and the various regulations and
rules enacted by the Forest Service.266 It may certainly be argued that the ultimate
decision of the Forest Service may not result in the management of the subject roadless
lands as de facto  wilderness. That speculation, however, ignores the tenor of the current
presidency, and the evidence thus far imparted to the public. The President’s October,
13, 1999 Memorandum, for example, clearly establishes expectations for the result of the
Forest Service’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. The President
described the roadless lands as:
.. .Some of the last, best unprotected wildlands in America.. .They are a 
treasured inheritance, enduring remnants of an untrammeled wilderness 
that once stretched from ocean to ocean. Accordingly, I have determined 
that it is in the best interest of our Nation, and of future generations, to 
provide strong and lasting protection for these forests...267
Former Chief Dombeck added: “Our objective is to ensure that our grandchildren 
will be able to marvel and wonder at the land legacy we hold in trust today.”268 This is 
not the language of an Administration intending to manage the roadless forests for any 
commodity but wilderness. As NEPA is not substantive, but rather procedural,269 the 
Forest Service is free to choose the outcome of its environmental review, provided the 
effects of its decision are adequately described and disclosed. Any argument that the 
outcome is not predecided must be tempered by the clear executive mandate to the Forest
365 16 U .S .C . §§1600-1606 , 1607-1614 .
266 See 36 C.F.R. §219.17 for a discussion o f  roadless area evaluation.
267 Supra, note 255.
268 Supra, note 261.
269 Marsh v.Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,109 S.Ct.1851 (1989).
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Service, and the ineffectiveness o f the NEPA process to conclusively alter the agency’s 
intent.
Returning to the premise that the suggested outcome of the Forest Service EIS 
will be a pseudo-wilderness designation for all or nearly all of the lands under 
consideration, the question remains: is the current roadless initiative in comport with the 
existing legal structure for both wilderness designations, and with the agency rules for 
national forest management? Congress has for nearly 40 years recognized the value of 
wilderness to the American public.270 The Wilderness Act provides specifically for the 
protection of the “wild” character of national forest roadless lands. As a mechanism for 
such inclusion, the Forest Service carried out an initial roadless inventory (RARE), and a 
more comprehensive subsequent inventory culminating in 1979 (RARE II). The purpose 
of these inventories was to provide the information necessary that the President might 
suggest to Congress those lands the executive branch believed appropriate for inclusion 
in the wilderness system.271 The Act represents a specific exercise of Congressional 
legislative authority under Article I of the Constitution for the management of federal 
property. The specific delegation made to the executive branch entailed the 
identification, and then the suggestion to the legislature o f those lands suited for special 
status.
Contrast this mechanism with the current methodology employed by the executive 
branch. The legislature’s role has been excised. The identification of the lands to be 
managed as wilderness, and the specific management regimes are decisions being made
270 Supra, note 255.
271 Id. at §1132.
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entirely by the executive branch. I would suggest that there may be a separation of 
powers infirmity in the current scheme.272 Regulations, it has been argued, should not be 
a substitute for laws promulgated by Congress.273 In this case, not only is the executive 
branch disregarding a specific federal statute, it also appears to be exercising authority 
neither granted to it by the Constitution nor delegated to it by the Congress.274 This 
perception is, of course, premised upon the earlier argument that the current exercise 
being conducted by the Forest Service is a thinly disguised attempt to create wilderness. 
Contrarily, if one rejects that argument, the Forest Service's position may be seen as 
merely an exercise of some broad discretion to manage national forests.
The separation of powers problem is not lonesome. The statutes that direct Forest 
Service management fail to clearly authorize the current process. The Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) does not mention a “wilderness” use at any point.275 
While outdoor recreation, watershed, wildlife and fish purposes are indeed mentioned,276 
and the maintenance of these goals may imply exclusion of human activity from certain 
regions, it is creative indeed to read the MUSYA as authorizing the designation of S8.5 
million acres as wilderness, replete with the exclusion of other resource users.277 The
272 This view is shared by Dr. Jefferson G. Edgens, Roadless Area Paved With Politics, Georgia Public 
Policy Foundation (December 20, 1999) < http://www/gppf.org/pubs/commentaries/1999/wildemess.htm>.
173 Louis F ish er , Co n s t it u t io n a l  Co n fl ic t s  B etw een  C o n g r ess  a n d  t h e  P r e s id e n t  107 (1997).
374 This is not an instance o f  a “grey area” delegation where a court might apply the "intelligible principle” 
test found in Mistretta v. U.S.. 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989). Rather, in this case, Congress has explicitly expressed 
the process for wilderness designation by statute.
275 Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act o f  1960, 16 U.S.C. §§528-531.
276 Id. at §528.
277 The USFS does acknowledge the MUSYA provision "that the establishment and management o f  
wilderness was consistent with the management o f  the National Forest System for multiple uses.” It is
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criticisms o f the term “multiple-use” are numerous—the result: the MUSYA can 
essentially be argued to support any land management regime desired.278 It is important 
for the purpose o f this paper to note only that the MUSYA did not explicitly provide for 
protected wilderness designations. Had it done so, Congress would have had little reason 
to enact the Wilderness Act a mere four years later.
The RPA and the NFMA are perhaps the more pertinent statutes, as they direct 
more specific levels of action on the national forests. The wilderness planning 
requirements of these statutes are manifested in the Forest Service national forest 
regulations.279 When managing roadless areas on national forests, the Forest Service 
regulation provides succinctly that: “Unless otherwise provided by law, roadless areas 
within the National Forest System shall be evaluated and considered for recommendation 
as potential wilderness areas [to the President and then to Congress] during the forest 
planning process.”280 The October 13, 1999 executive memorandum to the Forest 
Service does not appear to comprise the “law” required by this regulation to alter the 
required process; yet the Forest Service has apparently relied upon it as such. The 
roadless areas in question are being analyzed for management as wilderness, yet no
difficult to envision how this relatively innocuous conclusion is a rationale for an executive declaration that 
the entirety o f  the roadless lands be set aside as wildlands. While wildlands may indeed provide several 
“uses” to the public, the volumes at issue and the sweeping nature o f  the proposal do not reflect a concern 
for utilizing the resource “in the combination that best meets the needs o f  the American people.” It is o f  
note that Congress, in 16 U.S.C. §532, provides that an adequate road system is integral to “provide for 
intensive use, protection, development, and management o f  these lands under principles o f  multiple use and 
sustained yield of products and services.” One might argue therefrom, that roads are necessary if  one 
intends to manage in a multiple-use sustained-yield regime.
278 See R o b e r t  H. N e ls o n ,  P u b l ic  L a n d s  a n d  P r i v a t e  R ig h t s :  T h e  F a i l u r e  o f  S c ie n t i f i c  
M a n a g e m e n t  (1995) fo r a  d iscussion  o f  the defects in  the  MUSYA.
279 Roadless area evaluation is addressed at 36 C.F.R. §219.17.
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recommendation shall be offered to Congress. The decision will rest with the agency, 
ostensibly in violation of its own regulation.
The problem persists in the Forest Service Manual (FSM) detailing Recreation, 
Wilderness and Related Resource management.281 Section 2321 of the manual, entitled 
Establishment or Modification, states: Direction for evaluating potential wilderness and 
recommending areas to the Congress for wilderness designation is found in 36 CFR 
219.17 and FSM 1923...” The FSM clearly acknowledges the sole authority of Congress 
to designate wilderness, and the role of the agency as an evaluator, not a decision-maker.
There are then, legal questions at every level with the roadless initiative. The 
existing statutory requirements for wilderness are avoided, if only superficially, by not 
labeling the current undertaking as a wilderness designation process. The executive and 
the agency must be confident that the flimsy facade will survive judicial scrutiny; I am 
not.
The acceptance of the premise that the current roadless initiative will create de
fa c to  wilderness is largely immaterial to a conclusion as to whether the current proposal
is the “best” means to resolve this long-standing land use conflict. The process of
resolving such a contentious issue should not itself inject a new layer of conflict into the
mix. President Carter, in 1979, stated to the Congress:
RARE II provided a comprehensive nationwide review and 
evaluation of these important lands [roadless national forests]. It is 
my hope that the decision being announced today will help resolve 
the long-standing controversy over their case. This decision will 
assure the American people that high-quality areas will be protected
280 Id. at (a).
281 Forest Service Manual, Title 2300 (as amended June 20, 1990).
123
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for wilderness consideration by the Congress and for the enjoyment 
of future generations. It will also assure a continuing sustained yield 
of goods and services from these lands not recommended as 
wilderness. This will help our national economy as well as the 
growth and stability of local communities by providing additional 
oil and gas, minerals, and timber products which are essential to 
restraining inflation and increasing productivity.282
President Carter was, of course, referring to his recommendation to Congress for the
inclusion of 1 5.4 million acres of roadless national forest for designation as wilderness.
Now, twenty odd years later, another president is proposing that such land use protections
be granted for an additional 40 million odd acres; this time without Congressional assent.
There is no shortage of conflict with the substantive issue of wilderness
designation. The Wilderness Act and the RARE process were results of that conflict.
Unfortunately, the current Executive directive has made the procedural aspect of
wilderness designation equally contentious. Speed, for example, is of prime concern of
the Administration.283 The haste with which the agency is scrambling to complete the
analysis and decision-making under NEPA has been recognized by at least one court as
perplexing. Judge Edward Lodge writing from the federal bench noted that:
The sheer magnitude of this governmental action involving some 40 
to 60 million acres nationwide that precipitated 500,000 comments 
in sixty days is the best evidence the Forest Service should proceed 
with caution. Time is not of the essence on an issue that has been 
studied for over 30 years.284
281 Communication from the Secretary ofAgriculture Transmitting the President s Recommmdation fo r  the 
Designation as Wilderness o f  approximately 9.9 Million Acres o f  National Forest Lands GPO, H.R. Doc.
96-119 96th Cong., (May 4, 1979).
283 Supra, note 261. Chief Dombeck expected the final EIS and rule issuance by Fall 2000.
284 State o f  Idaho etal. v. USFS, CV99-611-N-EJL, 2/18/00 Order o f Court (D. Idaho, 1999).
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The current process has likewise been indicted by the Western Governor’s 
Association (WGA). The WGA argued that the forest planning process was the 
appropriate mechanism for a roadless review, as well as noting that the Enlibra 
collaborative doctrine to which the WGA subscribes was disregarded entirely by the 
Administration.285
The Society of American Foresters (SAF) also condemned the current process.286 
The SAF, like WGA, argued that the forest planning process was a preferred mechanism 
to deal with roadless forest, not a single national level decision. SAF too noted the 
USFS’ failure to adhere to its own regulations requiring collaborative decision-making.
Finally, and more recently, the National Association of Forest Service Retirees 
labeled the rules as “incomplete, arbitrary and illegal.”287
It is clear that the process underway will intensify the substantive conflict, rather
than abate it. A decision of such magnitude, if for no legal argument, should nonetheless
be left to the Congress for the fact that the legislature represents the political mechanism
best able to resolve entrenched conflict. The inherent problem is illustrated by the
Statement of Representative George Miller, the ranking Democrat on the House
Committee on Resources. Miller stated:
In my view, the President’s initiative sets in motion a process...[to 
afford] long-term protection for these vital resources in the final 
policy. But the initiative also sets forth an open public process for 
comment and debate on roadless issues.288
285 December 20, 1999 letter to Michael Dombeck, Chief, USFS; Resolution 99-030.
286 November 8, 1999 letter to USD A Forest Service-CAET.
287 January 21,2001 letter to Ann Veneman, Sect. O f Agriculture.
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Miller is incorrect, for the NEPA establishes the requirements for a public
process. Nonetheless, his comments are probative. He first notes his agreement with
what will be the eventual outcome of the initiative, then softens it by noting too that the
public will be involved. What he omits is that regardless of the outcome of the NEPA
process, no substantive changes to the initiative need occur in response to any public
comment. In contrast, Don Young, chairman of the same committee, stated:
Land designations and administration of the National Forest System 
are subjects within the jurisdiction of the Committee, as are the 
regulatory allocations of federal land by the Forest Service. 
Because, in part, the Administration has acted without proper 
consultation with Congress it is vital that the Committee examine 
the underpinnings o f this directive...I hope the Administration will 
be forthcoming and cooperative in our effort to determine how and 
why this controversial policy was developed.289
It spurs speculation as to why the Executive would compound a contentious
subject with a contentious process. The fact remains however, that the current process
will lead to greater conflict between the interested parties, including the Congress. In
1978 the contentious nature of these issues was aware to all. Senator Frank Church noted
that even though a wilderness system would be in place following RARE II, the
controversy would continue. He stated:
...The remaining [roadless] areas are still susceptible to a continuing 
controversy, and you get to the point where wilderness advocates are 
in a position to say: ‘This is ours because Congress has said so; now
288 Hearing on National Forest Roadless Area Policy Before the House Comm. on Resources November 3, 
1999. (Statement o f  Rep. George Miller).
289 Press Release, October 28, 1999 H.R. Comm, on Resources, Don Young Chairman. 
http://www.house.gov/resources/press/1999/991O28roadlessdocuentreouest.htm.
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let’s take a closer look at what is yours over here.’ That process 
keeps bubbling along year after year.290
During that same hearing, it was made clear that the mechanism to finally resolve the
roadless issue would reside with Congress. The Forest Service Director o f Recreation
Management suggested in discussing the results o f RARE II:
Once this is done [RARE II], we would most likely package it into 
some sort of environmental statement process... Most likely when it 
reaches the national level the Secretary of Agriculture would 
become the deciding official. He would be prepared to select one of 
the alternatives and propose to Congress, certainly, legislation for 
immediate designation of certain areas as part o f a wilderness 
system—helping round out the wilderness system. He could also 
propose that the Congress, through statute, provide planning 
guidance back to the Department through RPA and land 
management planning for unit planning at the local 
level.. .Congress, of course, must ultimately designate wilderness.291
It was at that time recognized that statutory authority would be mandatory to 
resolve a conflict with the intensity o f the roadless issue. Forest planning is recognized 
as historically contentious,292 and the President’s plan magnifies that dispute. The 
preferred alternative in the Roadless Final EIS, Alternative 3, would prohibit road 
construction, reconstruction and commercial timber harvesting on S8.S million acres of 
national forest.293 It is beyond debate that a decision of this magnitude, facilitated solely 
by the executive branch and its agency, will guarantee long-lived resentment among 
portions of the public, and fodder for legal disputes well into the future.
290 Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II) Before the Sen. Comm, on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 95lh Cong., Pub. No. 95-92,9-10 (February 1978).
:9‘ Id. at 8.
292 C h a r le s  F. W il k in so n  a n d  H . M ic h a e l  A n d e r s o n , L a n d  a n d  R e s o u r c e  P l a n n in g  in  t h e  
N a t io n a l  F o r e s t s , 76 (1987).
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More recently, the Committee of Scientists has found that a key to future national 
forest management will depend on collaborative planning.294 It is curious that while the 
roadless initiative has the appearance of a predecided, unilateral process, the regulations 
mandate a collaborative and cooperative planning process to develop landscape goals.293 
A landscape absent a 58 million acre roadless block hardly appears to meet the intent of 
these new regulations.
Already the agency and the executive struggle to deal with the artifacts of the 
former administration. Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck, in a January 5, 2001 
statement, spoke glowingly of the accomplishment of the agency in reaching a decision 
on the roadless issue, and “lasting protection" the decision would provide the national 
forests.296 Dombeck noted proudly that the agency had managed to address some one 
million comments during the rulemaking process. The final rule and record of decision 
confirming Dombeck’s statements were published in the Federal Register a week later, 
claiming somewhat oximoronically, that “the intent of this final rule is to provide lasting 
protection for inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest System in the context 
of multiple-use management.”297 If nothing else, such a statement should conclusively 
prove what the critics o f the MUSYA have claimed for decades—that it can be relied 
upon to justify virtually any form o f management.
293 United States Department o f  Agriculture, Forest Service Roadless Area Conservation Final 
Environmental Impact Statement S-9 (2000).
294 Sustaining the People's Lands: Recommendations fo r  Stewardship o f  the National Forests and 
Grasslands into the Next Century, USDA, Comm, o f  Scientists (March 15, 1999).
295 Id. at 219.12.
296 Mike Dombeck, A speech entitled Roadless Area Conservation: An Investment fo r  the F«/ure(January 
5,2001)
297 36 CFR, Part 294 (published at 66 Fed Reg. 3243, January 12,2001).
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Predictably, the Bush administration's executive order delaying the 
implementation o f the roadless rules was published in the Federal Register less than thirty 
days later.298 The new administration is now grappling with how to address the sweeping 
nature and the investment in the proposed rules. Of course, as with many such issues, the 
courts have been enrolled.299 A recent ruling by a federal judge in Idaho has held that the 
Forest Service violated the NEPA in promulgating the roadless rules.300 While the court 
did not enjoin the agency’s implementation of the mles, it quite clearly indicated that 
once the new administration had completed its review of the mles, it was likely that any 
implementation o f the mles would trigger the issuance of an injunction by the court.
Interestingly, the Forest Service did not defend the merits of the Plaintiffs case, 
but rather argued only that it was premature to issue injunctive relief. It can be made no 
more clear that delegation has wreaked havoc upon the agency than in a situation where 
the agency spent nearly a year developing its roadless mles, quickly promulgating the 
mles under the outgoing executive, and then under the successor administration, is 
essentially directed to not participate in the legal defense o f those mles; an absurd result 
by any standard.
The perspective one holds on the merits of the roadless mles is immaterial to the 
question of whether a matter of this magnitude, affecting 58.5 million acres (or nearly 
30% o f the total national forest system), and one that has become caught between
298 36 CFR, Part 294 (published at 66 Fed Reg. 8899, February 5, 2001)
299 See State o f  Idaho v. U.S. Forest Service. (D. Id. 2001); Kootenai Tribe o f  Idaho v. Glickman. (D. Id. 
2001); State o f  Alaska v. U.S. Pent’ o f  Agriculture: (D. Alaska 2001); and American Forest & Paper 
Assoc, v. Veneman (D. D.C. 2001). Further, the States o f  Wyoming, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota and 
South Dakota intend to support the lawsuit by the State o f  Idaho.
300 See State o f  Idaho v. U.S. Forest Service. (D. Id. 2001), Order o f  Judge Edward Lodge (April 5 ,2001) 
and Order o f  Judge Edward Lodge (M ay 10,2001)
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opposing management ideologies, is a matter that should be decided solely by the agency. 
It seems reasonable to expect an explicit Congressional role. The fact that Congress will 
likely not act cannot be relied upon as tacit approval of the agency's decision, for all of 
the various reasons that a legislature cannot mobilize to nullify an agency decision in a 
regular and effective manner. This decision demands Congressional ratification, and 
delegation makes certain that Congress need not speak.
Summary
In summary, the roadless issue has been intensely contentious from the first.
While the Forest Service and Congress apparently recognize the value of collaboration in 
national forest management,301 the current roadless initiative process makes no allowance 
for conflict mitigation via a cooperative agency mechanism, nor a legislative 
compromise. Should the current administration succeed in undermining the current rules, 
it should signal to any observer o f the process that the agency and the executive branch 
have usurped far too much management authority. It is inconceivable that drastic 
management decisions can be slipped on and off like a pair of shoes, while the legislative 
body responsible for these lands remains a passive conspirator. If indeed one million 
citizens took the time to comment on the roadless rule, should not the Congress have 
been compelled to participate in the decision, not as passive observer, but as the political 
body best suited to make political decisions on national forest management?
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II. The Committee o f Scientists’ Recommendations
Roger Sedjo, in criticizing the role that the Committee of Scientists (and a 
member of the Committee himself) had taken with Forest Service rulemaking, recently 
stated:
...The Committee decided to provide the new mission statement that 
the Forest Service has lacked. Casting aside concerns about whether 
it was appropriate for the committee to dictate a mission for the 
Forest Service, the committee boldly declared that the binding 
change has been sustainability and recommended, in essence, that 
the Forest Service manage for sustainability. Apparently, the 
committee was less concerned about the necessity of having a 
legislative directive to provide mission clarification from Congress 
and the President...302
Sedjo is correct in noting that this most recent foray into ferreting out a mission for the
Forest Service is lacking in statutory authority. It may be argued that this type of explicit
discussion of the agency interpretation of congressional intent is in keeping with what the
PLLRC recommended in 1970.303 For example, the regulations remark that:
This section would confirm ecological, social, and economic 
sustainability as the foundation for the National Forest System 
management. The first priority for management is the maintenance 
and restoration of ecological sustainability which is consistent with 
laws guiding use and enjoyment of National Forest System lands.
These laws clearly proclaim a national policy to provide for 
sustainability of these lands in perpetuity.304
301 Supra, note 222.
302 Roger Sedjo, Does the Forest Service Have a Future? in A VISION FOR THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE, 
G o a l s  fo r  It s  N ex t  C e n tu r y  177-78 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000).
303 Supra, note 47.
304 Supra, note 222 at Section 219.19.
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I am unsure as to the objective meaning of either of the first two sentences, but I
am awed, that after 40 years o f struggling with identifying the one true meaning of the
myriad legislation surrounding national forest management, the committee has
discovered it. It is interesting to note the contrast between this view, with that o f former
Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas, who notes:
The problem is not that the Forest Service does not have a clear and 
overriding mission but that the mission is not clearly spelled out in 
law and is not universally acknowledged. And the Forest Service 
can do little or nothing about it. The mission has simply evolved, 
with no open blessing from Congress or the administration.305
It may be that the missions identified by both the committee and by Chief Thomas are
one and the same (I cannot say definitively due to the amorphous nature of the
committee’s finding). Regardless, the committee sees the mission “clearly proclaim[ed]”
in the law, whereas Chief Thomas finds it notably absent. The GAO, in its review of
these same rules, has concurred with Chief Thomas, finding that:
Although the Forest Service’s 1999 proposed planning regulations 
would make ecological sustainability, rather than economic or social 
sustainability, the agency’s top priority, the priority assigned to 
ecological sustainability is not driven by the statutory authorities 
specific to the management of the national forests. These authorities 
provide little direction for the agency in resolving conflicts among 
the competing uses on its lands. Rather, the priority assigned to 
ecological sustainability is predicated on the requirements in 
environmental laws—enacted primarily during the 1960s and 
1970s—and their implementing regulations and judicial
interpretations.306
305 Jack Ward Thomas, What Now? From a Former C hiefo f the Forest Service in A  VISION FOR THE U.S. 
Fo r e st  S e r v ic e , G o a l s  fo r  Its  N e x t  C en tu r y  12 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000).
306 General Accounting Office, Forest Service: Proposed Regulations Adequately Address Some, But Not 
All, Key Elements o f  Forest Planning 6 GAO/RCED-OO-256 (2000).
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The committee's proclamations and subsequent codification as administrative 
rules have engendered conflict within the culture of the Forest Service itself. The FSX 
Club, an association of Forest Service retirees, made the following comment upon the 
draft rules:
Ecological management as defined by the Committee o f Scientists, 
and included in this rule, is not a scientific based form of 
management but a philosophical approach. The FSX Club of 
Washington, D.C. strongly urges the Forest Service to withdraw the 
proposed rule and undertake a rewriting of it by scientists, planners, 
resource specialists and forest managers experienced in the actual 
conditions facing the National Forests.307
Similarly, the Service’s own scientists complained that:
Ecological integrity and species viability, as we shall discuss later in 
this comment, are concepts not real entities such as number of trees 
of a certain size or miles of stream that have specific characteristics.
They are human constructs based upon both implicit and explicit 
assumptions. Further, even as concepts, they are ambiguous, 
elusive, or impossible to measure with clarity of any degree o f 
scientific consensus. Thus, hinging forest planning and 
management success on ecological sustainability as defined by 
ecosystem integrity and species viability dooms every plan and 
planning process to failure before it even starts.308
More recently, the Society of American Foresters has criticized the adopted 
regulations as “inconsistent with current law, particularly the Multiple-Use, Sustained- 
Yield Act of I960.”309 In its letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, the SAF points out 
that the Chairman of the Committee of Scientists, K. Norman Johnson, has publicly 
stated that:
307 January 31,2000 letter from Robert C. Van Aken, President, The FSX Club, to Project Team Leader, 
USDA Forest Service (January 31, 2000).
308 Memorandum from Robert Lewis, Jr., Deputy Chief for Research and Development USDA Forest 
Service, to Chief, USDA Forest Service (February 7, 2000).
309 February 8, 2001 letter from William Banzhaf, Exec. VP. SAF to Ann M. Veneman, Sec. o f  Agriculture.
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I believe that this [species diversity] requirement, will seriously 
undermine the ability o f the Forest Service to achieve the broad 
definition o f sustainability stated in the proposed rule and to meet 
the mission of the Forest Service of providing for multiple-use of the 
national forests and grasslands.310
Dr. Johnson was remarking on C.F.R. 219.20(2) which requires that decisions consider 
and ensure a ‘'high likelihood’' that species viability will persist and that populations be 
well distributed throughout their respective ranges. If Dr. Johnson’s premonitions are 
correct, and these rules spell the end of active forest management, it seems axiomatic that 
the rules will have violated the fundamental tenets of both the Organic Act and the 
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (this does not assume that the earlier NFMA 
regulations did not also violate the MUSYA).
It is impossible to ignore the obvious—the use of administrative rules to establish
management policy is inherently flawed. Rules are supplements to the statutes, not
replacements for them. In the case o f the Forest Service however, as the agency casts
about for a mission, any mission, that can save it from the abyss, rules are appealing as a
means to chart a course. The GAO has recently (and in concurrence) noted that:
By making clear that ecological sustainability—rather than 
economic or social sustainability—is the Forest Service’s highest 
mission priority, the agency’s proposed planning regulations, when 
finalized, would provide the national forests with needed direction 
on how to resolve conflicts among competing uses when developing 
and implementing forest plans. However, establishing ecological 
sustainability as the agency’s highest mission priority is better done 
outside procedural regulations governing forest planning.311
310 Supra, note 224.
311 Supra, note 306 at 12-13.
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Additionally, COS embraced the principles that surround and embody 
collaborative decision-making. To some extent, the collaborative process proposed by 
the Committee has been field tested. The recently enacted Herger-Feinstein Quincy 
Library Group Forest Recovery Act sets forth the management framework for over 2 
million acres o f national forest in California.312 The Act, a codification of the agreement 
reached by the parties to the Quincy Library collaborative effort represent a first in 
national forest management—Congressional ratification of a locally developed forest 
management plan. The Act sets out some specific management constraints, in 
particular restrictions on timber harvesting in designated spotted owl habitat, riparian 
areas, and in other areas of heightened concern. Further, the act sets out quite specific 
silvicultural requirements, requiring such things as the use of group selection and 
individual tree selection, in which group selection on an average must equal .57 percent 
of the project area each year, and that the total acreage to be managed must not exceed 
70,000 each year. Though containing these specifics, the law generally references the 
Quincy Library Group-Community Stability Proposal as the guidance for the amendment 
o f the forest plans. This is a case-book example of the delegation of forest management 
to someone other than the Forest Service. In this case the delegation is not even to the 
agency, but rather to a collection of local interests.
The Congressional ratification of the uneven-aged management prescriptions 
proffered by the Quincy Library Group, however, does to some extent suggest that in this 
case Congress was willing to bear the responsiu.iity for the direction in which these select 
forests would be managed, and to that extent, is a positive step toward the elimination of
312 Pub. L. 105-277, codified at 16 U.S.CA §2104.
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the effects of delegation—paradoxically, through the use of a form of delegation. It 
remains to be seen however, whether this method will ultimately be successful. In 
addition to the difficulties with implementing such a process on each and every national 
forest, and the criticisms by many of the collaborative process, there also is the 
unanswered question of whether the costs associated with vague legislation will be 
resolved by this methodology. In this regard, for example, witnesses during the hearings 
on the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Act (H.R. 858) made the tried and true 
arguments that forest mangers have come to rue:
Overall HR 858 is vague and creates a great uncertainty about what
actually will happen “on -the-ground” ...313
Summary:
The GAO, an agent of the Congress, realizes that rules cannot act as proxies for 
clear legislation. Inappropriate as they may be as statutory substitutes, national forest 
rules are a harbinger of litigation. Dissatisfaction with the agency’s decision under the 
Committee’s recommendations, and the inevitable inability to measure, quantify, or 
justify the outputs of this new management paradigm, will as Sedjo suggests, write the 
obituary of the agency.314 The culprit is delegation. If not for the vast, shifting terrain in 
which the Committee made its decision, no doubt the rules would have tracked legislative 
intent. It’s really quite simple—tell the agency what you want done, let them do it, and 
judge whether they accomplished the task. Delegation interrupts this primal process.
313 Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest 
Health o f the H.R. Comm on Resources, 105* Cong., 1“ Sess. March 5, 1997. P. 96., Testimony o f  Lois 
Blumberg, Asst. Regional Director, The Wilderness Society
314 Supra, note 302h at 185-186.
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Instead of certainty, the new NFMA rules have already become entangled in 
litigation. A suit filed in California by 14 environmental groups challenges the rules as 
violative of the NEPA, the ESA, the NFMA, the APA.313 Notably absent from the 
complaint is an allegation that the new rules violate the MUSYA, the law that the forestry 
professionals have largely claimed the rules violate.
Further, the Bush administration has recently determined that national forest 
compliance with the new regulations will be delayed, allowing for publication of a 
redrafted version of the rules sometime in May, 2002.316
Even here, with the support (albeit less than unanimous) of an esteemed scientific
review panel, the debate is not settled. Professor Arthur Cooper, a member o f the
original COS, fatefully noted that:
There is urgency about the need to bring multiple use and 
sustainability into closer agreement. Should the Forest Service 
finally adopt regulations with an emphasis on sustainability similar 
to those out for review now, there is a chance it would be setting 
itself up for another “Monongahela” case.317
While the “scientific” inquiry may be at an end, the legal and political warfare 
rages. With no way to resolve such disputes other than through the political process, 
Congress must shoulder the responsibility for shaping and settling the debate.
This chapter should not suggest that there may not be a form of administrative 
regulation that would in fact complement the underlying statutes, and in fact resolve
315 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept, o f  Agriculture. (N.D. CA 2001)
316 April 25,2001 Lener from David P. Tenny, Acting Undersecretary for Natural Resources, USDA, to 
Dale Bosworth, Chief, U.S. Forest Service.
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many of these concerns. Unfortunately, if the agency rule-making process is available as 
a forum for political debate, many legislators will in fact choose to see the battles fought 
in that arena. The underlying statutes must at all times place the blame or credit for 
Forest Service behavior at the feet of the Congress. Whatever rule-making occurs must 
be done in a manner that does not interfere with that tenet. While rules can be relied 
upon to fill in the details, the “filling in” must never be permitted to upstage the 
legislative actors.
317 Arthur W. Cooper, “Proposed Forest Service Planning Regulations,” Testimony Before the Senate 
Subcomm. on Forests and Public Land Management on behalf o f  the Society o f American Foresters, March 
2,2000 .
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Chapter 8: Realties, Suggestions, and Remedies
When government holds a forest fo r  both conservation and limber, 
how much we get o f  each and on what timetable can only be 
determined by never-ending political struggle. Today’s political 
contest must be won today; tomorrow must take care o f  itself A 
government agency established to balance opposing objectives o f 
economic use and conservation is a political house divided against 
itself forever tugged in opposing directions. The agency will staff 
up with conservation biologists on one side o f the building and 
economists on the other. But how many trees are cut and how many 
are left standing will, in the end, have nothing to do with either 
discipline.
- Peter Huber318
There are, it seems, several aspects to the problems posed by delegation.
Foremost are the incentives faced by legislators to delegate, and the subsequent nature of 
the statutes that they enact. Another is the related role that an agency may play in 
supporting such laws, and lobbying the legislature for the discretionary authority the 
bureaucracy believes is in its best interest. Last is the part played by the courts. The 
judiciary has the ability to either ratify or prevent delegations of legislative authority. All 
of these facets, working singly or in combination, are capable of setting the stage for the 
problems discussed in Chapters 4, 5,6, and 7.
What can be done to prevent this particular outcome? I suggest that there are 
ways of looking at the national forest situation that may obviate the historically granted 
discretion to the Forest Service. However, any proposed answers to the problems of 
delegation must first incorporate two contextual facets. The first is an understanding of
318 P ete r  H u b e r , H a r d  G r e e n : Sa v in g  t h e  En v ir o n m e n t  fr o m  t h e  En v ir o n m e n t a l is t s , A  
C o n se r v a t iv e  M a n if e s t o  92 -9 4  (1 9 9 9 ).
139
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the role that scientific management has come to play in national forest management. 
Second, there seems to be a fundamental distrust of the agency by its critics that must be 
appreciated. These two factors will inevitably impact the effectiveness of any potential 
solution.
This Chapter will first discuss the role that science has evolved to playing on 
national forest management. The thrust of that discussion is that science can no longer be 
relied upon for either justifying delegation nor in acting as a shield for the Forest Service. 
Following that discussion, this Chapter will look at some possible solutions to the 
delegation problem, broken into legislative, judicial, and administrative categories.
The Decline of Scientific Management
There is little doubt that the role played by science, and the faith placed in the 
Forest Service’s ability to manage based upon science, have eroded considerably.319 It 
may be as others suggest that the Forest Service reliance upon science was never that 
deific and in fact has always been only a piece in a far larger management puzzle.320 
With either paradigm, however, there has nonetheless been a decline in the ability of the 
Forest Service to rationalize or defend its management positions based upon scientific 
arguments. The reasons for this are twofold. The first is systemic. The American public, 
with its increasing interest in the management of public lands, has, in many cases, 
developed opinions that forest management is somehow simple or unscientific, not 
requiring any particular training or education in order to make decisions. This may be a
3,9 Robert Nelson, The Religion o f  Forestry: Scientific Management, 97 J. OF FORESTRY 4 (1999).
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natural result o f  intense public interest in any field—it tends to generate armchair 
professionals—in this case armchair foresters. Professor Nelson summarizes the 
problem:
The management of the national forests is in a state of paralysis and 
gridlock. Part o f the reason is that the American public no longer 
accepts the main tenets of scientific management, whether applied to 
forests or other areas of American life. The level of public trust in 
professionals, from doctors to lawyers to economists to foresters, 
has been declining for a quarter of a century. Before agreeing to 
surgery, patients solicit second and third opinions from other doctors 
as standard operating practice. One observer found that “judges 
increasingly worry that parties to a case can find an ‘expert1 to 
testify to anything and that flawed or distorted research-‘junk 
science’-can mislead jurors.11 Other signals of this trend are seen in 
the willingness o f members of the U.S. Congress as well as the 
judiciary and executive branches to intervene in the management of 
the national forests...Part of the reason the Forest Service is 
confused about its mission is that the American public is no longer 
sure about the future of professional expertise and the place of 
science in government, [citations omitted]3-1
The unfortunate result is that forestry, perhaps more so than any other
profession, has become the habitat of amateurs and self-anointed experts, vocal critics
that have never managed an acre of forested land, nor have any formal training in the
field. Clawson, perhaps remorsefully, points out that:
In the “good old days11 of truly long ago, the district manager could 
make a timber sale, issue a grazing permit, build a fire-control line, 
engage in some controlled burning, or carry out other resource 
management actions on the land, using his best professional 
judgment and the best facts available to him...That day of federal 
land management has passed....322
320 Jack Ward Thomas and James Burchfield, Comments on “The Religion o f Forestry: Scientific 
Management" 97 J. OF FORESTRY 10 (1999).
321 Robert Nelson, Rethinking Scientific Management: Brand New Alternatives fo r  a Century-Old Agency, 
in A V is io n  f o r  t h e  U.S. Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e : G o a l s  fo r  It s  N e x t  C e n t u r y  58 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000).
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This state of affairs has relegated to an ancillary position the role o f science, and
largely replaced it with personal value systems and rhetoric. Forest management critics
are often motivated by emotional and aesthetic concerns with very little regard for any
scientific position that tends to rebuke the value-driven stance they have adopted.323 The
unfortunate result is that forest science has increasingly become a tool for accomplishing
the goals that particular interests seek. The value of science as an objective touchstone,
against which political decision can be measured or gauged, is lost.324 Baden and Dana
recognize and describe the problem:
...It has become apparent since the Progressive Era that science 
cannot be insulated from politics. Special interest groups sway 
scientists as persuasively as laymen. Thus, when presented with the 
same set o f information about the dangers of nuclear waste disposal, 
a scientist from the Sierra Club will often defend a significantly 
different position from that of a scientist from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.325
322 M a r io n  C la w s o n , T h e  Fed e r a l  La n d s  Re v isit e d  2 5 7  (1983).
323 M a r io n  C la w s o n , Fo r e st s  Fo r  W h o m  a n d  Fo r  W h a t? 22 (1975).
324 See Connie P. Ozawa, Science in Environmental Conflicts, 39 SOC. PERSP. 219 (1996) in which the 
author argues that science and politics have essentially become indistinguishable, and that science as a 
means o f  shielding an administrative position or decision from criticism has become difficult if  not 
impossible
325 John Baden and Andrew Dana, The New Resource Economics in FEDERAL L a n d  POLICY 6 (P h illip  O. 
Foss, ed., 1987).
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This departure of scientific management from the scene has been documented most
pessimistically by Nelson:
The loss of the scientific management ethos that guided the agency 
in the twentieth century is fatal. It is possible to stumble along 
making incremental changes but this merely delays the inevitable 
and increases the costs. Instead, the current functions of the Forest 
Service should be reassigned to other new and existing federal 
agencies, to states, and to the private sector.326
The second difficulty faced by the Forest Service is a general distrust by those
most aggrieved by national forest management. From broad accusations of agency
capture by the timber industry, to specific distrust of such methods as clearcutting and
any argument as to its use as a valid silvicultural tool, to the more recent failure to accept
ecosystem management, there is among at least an element of the public an absolute
unwillingness to accept the representations of the agency as fact. As Richard Alston
describes it: “What are sound forestry practices to some represent abuse of the landed
inheritance to others.”327
What these two observations mean for the Forest Service is simple. The historic
argument made for delegation as deference to an agency’s scientific expertise has become
increasingly baseless. The “Pinchotian” pride in sound, scientific forest management has
been debunked as either a myth, or a shift has occurred that does not validate agency
discretion. No longer can Congress legitimately hide behind language like:
There are certain times, Mr. Chairman, when Congress should leave 
management to the professionals. This is one of those times. In 
these cases, Congress should establish general guidelines, without
326 Supra, note 2 at 10
327 R ic h a r d  m . A l s t o n ,  T h e  I n d i v id u a l  v s .  T h e  P u b l i c  I n t e r e s t :  P o l i t i c a l  I d e o l o g y  a n d  
N a t i o n a l  F o r e s t  P o l i c y  5 (1983).
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shackling the bureaucracy. Congress cannot hope to manage better 
than the managers, particularly on esoteric, complicated, and 
technical issues such as those involving the future of our forests.328
This quote, referring to S. 3091 that was to become the NFMA, is a typical 
rational offered for deference to the bureaucracy. The premise, though, that the 
bureaucracy is better suited due to its superior technical knowledge, at least with the 
Forest Service has become unacceptable. The agency’s science is not capable of 
insulating national forest management decisions. Consequently, delegation to the agency 
should not carry the momentum as it once did. That does not, however, resolve the 
current situation that has resulted from the MUSYA and the NFMA. As Peter Huber 
eloquently put it at the beginning of this chapter, science and economics cannot provide 
the basis of forest management, rather it is largely devolved into a political question.
With all of this in mind, it seems reasonable to turn to political and legal solutions 
as a means of correcting for the damage wrought be delegation. Any reliance upon a so 
called “scientific” rationale or remedy does not appear to offer a solution that will endure. 
As such, three forums exist in which legal or political solutions might occur.
Legislative Solutions
Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the manner in which federal 
property, including the national forests, are to be managed. The trick, it appears, is to 
keep that management responsibility within Congress’ hands. Drawing once more upon
328 Forestand Rangeland Management Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Environment, 
Conservation and Forestry o f  the Senate Comm, on Agriculture and Forestry and the Subcomm. on the 
Environment and Land Resources o f  the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 
25 (Comments o f  Senator Bob Packwood) (1976).
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Morris Fiorina's delegation equation, it seems simple that to effectuate that result, one 
need only alter the equation to make the costs of delegation outweigh the benefits. While 
simple, this proposition faces several obstacles.
One hurdle that has been broadly recognized, is the tendency of legislators to 
make politically palatable, short-term decisions in their own re-election interests, while 
foregoing the difficult decisions into the more distant future. This temporal bias towards 
the short term is compounded by the legislative desire to associate themselves with the 
benefits of projects and to obscure the costs of such projects.329
The second, and perhaps the most significant obstacle, is the very nature of 
national forest management itself. As others have noted, it is not likely that any 
management consensus is likely to ever be reached among the public at large, and 
certainly not among the more polarized interests.330 That said, referencing the graph I 
presented in Chapter 4, in such an environment of fragmented public interest, Congress 
will invariably continue to find that the benefits of delegation outweigh the costs. How 
then, in the face of can the equation be altered to incur greater expense on the Congress?
In order to adequately alter the equation, legislators need to recognize that 
delegation will diminish the likelihood of re-election. That does not presently occur 
because the brunt of the negative effects of delegation are borne by the agency. There 
needs to be a fundamental alteration of the statutory basis for national forest
329 Richard L. Stroup and Sandra L . Goodman. Property Rights, Environmental Resources, and the Future 
15 Ha r v  J .L . &  Pu b . Po l ’y . 427,433-5 (1992); See also Ja m es  D . G w a r t n e y  a n d  R ic h a r d  L. STROUP, 
Ec o n o m ic s , P r iv a t e  a n d  Pu b lic  C h o ic e  800 (1997).
330 Roger Sedjo, Does the Forest Service Have a Future? in A VISION FOR THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: 
G o a l s  FOR It s  N e x t  CENTURY 183 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000); Max Peterson Discussion: Does the Forest 
Service Have a Future? in A VISION FOR THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: GOALS FOR ITS NEXT CENTURY 199 
(Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000).
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management, for the current legislation permits the Congress to continue its delegatory 
behavior. The change would necessarily impose the costs of forest management 
problems directly upon the Congress. Delegation would not be a sought after remedy, if 
the costs remained squarely with Congress. This can be viewed in two ways: one, a 
change to the national forest management legislation that would so clearly define the 
agency's mission and the parameters in which it was to accomplish that mission, such 
that little or no delegation would occur; and two, a less direct change, or series of changes 
that would refocus responsibility on the Congress without the need to alter the underlying 
statutes.
Many have suggested the former, in which a clear mission for the agency would 
be identified. Clarity, however, is only a partial solution. The agency too must be 
constrained from exerting the discretion that has come to plague it. If, for example, the 
Congress were to adopt Dr. Thomas' suggestion that biodiversity is the primary mission 
o f the agency, that alone is insufficient.331 The law cannot read “Biodiversity is the 
premiere goal of the Forest Service and the foremost required output from all national 
forests—go forth and accomplish this!’’ This is merely a spin on the MUSYA, and the 
Forest Service cannot simply be granted blanket authority to meet that mission in the 
fashion it sees fit. The days of professional discretion coupled with scientific expertise 
are at an end. Couching the agency mission in such terms with nothing else, will lead to 
the same delegation problems faced today. Constraints must be implemented.
331 Id. a t Jack Ward Thomas, What Now? From A Former Chief o f  the Forest Service, in A  VISION FOR THE 
U .S . F o r e s t  S e r v i c e :  G o a l s  f o r  I t s  N e x t  C e n t u r y  12 (Roger Sedjo, ed., 2000 )
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Provided Congress could realize and embrace a focused mission, and further 
articulate it in statute, it is nonetheless historically unlikely that Congress would also be 
willing to limit discretion by implementing restrictions on the agency's actions. That is 
not to say that there would not be support for such constraints.332 There does however, 
seem to be a difference in opinion on the ability of Congress to craft constraints, and their 
value and effectiveness if implemented.333 Given those concerns, it nevertheless is 
pessimistic to claim that a comprehensive statutory mechanism coupled with the 
appropriate administrative devices could not be developed to accomplish both the 
elimination of delegation and still guarantee the agency sufficient flexibility to respond to 
varying landscapes and environments. No serious attempt has heretofore been made; the 
mystique of agency expertise and discretion has up until now been insurmountable.
This is not to suggest that no such attempts have been made. Senate Bill 2536 is 
one.334 This bill, largely a farm budget bill, included language applicable to the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Congress, at least in this occasion, was unwilling to permit the 
executive branch to further modify the Corps' mission. Section 3102 reads in pertinent 
part:
...none of the funds made available by this or any other Act may be 
used to restructure, reorganize, abolish, transfer, consolidate, or 
otherwise alter or modify, the organizational or management
332 For example, there was some limited support for S.2926, and there seems to be a current cry from some 
that more prescriptive legislation is warranted.
333 Randal O ’Toole in R e fo r m in g  THE Fo r e s t  S e r v ic e  (1988) argues that prescriptive legislation is 
merely a treatment for the symptoms, not a cure for the problem, (p. 185). Though he may be correct that 
simply regulating the Forest Service timber management program may be insufficient, with legislative 
direction as to a clear management mission, the two would complement one another. In effect the ailment 
and the symptoms would both be cured.
334 S.2536 remains before the 106th Congress, though has been incorporated in HR 4461.
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oversight structure; existing delegations; or functions of activities, 
applicable to the Army Corps of Engineers, [emphasis added]
Surely, the delegated powers of the Forest Service could likewise be controlled.
A clear set of constraints could likewise be linked to the agency budget, or as this law 
provides, no funding from any source would be available for the agency that deviated 
from Congressional restrictions. This is, o f course, only a facet of a far larger 
proposition, but it demonstrates on a small-scale congressional willingness to accept 
responsibility for an agency" actions.
Perhaps a more effective approach is represented by S.433.335 This bill, 
tentatively titled the “Congressional Responsibility Act of 1997”, contained a number of 
provisions specifically designed to rectify the delegation issue, though not limited to the 
Forest Service. One of the primary mechanisms is in Section 4. Enactment o f  Agency 
Regulations. This section requires that prior to any administrative regulation becoming 
effective, the Congress must first enact a bill containing only the text o f the rule. In 
effect, Congress wold be forced to ratify each and every agency rule, as meeting the 
intent of the statute the rule was attempting to implement.
There is some merit to this approach. For example, the proposed regulations that 
will implement the suggestions of the Committee of Scientists or the Roadless Area rules 
discussed in Chapter 7, would be require the ratification of Congress to become effective. 
The action or inaction of Congress on the regulations would send a clear message to the 
agency and the public as to how the Congress expected to see these forest lands managed. 
Such a bill, tailored to the particular needs o f the Forest Service, could provide a means
335 S.433 was before the 105th Congress in 1997, but never left committee.
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to remove the agency from the precarious position in which it now rests, and redirect any 
discontent with forest management to the Congress. The democratic process would, at 
least theoretically, account for this dissent in the formulation of the rules, so when they 
were presented as a bill, the political process would have already accounted for all 
interests.
The other interesting aspect of the bill is a limitation on judicial review of the 
promulgated rules. Section 6 provides that the rules contained within the bill would not 
be considered an agency action for purposes o f judicial review under Chapter 7, Title 5 of 
the United States Code. This provision makes particular sense in the highly litigious 
setting of the Forest Service. The rules, at least, reflecting clear legislative intent, would 
not be subject to challenge, for example, for failing to comply with the MUSYA or the 
NFMA. Challenges would then essentially come only for specific actions o f the agency 
for not meeting its own rules, as congressionally sanctioned. This could be a significant 
step in reducing the litigation plaguing the agency, without denying the public its access 
to the decision-making process, an oft cited argument against any proposed limitation in 
judicial review.
Limitations on judicial review, while vociferously criticized,336 comprises two 
areas of import. First and perhaps more pragmatically, it offers a means to actually get 
forest management out o f the courtrooms and back into the forests as Richard Behan 
might put it. Second, by limiting judicial review, Congress is essentially saying that it 
has democratically established the means o f national forest management, and it does not
336 Victor Sher and C. Hunting Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from  
Judicial Review o f  Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. E n v t l .  L. Rev. 435 (1991).
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wish to see its federal land management prerogative second guessed by interest groups or 
the courts, once that democratic decision is reached.
O f course, the devil is in the details, and that certainly applies to this question. 
Where, when, and how much limitation on review is desirable is part and parcel of the 
political management decision itself. Nonetheless, limitations on review have beneficial 
effects, the critics aside, and such limitations do not detract from a citizen’s right to 
participate in government, if  the limitations are in fact products of the democratic 
process, whereby that citizen’s will is or is not accepted. If the role of the courts is to 
assess whether an agency has acted in accord with the law, or has met Congressional 
intent, why not have Congress explicitly make that decision? If the agency actions are 
ratified by the Congress, there appears very little need for the courts to become involved.
Skeptics, of course, will argue that to ever expect Congress to accept greater land 
management responsibility is foolhardy and naive.337 How can the incentives for 
delegation ever be overcome, such that the Congress will in fact choose not to delegate? 
Fortunately, there are several examples of differing scales, where the Congress has in fact 
not delegated to anywhere near the extent is has previously, and in fact has set forth 
relatively specific management direction.
The first, and the more limited of the two examples, is represented by the timber 
salvage riders passed into law by Congress in 1989,1990, and 1995 in particular. Love 
them or hate them, what these laws have in common is that they represent a clear 
decision by the Congress to absorb both the costs and the benefits of directing a particular
337 K.. Norman Johnson, The Role o f  Our National Forests in American Life, a paper prepared for the Seth 
Diamond Lectures at the Universities o f Idaho and Montana, ( April 6,2001)
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management regime in a specific and explicit manner. The 1995 rider is particularly 
enlightening in this regard.338 The rider specifically provided:
1. Salvage timber harvest was to be achieved to the “maximum extent 
possible” at a level above the existing program level.339
2. The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to conduct salvage 
sales notwithstanding any “decision, restraining order, or injunction” 
issued by a court.340
3. No salvage timber sale shall be subject to administrative review.341
4. No “restraining order, preliminary injunction , or injunction 
pending appeal” shall be issued by any court with respect to any 
decision to prepare or advertise a sale.342
5. Civil lawsuits filed against any sale shall be heard at the earliest 
possible date and any decision thereon must be rendered within 45 
days o f the date of the suit.343
6. The Secretary of Agriculture is not required to issue rules to 
implement the salvage rider.344
7. The documents and sale procedures under the rider shall be 
deemed to satisfy the requirements of the RPA, the FLPMA, the 
NEPA, the ESA, the NFMA, the MUSYA, and any and all other 
applicable federal environmental and resource laws.345
338 Pub L. 104-19, Title II, §2001, July 27, 1995, 109 Stat. 240 as amended.
339 Id. at (b)(1).
340 Id. at (C)(9).
341 Id. at (e)
342 Id. at (3)
343 Id. at (5)
344 Id. at (b)
345 Id. at (i.).
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8. The rider shall not require nor permit any amendment or other 
changes to any forest plan.
The specificity and the clarity with which the Congress addressed this national 
forest question provide some hope that a more comprehensive proposal might at some 
point become a reality. While some might argue that the political will does not exist for 
the Congress to ever address national forest management explicitly, this particular law 
belies that point. For example, even after the Clinton Administration attempted to soften 
and modify the effects of the 1995 rider by executive directive, the Forest Service was 
nonetheless able to meet the explicit volume commitment made by the Secretary of 
Agriculture to Congress. Every party to this episode was quite aware of where 
responsibility lay. The salvage riders, whether welcome or detested, represent a political 
mechanism that left little doubt as to the manner in which the agency was to act, and 
more importantly, the blame or kudos for the results could be laid squarely at 
Congressional feet.
The second, and broader example of a non-delegated national forest decision is 
the Alaskan National Interest Conservation Act (ANILCA).348 While it covers quite a 
broad array of topics (it is particularly well known for guaranteeing access for non- 
federal inholders in the national forests) the ANILCA is notable for a particular 
Congressional edict which addresses the balancing point on Alaskan national forests 
between local and national interests, and between economic and environmental concerns:
346 Id. at (1).
347 See USDA Forest Service, Forest Management Program Annual Report, FY 1996, pp. 22-24, for a more 
detailed summary o f  these events.
348 P.L. 96-487, codified at Title 16 U.S.C. §3101 etseq.
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This Act provides sufficient protection for the national interest in the 
scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values on the public 
lands in Alaska, and at the same time provides adequate opportunity 
for satisfaction of the economic and social needs of the State of 
Alaska and its people; accordingly, the designation and disposition 
of the public lands in Alaska pursuant to this Act are found to 
represent a proper balance between the reservation of national 
conservation system units and those public lands necessary and 
appropriate for more intensive use and disposition, and thus 
Congress believes that the need for future legislation ...has been 
obviated thereby.349
Such a declaration is attractive in that the Congress, depending on the details of the 
management plans, has taken the responsibility for the management of these public lands, 
and individual legislators can be held accountable to the decision. While nearly two 
decades old, the ANILCA nonetheless represents a far more desirable legislative scheme 
than the statutes generally governing the national forests.
These examples aside, the criticism remains that it is far too politically divisive or 
contentious for any comprehensive piece of national forest legislation to be promulgated. 
This pessimistic view discounts the examples cited, all o f which occurred in a climate of 
intense political wrangling. Neither the salvage riders nor the ANICLA were passed in 
some utopian environment of bilateral trust and understanding. Rather, both the salvage 
riders and the ANILCA were promulgated after protracted political warfare. As such, 
even in today’s’ conflict-ridden national forest management era, there is no reason to 
eliminate the potential for Congressional action designed to clarify the role of the forests 
and of the Forest Service.
349 Id. at §3101(d).
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What’s available now as candidates? There are two, particularly different 
substantively, pieces of national forest management legislation pending. The first, a 
long-lived bill submitted by Senator Larry Craig entitled the Public Lands Planning and 
Management Improvement Act o f1999.350 The other is the recurring product o f wide 
number of sponsors entitled the National Forest Protection and Restoration Act o f  
2001.351 While the substance of the two bills provides much fertile material for 
discussion, the importance to this paper is their delegatory content.
Senator Craig’s bill and the H.R. 1494 are depicted in Chart 11 below, in 
comparison to the earlier laws and bills.
350 S. 1320, 106th Congress, 1st Sess. (1999).
351 H.R. 1494 107th Cong., 1“ Sess. (2001), formerly H.R. 1396, 106th Cong., 1“ Sess. (1999).
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C h a rt 11.
■  Delegation Ratio
■  Constraint Ratio 
□  Discretion Index
As can be seen, both versions are comparably delegatory to both the NFMA and 
the NFTRA. Both, however, employ far more constraints on agency discretion, and 
therefore both have discretionary indices below any of the other laws examined in this 
paper. A close reading of the these two recent bills reveals that they are quite 
prescriptive in a number of ways, the extent o f which may not be entirely reflected in 
Chart 11.
It may be that both reflect a modem trend toward less discretionary laws, 
accomplishing that goal largely by limiting the exercise of delegated authority. They
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may also reflect a certain willingness or understanding on some level that delegation and 
boundless discretion may not be an effective means of managing the national forests.
The bottom line in any attempt to change the outcome of the delegation formula is 
to convince voters that legislative delegation to the Forest Service is not in the interests of 
the public, that it produces poor but expensive results, and that legislators that support its 
continuation are not desirable. A political solution to a political problem may be viable 
when the diverse interests realize that the legislators they believe can be influenced do 
not serve those same interests by leaving the agency with the discretion and authority to 
produce a myriad of unaccountable management results. Special interests should realize 
that reliance upon indirect controls like the budget or the judiciary, imparts greater 
uncertainty into the outcome of the agency’s efforts. Those interests seeking 
predictability and certainty should denounce delegation, and lobby for greater legislative 
responsibility. As Jerry Mashaw pointed out, the legislator’s role in policy formulation 
must become apparent once the agency “chooses a determinate policy.”352
State Trust Land Management
Legislation might also be crafted which imparted specificity, fundamentally 
altered the management approach, but still left the implementing agency with substantial 
discretion. One such model would emulate state trust land models. The specificity of 
purpose with which the various state trust land management programs are endowed, 
provides an example of an instance in which the legislature established the purposes of
352 J e r r y  L. Ma s h a w , G r e e d , C h a o s  a n d  G o v e r n a n c e : U sin g  P u b l ic  C h o ic e  t o  Im pr o v e  Pu b lic  
La w  148 (1997).
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the public lands, and various agencies were basically left only with the management 
decisions.353 The political disputes were largely resolved by the time the matter came 
before the agencies. Consequently, the trust land management model has been cited as a 
possible alternative management mechanism for federal public lands.354
There a number o f reasons why such a model may be a viable solution to many of 
the current problems in federal public land management, but for purposes o f this paper, 
trust-type management represents a particularly defined objective for the implementing 
agencies, generated within the political process, at the legislative level. State land 
managers do not find themselves facing as many of the conflicts which do the Forest 
Service, thought these state agencies engage in many of the same types o f resource 
management activities.355
The trust model is but one potential alternative to the problems associated with 
the current system. There are other more “radical” options for the management o f the 
public lands that have been suggested over time. These alternative regimes depend 
largely upon fundamental restructuring of national forest management and redefinition of 
the basis of property rights in the forests. Options range from the complete privatization 
o f the national forests,356 disbursement of the national forests to various interest groups in
353 Jo n  A. S o u d e r  a n d  S a l l y  K . F a i r a x ,  S t a t e  T r u s t  L a n d s  (1996).
354 Supra, note 122.
355 For example, it is the experience o f  the Montana Department o f Natural Resources & Conservation that 
few o f  its timber sale projects are challenged, and those that are, are challenged on procedural bases. The 
agency’s timber program must follow the specific mission o f  providing economic support for the school 
trust beneficiaries, and therefore, at least theoretically, cannot be dragged by varying political forces down 
management paths that do not satisfy that primary management goal.
356 Terry Anderson, V. L. Smith, and E. Simmons, How and Why to Privatize Federal Lands, Cato Policy 
Analysis No. 363 (December 9, 1999); Richard L. Stroup Privatizing Public Lands: Market Solutions to 
Economic and Environmental Problems, 19 P. La n d  & RESOURCES. L. REV. 79 (1998); Richard L. Stroup, 
Weaknesses in the Case fo r  Retention in RETHINKING t h e  PUBLIC La n d s  (Sterling Brubaker, ed. 1984);
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fee or to endowment boards with fiduciary responsibilities,357 to narrow dominant use 
management by Forest Service units or geographically based dominant use system 
ratified by Congress.358 Any of these alternatives, to be effective, would require explicit 
legislative action on the part of Congress
Judicial Solutions
A judicial solution is premised upon one event: that the courts will once again 
rigorously enforce the historical nondelegation doctrine. The possibility of that occurring 
is arguable, particularly in light of the acceptance by the American public o f the 
bureaucratic culture entrenched in modem government.359 With that culture has come 
greater reliance upon administrative agencies. With the reliance has come greater agency 
discretion and authority. It is not foreseeable that this state o f affairs will change in the 
near future.
Perhaps more important, is the absolute authority possessed by Congress under 
Article IV of the Constitution to manage federal property. With such broad powers, the 
likeliness o f any court finding any particular delegation to the Forest Service as illegal is 
quite slim. There is, then, little reason to expect judicial relief from the delegation 
problems that haunt the Forest Service. Though the trend may swing towards a
Richard L. Stroup and John Baden, Externality, Property Rights and the Management o f  Our National 
Forests, J.L. & ECON. (1974).
357 Thomas R. Bourland and Richard L. Stroup, Rent Payments as Incentives, J. Fo r e s t r y  18 (1996); 
Richard L. Stroup and John Baden, Endowment Areas: A Clearing in the Policy Wilderness, 2 C a to  J . 3 
(1982).
358 Both Dr. David Jackson, Professor o f  Forest Policy and Economics at the University o f  Montana, and 
Dr. Richard Stoup, Professor o f  Economics at Montana State University have advanced theories o f  
management that would establish systems o f this nature.
359 Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc., supra note 10.
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revitalized nondelegation doctrine in the future, the Forest Service should not expect to 
be the beneficiary of such an occurrence. Only a Congressional modification of the role 
the courts have come to play in charting national forest management can offer a solution 
to the litigation that has thrust the judiciary into the role as federal land manager.
Administrative Solutions 
Any administrative solution, considering the relationship between the Congress 
and the agency, must be premised upon one thing: the Forest Service must accept the 
realization that delegation and its accompanying authority are not in the best interests of 
the agency in the current political and social climate. Given that acceptance, the agency 
needs to aggressively consult with Congress on how best to define its mission, how to 
reduce the effects of current delegation, and refrain from supporting any legislation that 
would tend to preserve the agency’s professional discretion. The GAO similarly noted 
that:
While the agency continues to reduce its emphasis on consumption and 
increase its emphasis on conservation, the Congress has never explicitly 
accepted this shift in emphasis or acknowledged its effects on the 
availability of other uses on national forests. If the Forest Service is to be 
held accountable for its performance,[and I would add for Congress to be 
held accountable] the agency will need to consult with the Congress on its 
strategic long-term goals, as the Government Performance and Results Act 
requires. This process may entail identifying legislative changes that are 
needed to clarify or modify the Congress’ intent or expectations.360
As discussed earlier in this paper, the notion of professional discretion and
scientific management have been seriously compromised. The agency cannot continue to
360 F o r e s t  S e r v ic e  D e c is io n -M a k in g :  A F r a m e w o r k  f o r  Im p ro v in g  P e r f o r m a n c e  GAO/RCED-97- 
91, p. 7 (1997).
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rely upon these concepts to defend its action. It must instead seek specific direction and 
ratification of its actions from the Congress. This is, unfortunately, not an easy pill to 
swallow, particularly for foresters with training and experience in their field, and a 
certain pride in their abilities to manage the national forests. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains in this context that discretion is synonymous with conflict and litigation. With 
no clear mission and boundless discretion, no USFS bureaucrat is able to function 
effectively or efficiently.
Historically, the agency has supported legislation and administrative regulations 
that have ensured its discretion would remain unencumbered to the greatest extent 
possible. There needs to be a fundamental rethinking of how that discretion has 
ironically come to cripple the agency. The Forest Service needs to propose new 
legislation designed to bring the delegation issue to the fore and make the public aware of 
the source of the agency difficulties. Perhaps then the equation can be altered for the 
legislators, and the “fault lines of legislator’s political advantage” can be shifted for both 
the agency and the public’s benefit. As Professor Leshy stated it: “Congress is more 
directly accountable and better able to resolve the tension between local and national 
interests, than unelected officials in the executive branch.”361
To articulate the problems that have come to plague the agency, and to suggest 
thoughtful, nonpartisan solutions, the formation of a second Public Land Law Review 
Commission (PLLRC) is warranted. It has been nearly 30 years since the Congress was 
the beneficiary of the last PLLRC findings, and a review of the tremendous changes in
361 Multiple Use and Sustained Yield: Changing Philosophies for Federal Land Management? 102*1 Cong., 
2nd Sess. 117 (1992) (Testimony o f  John Leshy).
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the very nature of forest management in the last three decades is overdue. Unlike the 2nd 
Committee o f Scientists ( a creation of the executive branch), whose suggestions have 
been by and large adopted by the Forest Service and made law by administrative rule, the 
PLLRC’s assessment is made directly to the Congress, and whose findings are made law 
only by an explicit act of Congress, a far preferable means of national forest 
management.
Criticisms leveled at the original PLLRC have either been obviated by the passage
of time, or can be adequately addressed in the second report.362 Most importantly
however, is the notion that Dana and Fairfax identify, that a new report must be both
timely and probative:
The commission's discussions o f disposition and commodity 
utilization were sorely out of tune with the times. Its bland 
generalizations about environmental quality were a thin veneer over 
recommendations that were unacceptable to the Congress, which 
Aspinwall insisted should impose clear direction on public land 
management.363
A coupling o f the experience and consideration of the original PLLRC, the criticisms of
that early study of management, and an understanding of the current situation should
provide the guidance and context for the next undertaking. Provided delegation is
recognized as a pitfall, a new PLLRC could develop strategies to mitigate its effects, and
bring the problem to the fore in a manner which the Congress might not so easily ignore.
Many readers familiar with Norton Long’s eloquent, but despondent writing:
There is no more forlorn spectacle in the administrative world than 
an agency and a program possessed o f statutory life, armed with
362 S a m u e l  T . D a n a  a n d  S a l l y  K . F a i r f a x ,  F o r e s t  a n d  R a n g e  P o l i c y  232-235 (1980) and  H a m i l to n  
K . P y le s ,  e d .  ,W h a t ’s  A h e a d  f o r  O u r  P u b l i c  L a n d s  ( 1970)
363 Id. at 235.
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executive orders, sustained in the courts, yet stricken with paralysis 
and deprived of power. An object of contempt to its enemies and of 
despair to its friends364
can no doubt see the image of the Forest Service within those words. Without a dramatic 
shift in the manner in which the agency and forests are empowered, Professor Nelson’s 
prediction of demise may all too well be true. 365 The public must consciously assess 
whether the Forest Service continues to serve a useful or necessary component in federal 
natural resource management. If indeed it does, the Congress must be prompted to take 
steps to correct the situation in which the agency has found itself. If the agency no longer 
seems useful or necessary,, then perhaps equally radical steps are warranted to replace an 
outmoded institution. Surely that is preferable to Long’s purgatory.
364 Norton Long, Power and Administration, PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. (1949).
365 Supra, note 2.
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